ATTENTION ALL UNDERCOVER UNITED STATES AGENTS OPERATING IN MEXICO.

THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION MAY SAVE YOUR LIFE

IF THE FOLLOWING STRATFOR ALERT IS ACCURATE... AND MOST OF THEIR WORK IS... THEN WE COULD SEE MANY UNDERCOVER UNITED STATES AGENTS EXPOSED BY THEIR COUNTERPARTS OR OTHERS IN THE MEXICAN GOVERNMENT.

IF YOU ARE AN UNDERCOVER UNITED STATES NARCOTICS AGENT, I WOULD READ THE FOLLOWING POST VERY CAREFULLY AND THEN DECIDE FOR YOURSELF IF YOU WANT TO END UP LIKE ENRIQUE "KIKI" CAMARENA.

One of Kiki's friends made the following statement re Kiki: "I'll never understand why he tried to take on the Mexican traffickers alone. He, better than anyone else, understood the Mexican mentality about such matter and had to know he couldn't win. He was killed."

If you are an undercover U.S. drug agent, No matter what agency you are in...

You KNOW how Kiki was killed. Just ask yourself? Is this the way you want to die?

It doesn't matter if you are one of the NWO puppet players or if you are an innocent patriotic American who has ignorantly gotten caught up in this. THE DRUG TRAFFICKERS IN YOUR AGENCY WILL SACRIFICE YOU TO KEEP THEIR HANDS IN THE DRUG MONEY BAG!

Subj: Mexico/United States Date: 11/18/1999 8:50:09 PM Pacific Standard Time From: alert@stratfor.com (alert@stratfor.com) To: redalert@stratfor.com

STRATFOR.COM's Global Intelligence Update - November 17, 1999

By The Internet's Most Intelligent Source of International News & Analysis http://www.stratfor.com/ _________________________________________

WHAT'S GOING ON IN YOUR WORLD?

Japan Plays Games With the Yen

Update: Yeltsin Storms out of OSCE Summit

Iran and Pakistan Ally Against the Taliban

FIND OUT AT http://www.stratfor.com/ __________________________________________

COMING THIS WEEKEND

Yeltsin storms out of the OSCE summit, signaling a foreign policy shift.

Nigerian President Obasanjo backs off hardline stance toward military.

__________________________________________

STRATFOR.COM Global Intelligence Update November 18, 1999

Mexico Rebuffs Future U.S. Drug War Support

Summary:

Mexico is suddenly signaling that its military may end counter narcotics cooperation with the U.S. military. While on the surface this move stems from growing Mexican mistrust toward the United States, the break in counter drug military-to-military relations could be an effort to conceal high-level corruption on the part of Mexican military officials. It also connotes widespread dissatisfaction with the U.S. war on drugs. But regardless of the reasons, the move is a threat to U.S. counter-drug efforts throughout Latin America.

Analysis:

Senior Mexican and U.S. officials from a joint counter narcotics taskforce, the High-Level Contact Group (HLCG), met in Washington D.C. Nov. 10. There, the Mexican Foreign Minister Rosario Green and White House drug czar Barry McCaffrey praised each country for its cooperative effort to curtail drug trafficking from Mexico. U.S. officials applauded Mexico on its counter narcotics program and recent record seizures of marijuana and heroin.

But at a press conference later that day, Green reiterated that Mexico would forego future U.S. military donations, saying Mexico "will be able to rely on our own resources," reported the Dallas Morning News, one of few U.S. newspapers to cover the event. Mexico's move to end counter narcotics cooperation, on the surface, defies economic, political and military reason. Why would a country plagued by drugs and corruption give up future U.S. military resources to help fight the drug war?

Ostensibly, at least, Mexico says it is capable of fighting its war alone. A letter from the Mexican Secretariat of Foreign Relations (SRE) to the Mexican Senate Nov. 1 explained that Mexican armed forces, trained in the United States, had strengthened Mexico's anti-narcotics capabilities, ending the need for equipment and logistics transfers with the United States.

Mexico has received important U.S. help for its interdiction efforts in recent years. Since the United States began counter surveillance in 1990, U.S. P-3 aircraft have been authorized to monitor narco-trafficking aircraft over Mexican airspace. Mexican pilots have received radar training, and Mexico purchased its own Citation aircraft to support interdiction.

Both governments have cooperated in tactical and maritime information sharing and have coordinated communication capabilities. The Mexican navy and the U.S. Coast Guard began direct communications in June 1997 for counter drug coordination. About 100 Mexican special forces troops were trained in small-unit tactics at Fort Bragg in North Carolina. A number of pilots were given helicopter training at Fort Rucker in Alabama. This training and information sharing has apparently given Mexico the capacity to coordinate its own military counter drug efforts.

