STRICTLY PRIVATE & CONFIDENTIAL

12 MARCH 2011

NWO-Khazars-Rothschild-CIA may be involved in another massive crime against the People of the Sovereign Nation of JAPAN:

If it can be proven beyond reasonable doubt, that the 8.9 Earthquake in the Honshu JAPAN on 11 March 2011, which resulted in a devastating TSUNAMI, was indeed triggered by the detonation of a Bomb or Nuclear weapon planted by the Evil NWO-Khazar-Rothschild-CIA operatives beneath the Major Earthquake Fault-lines in JAPAN.

EVENT ANALYSIS:

- **The Epicenter of the massive 8.9 Honshu-Japan Earthquake is located relatively near the following US Military Bases in Japan:**

i. **Yokusuka US Military Naval Base;**
ii. **Fussa US Airforce Base; and**
iii. **Misawa US Airbase**

Please see ITEMs-2 & 4 below: MAP of the US Military Bases in JAPAN & Yokusaka US Naval Facility.

Kindly see ANNEX-2 & 3 below: United States Armed Forces in JAPAN & US Military Bases in JAPAN.

- **Substantial number of Japanese local and national Politicians supported by the people, wanted the US Military Bases in Okinawa and other Japanese territories to be moved out of JAPAN and transferred to US Territory in Hawaii and Guam.**

Please see ANNEX-1 below: Japanese Bureaucrats Hide Decision to Move All US Marines out of Okinawa to Guam [Japanese original text at Tanaka News.

- **The massive 8.9 Honshu-JAPAN Earthquake may be triggered intentionally by the NWO-KHAZAR-CIA, in response to Japanese Politician's intention to move out the US Military bases out of Japan, similar to the Massive Mount Pinatubo Volcanic Eruption and Earthquake in the entire Luzon in the Philippines in 1991, during the Senate and Congress proceedings not to renew the US Military bases and move them out of the Philippines.**

*Please see **ANNEX-5** below: Mount Pinatubo Volcanic Eruption during the Senate & Congress proceedings not to renew the US Military Bases in Subic and Clark*

- **Why is a massive Whirlpool is being created in off the coast of Honshu right after the 8.9 Earthquake? This Whirlpool may support the possibility of said Earthquake being triggered by detonation of Bomb or Nuclear Device beneath the Fault-lines in Japan?**

*Please see **Item-1** below: Images and Youtube Video of the Massive Whirlpool created after 8.9 Earthquake.*

- **NWO-Khazar-Rothschild-CIA is possibly waging a silent war against JAPAN and its people and utilize a man-triggered Earthquake, disguised as a natural disaster, in accordance with the PRINCIPLES of WAGING a SURROGATE WAR against humanity to depopulate the World, in accordance to the REPORT FROM THE IRON MUNTAIN.**

*Please see **ANNEX-6** below: Khazar & Rothschild Silent war against the entire Humanity as documented in the "REPORT FROM THE IRON MOUNTAIN"*

THEREFORE: It is highly recommended that: (i) the Honorable Officers of OITC, (ii) their Excellencies, the HIERARCHY, (iv) the INTERPOL & OITC affiliated Intelligence Agencies, and (v) the Senior Government Officers of the Sovereign Nation of JAPAN, to be assisted by the Senior Military & Intelligence officers of the PEOPLES REPUBLIC of CHINA and the RUSSIAN FEDERATION, may consider the following:

- **Investigate, gather evidence, monitor, the activities of the NWO-KHAZAR-CIA, and determine if the 8.9 Earthquake in Japan and the resulting devastating TSUNAMI is indeed being triggered by the detonation of Bomb or Nuclear Device beneath the Fault-lines in Japan?**

- **If the Rothschild bankers, like Goldman Sachs, JP Morgan, Barclays, and UBS and other NWO-Khazar-Rothschild owned hedge funds, initiated the following:**

  i. a massive sell-off of insurance related global stocks and Japanese stocks days or weeks before the 11 March 2011 Japan Earthquake, in order to PROFIT from the negative market impact of such earthquake; in the same way as those Rothschild bankers initiated a massive sell-off of BP PLC Stocks days or weeks before the Massive Oil Spill in the GULF of MEXICO;

  ii. will initiate a massive stock buying of Japanese companies, or insurance companies globally right after the these stocks are expected to bottom-out in

the next few weeks or months (possibly in March-June 2011) after the 8.9 Japan Earthquake; in the same way they did bought BP PLC stocks after the stock price of BP PLC bottomed out; and

iii. created options or derivatives instruments linked to the expected drop of stock prices of the: (a) global Insurance Companies, (b) Japanese insurance companies, (c) Japanese Companies, and (d) depreciation of Japanese Yen; in the major global Stock Exchanges such as EURONEXT, NASDAQ, NYSE, SGX, to profit from the negative market impact due to the massive Insurance pay-out and/or Reconstruction cost; in the same manner that those Rothschild bankers created derivatives products to profit from a drop of BP PLC Stocks after the Massive Oil Spill in the GULF of MEXICO;

iv. closely monitor the NWO-Khazar-Rothschild bankers activities to possibly buy the Japanese companies to become minority if not majority stockholders, in order to exercise control of Japanese companies, when the stock prices of these companies will bottom-out.

