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More than three decades after pledging to “reform and open up,” there are few signs the Chinese Communist Party intends to change its authoritarian posture. Under the leadership of President Xi Jinping, who will remain in power until 2022 and possibly beyond, the outlook for fundamental human rights, including freedoms of expression, assembly, association and religion, remains dire.
such developments pale in comparison to the government’s systematic efforts to silence independent civil society voices, its passage of abusive new laws, and a highly politicized anti-corruption campaign that is further undermining an already weak judicial system.
Over 16 human rights lawyers and activists—detained after a nationwide sweep of rights advocates in July 2015—were the clearest victims of the authorities’ hostility towards independent civil society. Most were held in secret and not allowed to communicate with their families or lawyers of their choosing. Families, lawyers, and supporters who inquired about the cases or sought the detainees’ release also became targets of the authorities’ wrath.
The secrecy surrounding these detentions stood in stark contrast to the aggressive state media campaign to smear the detainees, many of them well-known for their years of activism. The publicity, which departed from the quieter treatments of past political trials such as that of Liu Xiaobo’s in 2009, appears designed to punish the activists and advance President Xi’s campaign to depict independent civil society as a national security threat.
Chinese authorities’ enforced disappearance of critics from Hong Kong and other countries in 2016 garnered headlines globally. Beijing’s decision to interfere in a politically charged court case in Hong Kong in November undermined judicial independence and the territory’s autonomy. In the ethnic minority regions of Xinjiang and Tibet, Beijing continued its highly repressive rule, curtailing political activity and many peaceful expressions of ethnic and religious identity.
Authorities also moved to further limit freedom of expression. In November, the government passed a Cybersecurity Law, which will strangle online freedom and anonymity, and further clamped down on media outlets for reporting that departs from the party line. Authorities also issued multiple directives to tighten control over the internet, which has long been a beacon of hope as a relatively free public space, despite online censorship and surveillance.
The Chinese government continues to lead the world in the number of people executed, with 46 crimes eligible for the death penalty.
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Authorities increasingly use vague public order charges against activists, including “creating disturbances” and “disturbing social order,” in addition to serious political charges such as “subversion.” In a disturbing trend, charges of “subversion”—which previously had been reserved for those who voiced opposition to the Chinese Communist Party—are now being extended to lawyers and activists who do not directly challenge the party, as in the case against the Beijing Fengrui Law Firm.
In January, rights activist Zhang Haitao was sentenced to 19 years in prison for “inciting subversion of state power” and “probing and illegally supplying intelligence abroad.” In June, democracy activists Lu Gengsong and Chen Shuqing were slapped with over 10 years in prison for “subversion.”
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In June, the Cyberspace Administration issued new rules requiring app providers to keep user logs for 60 days to reduce the spread of “illegal information.” It also ordered news websites to “clean up” comment sections to purge views prohibited by the government. SAPPRFT also issued new rules requiring game developers to submit their work for government pre-approval.
In July, authorities sacked two of Tencent’s editors after the website ran a headline with an error seen as insulting to President Xi. That month the Beijing Cyberspace Administration shut down seven web-based news channels of Sohu, Sina, Netease, and Ifeng. In July, the CCP United Front Work Department established Bureau Number 8 to enlist the support of influential individuals in new media for the Party. In the same month, Beijing authorities sacked or demoted the editors of Yanhuang Chunqiu, a moderate history magazine with the backing of relatively liberal Party elders, leading to its closure.
Between October and December 2015, five staff members of the Causeway Bay Bookstore, which publishes and sells books in Hong Kong about mainland politics, went missing. One, Swedish national Gui Minhai, was disappeared from Thailand. Another British national, Lee Po, was disappeared from Hong Kong, though his travel documents had remained at home. In March, four of five disappeared booksellers reappeared in China, confessed on television to smuggling banned books, and were released. Swedish national Gui Minhai remains detained incommunicado in an unknown location. In June, Lam Wing-kee, one of the four who was released, broke with his captors’ orders and told media about his detention in the mainland. The central Chinese government has yet to explain whether, and under what circumstances, mainland security forces are operating in the territory, and Hong Kong authorities have failed to press for such information.
In July, a Shenzhen court convicted Wang Jianmin and Guo Zhongxiao, who published and sold Chinese political magazines in Hong Kong but reside in the mainland, to prison sentences of five and two years for “running an illegal business.” Their lawyer had contended that the duo did not break Chinese law as the magazines were sold in Hong Kong.
Tibet
Tibetans continue to face routine denial of basic freedoms of speech, assembly, and movement. In 2016 authorities prioritized rights-abusing “anti-splittism” and “stability maintenance” campaigns despite the absence of tangible threats, and forbade almost all residents of the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) from foreign travel.
In August, Wu Yingjie, an ethnic Chinese Communist Party cadre, was appointed to succeed Chen Quanguo as TAR party secretary and is expected to continue Chen’s policies of heavy-handed governance and social control. The 13th Five Year Plan began in 2016, and the TAR set ambitious goals for massive infrastructure construction and urban development; Tibetan areas of Qinghai and Sichuan provinces are also slated for greater resource extraction. Many reported public protests were against rural land grabs, including one in Gansu which security forces suppressed in May.
Continuing restrictions on religious freedom include a program of demolitions and evictions at Larung Gar monastic complex in Serta county, Sichuan, which will see the world’s largest Tibetan Buddhist community shrink from its 2016 population of at least 10,000 to no more than 5,000 by September 2017. The Tibetan writers Shokjang and Lomik were given three and seven-and-a-half year sentences, respectively, and Lu Konchok Gyatso and Tashi Wangchuk remained in custody at time of writing, one for planning to publish a book and the other for speaking to the New York Times about the loss of Tibetan language teaching.
At time of writing, two more Tibetans had self-immolated in 2016, both in Sichuan. At least four Tibetans were believed to have died in custody, including Kandze nun Yeshe Lhakdron, who has not been seen since her arrest in 2008.
Freedom of Religion
The government restricts religious practice to five officially recognized religions and only in officially approved religious premises. The government retains control over religious personnel appointments, publications, finances, and seminary applications. The government classifies many religious groups outside of its control as “evil cults.” Falun Gong, a meditation-focused spiritual group banned since July 1999, continues to suffer state persecution.
Zhejiang authorities released some of the individuals it took into custody in 2015 for resisting its campaign to remove crosses from churches in the province, known as China’s “heartland of Christianity.” In February, Zhejiang state television aired a coerced confession of human rights lawyer Zhang Kai, who had been detained incommunicado for providing legal advice to Christians affected by the cross removals. Zhang was released in March. But in Jinhua City, pastors Bao Guohua and Xing Wenxiang were sentenced to 14 and 12 years, respectively, in a case widely seen as retaliation for their opposition to the anti-cross campaign.
In April, President Xi gave a major speech on religion, during which he warned against “overseas infiltrations through religious means,” and called on religions to “Sinicize” or “adopt Chinese characteristics.”
In August, a Tianjin court sentenced Hu Shigen, a veteran activist and a Christian, to seven-and-a-half years in prison. Hu’s crimes, according to the prosecution, included “using illegal religious activities as a platform” to “spread subversive thoughts.”
In September, the Chinese government released draft revisions to its abusive 2005 Religious Regulations; these require that religion “protect national security” and prohibit individuals and groups not approved as religious bodies from attending meetings abroad on religion.
Guizhou authorities have held Pastor Li Guozhi of the Living Stones Church since December 2015, when the authorities closed down the 500-member house church and declared it “illegal.”