In addition to being confident that U.S. military support is less necessary, Mexican officials have expressed their dissatisfaction with the quality of U.S. military hardware received, in particular helicopters. In September, Mexico returned 72 problematic Vietnam War-era UH-1H helicopters donated in 1996 by the United States. Most of the helicopters had been inoperable since 1998.

Another factor in the decision to return the choppers may have been U.S. restrictions placed on their use. The donated helicopters came with stipulations requiring they only be used for counter narcotics efforts and not be used by the military in anti-guerrilla campaigns in troubled states like Chiapas or Guerrero.

Mexico's recent dissatisfaction over faulty military equipment only touches the surface of a deeper skepticism directed toward the United States. Mexican and U.S. officials have harbored mistrust toward one another since the beginning of the latest round of counter narcotics cooperation. The United States has spurned the Mexican government, on its own soil, in the past. Operation Casablanca in 1998, which netted U.S. arrests of at least 24 Mexican bankers, infuriated Mexican officials who did not know U.S. undercover agents were present in their country.

The United States also harbors doubts over Mexico's commitment to combating drug trafficking. The Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) remains wary of corrupt Mexican officials and federal police. In September 1999 congressional testimony, Richard Fiano, DEA chief of operations, disclosed that "continuing reports of corruption and the rapidly growing power and influence of the major organized criminal groups in Mexico cause us great concern about the long- term prospects for success."

Distrust is not the only factor in the rift between Mexico and the United States. Even when Mexico upholds its end of the bargain, and fulfills its obligation in meeting criteria for the U.S. drug certification process, it is not rewarded. In fact, the opposite has been true. Congress has harshly criticized Mexico for alleged failures in truly countering the flow of drugs across the U.S.- Mexico border. In the end, the United States continues to maintain the upper hand in the so-called bilateral approach to drug interdiction. While Mexico should be benefiting from cooperation arrangement with the United States, it doesn't.

In addition, U.S. aid is not as forthcoming as promised. U.S. Marine Gen. Charles Wilhelm told a Senate Armed Services subcommittee in April 1999 that "the continuing erosion of the intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance assets available to SouthCom is compromising our ability to concentrate limited resources."

Mexico's motivation for turning down further U.S. support may mean that officials in Mexico City are trying to conceal high-level military corruption. Recently, the Mexican military has been tainted by the very corruption it was supposedly fighting. The New York Times reported a classified DEA report in 1998 on the arrest of Mexican military Gen. Jesus Gutierrez Rebollo revealing wider ties between Mexican army officers, including those central to U.S. drug enforcement efforts in Mexico, and Mexican drug lords. Whatever the reasons for Mexico's decision to decline U.S. military assistance, they must be compelling enough for it to cut off its counter narcotic military link with the United States.

If Mexico wants more aid and less criticism from the United States, it has now positioned itself to make this demand. For the most part, the United States has three strategic interests in maintaining good relations with its southern neighbor: immigration, trade and drugs. Mexico's move, whatever its motives, has the potential to knock the third pillar, drugs, out from under U.S.- Mexico relations. Mexico threatens that valued lifeline in U.S.- Mexico relations, which places pressure on a Clinton administration that has been severely criticized for its ineffectiveness in the war on drugs.

The Mexicans have seen the how the Colombians have suffered in their counter narcotics relationship with the United States. U.S. promises of increased funding for drug interdiction have not been forthcoming. The United States has resorted to diplomatic missions by Defense Secretary William Cohen to Latin American nations to forge better ties. Cohen just visited Argentina, Chile and Brazil as part of an effort to gain support for the fight against drug trafficking. During the trip, on Nov. 16, he offered to cooperate with Chile and to supply it with military aircraft. But the United States' Latin American allies are having difficulty accepting U.S. aid promises at face value. Mexico's move may influence these allies to reject lopsided U.S. policies and become more self- reliant in their war against narcotics trafficking.

In the war on drugs, U.S. requirements for other countries have unilaterally favored the United States. If other countries do not cooperate with U.S. counter narcotics efforts, they may not receive drug certification and face the risk of economic sanctions. Fed up with the "my game, my rules" mentality of the United States, Mexico's move may be the first attempt by a Latin American country to gain control over its narcotics trafficking problems. This may be the beginning of the end of the military component of the drug war in Latin America.

(c) 1999, Stratfor, Inc. http://www.stratfor.com/