WHY is there a Giant WHIRLPOOL created after the massive 8.9 Earthquake in JAPAN?



Giant Whirlpool swirls near a port in Oarai, Ibaraki Prefecture (state) after Japan was struck by a strong earthquake off its northeastern coast Friday, March 11, 2011.

YouTube http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OPjZWpcOJaw

YouTube http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sU8zyscGWe4

1. MAP of Strategic US Military Bases in JAPAN



YouTube http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UdJe2joUJGo

YouTube http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Hjptje-abzs

2. MAP of IBARAKI Perfecture in JAPAN

3. Yokosuka is America's most important naval facility in the Western Pacific

Yokosuka, Japan
35°17'N 139°40'E

SOURCE: http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/facility/yokosuka.htm

Yokosuka is America's most important naval facility in the Western Pacific, and the largest, most strategically important overseas US Naval installation in the world. The centerpiece of the Pacific Fleet forward presence mission is the Forward-Deployed Naval Forces (FDNF) in Japan. The 17 ships in Japan make up the KITTY HAWK aircraft carrier battle group in Yokosuka and the BELLEAU WOOD amphibious ready group in Sasebo. Having ships in this strategic location gives a great deal of capability for the dollar because the Japanese government funds over 70% of total US military support expenses as host nation support, which totaled approximately $5 Billion in 1998. FDNF is also a force multiplier that gives us significant leverage in these asset-limited times. It would take three to five times as many ships from mainland US bases to provide the same presence and crisis response capability as from the FDNF. Although FDNF ships normally combine with rotational deployers from Hawaii and the west coast to engage Western and Southern Pacific countries, their strategic positioning makes them fully capable of providing initial and substantial response to other theaters.

Yokosuka has 18 ship berths, five tugboats, and numerous anchorages, as well as the only degaussing range in the western pacific, which is used jointly with the JMSDF. Piedmont Pier is where Yokosuka's forward deployed aircraft carrier is usually berthed. While the pier was being renovated, the carrier was berthed at Sherman Pier.

Fleet Activities, Yokosuka boasts the largest and best of everything the Navy has to offer, with 23,000 military and civilian personnel. COMFLEACT Yokosuka comprises 568 acres and is located at the entrance of Tokyo Bay, 43 miles south of Tokyo and approximately 18 miles south of Yokohama on the Miura peninsula in the Kanto Plain region of the Pacific Coast in Central Honshu, Japan. The 55 tenant commands which make up this impressive installation support WESTPAC operating forces, including principle afloat elements of the United States SEVENTH Fleet and COMDESRON 15, including the only permanently forward deployed aircraft carrier, USS KITTY HAWK (CV 63).

The new Fleet Activities Center was constructed as part of the Japanese facilities improvement program, under which the Japanese government provides support for the maintenance of U.S. forces to assist in the defense of Japan. Just past the new Fleet Activities Center is the Fleet Gym, a converted warehouse which has been in continuous use since the 1940's which will be replaced once the Fleet Activities Center is completed this year. The new Fleet Activities Center boasts a wide variety of services, including a mini-mart, barber shop, full service gymnasium, Fleet Lounge, roller skating rink, overseas telephone service center, internet Surf shop Cyber-cafe, and more.

With the onset of hostilities in Korea on June 25, 1950, Yokosuka Navy Base suddenly became very important and extremely busy. The US , although still an occupying power in Japan, turned its full efforts to the support of South Korea. The Navy Dispensary was enlarged and expanded and was commissioned a US Naval Hospital in 1950. The Naval Communications Facility, Yokosuka, was commissioned in January, 1951. In April 1951, the Ship Repair Department became a component command. It was redesignated the Ship Repair Facility. As the major naval ship repair facility in the Far East, the Yokosuka Facility assumed a vital role in maintenance and repair of the US Seventh Fleet during the Korean and Vietnam conflicts. In March, 1952, the geographical boundaries of the command of Commander Naval Forces Far East changed to exclude the Philippines, Marianas, Bonin and Volcano Islands. In December, 1952, the Headquarters were shifted from Tokyo to Yokosuka. The expanded Supply Department of Fleet Activities became the Naval Supply Depot, Yokosuka in August, 1952 and in 1960, the Naval Communications Facility was redesignated US Naval Communications Station, Japan.

Under BRAC 95 Guidance, Naval Pacific Meteorology and Oceanography Facility disestablished in April 1999. Functions associated with the Joint Typhoon Warning Center shifted to Pearl Harbor, Hawaii in January 1999. Functions associated with the Naval Pacific Meteorology and Oceanography Center West gradually shifted to Yokosuka, Japan between October 1998 and April 1999.

