​(I read this quickly and went over the details. Much of the info here is not accurate. He states that the US and Russia have only 2,000 nukes each. This is 100% false, they have over 7,000 each. He brings out some good points about being able to survive a nuclear war, but fails to mention those that are vaporized, they don't survive, obviously. Disease, crime, famine and starvation is also not mentioned much either. The basic premise that the US and NATO changed their war doctrines regarding Russia is the main issue here and gives the details in a video. I recommend learning about these facts.)

George

http://beforeitsnews.com/war-and-conflict/2018/05/putin-final-warning-to-us-nato-before-ww3-videos-2469908.html?currentSplittedPage=2

n 1949 the Soviet Union exploded its first nuclear weapon. The emerging nuclear arsenal of the USSR raised an overriding new requirement for U.S. doctrine. Although the JCS continued to plan for an attack against Soviet cities, destroying enemy nuclear weapons became the priority for American nuclear forces and remains so to this day. At the same time, U.S. leaders seriously debated whether to wage a preventive war in order to destroy Soviet nuclear forces before they could be used. In 1950, President Truman rejected preventive war as inconsistent with American values.

During the Kennedy administration, the Secretary of Defense McNamara developed plans that limited the U.S. nuclear attacks to only one or two of the three traditional categories of targets: nuclear forces, other military, and urban-industrial. Under the revised declaratory doctrine, known as the “no cities” or “city hostage” doctrine, U.S. forces would first, in the event of Soviet aggression, strike military targets (categories one and two) and simultaneously threaten next to hit cities (category three targets), in order to deter Moscow from retaliating against American population centers. The “no-cities” doctrine represented a shift away from massive retaliation and towards a more calibrated response to Soviet aggression. Indeed, this increased targeting flexibility was adopted by NATO in 1967 when it formally approved the declaratory doctrine of flexible response. Under this declaratory doctrine, which remains in force today,

During the early 1960s, deterrence was discussed in countervalue terms. For example, Jerome Wiesner, science adviser to President John F. Kennedy and President Lyndon B. Johnson, testified before Congress that the U.S. could establish deterrence based on a threat to destroy six of the 10 largest Soviet cities. However, by the mid-1980s, U.S. officials began to publicly explain that the U.S. did not target civilian populations and instead targeted Soviet military assets, including nuclear forces.