http://www.difesaonline.it/mondo-militare/f-35-nuova-relazione-riscontrate-276-carenze-il-velivolo-non-%C3%A8-assolutamente-pronto

(Franco Iacch)
13/01/17

The F-35 are found 276 deficiencies in combat performance. It is what has been learned since the last report, published a few days ago, signed by Michael Gilmore, director of operational test and responsible for evaluation of weapons systems for the Department of Defense.

The report also highlighted the progress, as in the resolution of problems regarding the ejection seat, but Gilmore outlines a bleak picture in view of mass production and the Initial Operational Capacity for the Air Force.

"Despite the latest implementations, they were identified 276 deficiencies in fighting performance. The new software will solve 3FR6 less than half of the deficiencies ".

The Block 3FR6 is the most recent among the released software to perform the tests. The report notes that "there were significant deficiencies well documented resulting in ineffective overall operational performance. Hundreds of deficiencies will not be adequately addressed with corrections and adjustments occurred with flight tests within the system development and demonstration ".

"Despite the conclusion of the current phase of development and demonstration is set to 2017, there is enough time to correct these fundamental weaknesses, nor the time to verify the fixes in test flights".

Gilmore is concerned that due to the delays experienced by the program, corrections could be made only in laboratories and untested in real flights. This - says Gilmore - is a huge security problem because the laboratories have proven not to represent in a real context of the aircraft stability problems.

Among the 276 deficiencies, Gilmore pays particular attention to the 25 mm cannon and the Alis diagnostic software.

"While the ground tests have been completed for all F-35 version, only the variant A has completed the initial phase of the test. The latter have revealed display problems for the rider due to integration with the helmet sensors. There is a high probability of discovering further deficiencies in the next test with the other versions of the main system, causing further delays ".

ALIS, or Autonomic Logistics Information System, continues to worry about the and operational test director responsible for the evaluation of weapons systems for the Department of Defense. ALIS is the nerve center of the F-35 system allows pilots as well as the strength to support the ground to take proactive steps to ensure the efficiency of the fighter in any theater of operations. Since its development, ALIS the backbone of the F-35 fleet has been defined. It is basically a hub used to plan missions, track the status of the aircraft, to order spare parts. Unlike all the other planes, ALIS daily manages these operations in a single hub in the world. All ALIS servers connect through military land networks or satellite. Obviously does not use internet. There is only one global server called Autonomic Logistics Operating Unit (ALOU). Each nation will have its own server, called Central Point of Entry (CPE). In turn, the squadrons using locally a server called Standard Operating Unit (SOU).

ALIS works this way: the F-35 a country X connects to SOU you to CPE interface. The latter stores the data and sends the information all'Autonomic Logistics Operating Unit. It is essential, therefore, optimal connection. Each aircraft can lose the connection with their own national servers for up to 30 days. After this deadline, the fighter must be grounded. Once the connection is established, the SOU loads the data in the CPE. Exist then how many servers will be countries that will purchase the F-35, but only one main hub in the world. ALIS was never designed with a back-up system. The fears are born then (in addition to the current system instability) for particular contexts in which you may experience loss of energy. This could limit the operations of the fleet to 30 days since the last connection.

Though designed exclusively primary form, ALIS should provide more redundancy to the infrastructure (in some years). However, in the event that ALIS should be offline, the F-35 can fly for no more than 30 days. ALIS does not limit flight operations, but does not communicate to the teams on the ground the real state of the aircraft. If offline, the teams on the ground should not do anything but physically proceeding, managing the entire supply chain of the hunt, as well as the configuration, error diagnostics, mission planning and debriefing. To ALIS are continuously developed

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IZAKOVIC