The U.S. Naval Ship Repair Facility is the largest naval ship repair facility in the western pacific. SRF can handle any ship in the U.S. Navy up to and including conventional aircraft carriers, for almost every type of ship repair. The facility's tradition and "roots" were firmly implanted in 1865 under the patronage of the Tokugawa Shogunate when the "Yokosuka Iron Works" was established. Since that time the shop and waterfront facilities have been extensively developed and expanded. During World War II this shipyard was one of the largest shipbuilding and repair sites of the Imperial Japanese Navy, employing over 40,000 people and building over 100 combatant ships. The facility was reopened by the U.S. Forces on 28 April 1947 as the "Ship Repair Department", Fleet Activities, Yokosuka, with an Officer-in-Charge and a staff of 75 U.S. Navy personnel and 576 former Japanese Imperial Navy employees. At that time the facility occupied about 72 acres, approximately one-quarter of the former Imperial Japanese Navy Shipyard. On 15 August 1951 the facility was officially designated the "U.S. Naval Ship Repair Facility" by the U.S. Chief of Naval Operations, and a Commanding Officer was assigned. On 29 March 1976, the Commanding Officer established a Sasebo office with a staff of seven Japanese. On 1 March 1984, the U.S. Naval Ship Repair Facility Detachment, Sasebo was officially established by the Chief of Naval Operations led by an Officer-in- Charge. Today the facility employs about 1,800 full-time Japanese Nationals (90 in the Sasebo Detachment), who are assigned throughout the organization, including top management, and 145 U.S. military and civilian members.

With the closing of Subic Naval Base, The Fleet and Industrial Supply Center (FISC) Yokosuka has taken on additional responsibilities and is now the U. S. Navy's largest supply facility in the Western Pacific. FISC Yokosuka is one of the Navy's eight supply centers and is the largest in terms of annual sales. Its mission is to provide supply and support services to fleet units and shore activities according to policies and procedures

prescribed by the Commander, Naval Supply Systems Command. FISC Yokosuka, in conjunction with Defense Distribution Depot Yokosuka (DDYJ), carries nearly 91,000 demand-based line items and 28,000 DLR's in support of 16 ships home ported in Yokosuka and Sasebo, plus shore activities throughout Japan and Korea, and numerous transient vessels. FISC Detachments in Sasebo and Tsurumi comprise the largest (11 million barrels storage) and most active bulk fuel complex in the DOD, and represent over 50 percent of all fuel assets in the Pacific. The support is provided through seven ocean terminals that span 1,200 miles from Hachinohe on Northern Honshu to Sasebo on the southern island of Kyushu. Fuel quality surveillance is provided by the laboratories located at each of the detachments.

Some of the facilities now occupied by FISC are of pre-World War II vintage, having been developed by Japanese Imperial Navy for a myriad of purposes. The largest building on the navy base, building J-39, which currently houses the FISC freight terminal operations, was previously a submarine factory and ship construction facility for the Imperial Navy. FISC Yokosuka facilities include l6 major warehouses, two cold storage facilities, and 125 major fuel tanks. The FISC facilities are located in three geographic areas in Japan: Sasebo, on the southern island of Kyushu, the Kanto Plain near Tokyo, and Hachinohe in northern Honshu. Fuel operations are also housed in these same locatins as well. In addition, FISC also operates the Cargo Terminal at Yokota Air Base.

Yokosuka

Yokosuka Navy Base is located in the middle of the Miura Peninsula in the southeast portion of Kanagawa Prefecture, and faces Tokyo Bay on the east. The city is located 65 km south of Tokyo and 30 km from Yokohama. Yokosuka is the largest, and one of the most strategically important overseas US Naval Installation. The base is composed of more than 27,000 military and civilian personnel.

Yokosuka is ideally located to give assigned personnel the opportunity to study Japan's past or catch a glimpse of her future. Visitors can travel to the nearby port city of Shimoda for the Black Ship Festival to commemorate Commodore Matthew C. Perry's landing in 1853; or, board a train for the 55-mile trip to Tokyo to see the whirls, blinks, whiz bangs and blips of the latest and greatest gizmos to hit the Akihabara Electronics district. At the Yokosuka-Chuo train station, which is

just a short walk from the main gate, you can purchase a ticket north to Tokyo or south to the beaches at the tip of the Miura peninsula. There are a wide variety of recreational options at your fingertips. At the 300,000 square foot Fleet Recreation Center, located within footsteps of the waterfront, you will have access to a huge gym, several racquetball courts, a state-of-the-art weight room, outdoor gear and even an internet caf&#eacute.

One of the issues driving the talks are housing shortages and inadequacies for U.S. personnel assigned in and near Yokosuka. At Yokosuka Naval Base, for example, families seeking on-base housing are placed on waiting lists that stretch for as long as 3 years. Yokosuka is one of the bases in which more housing is being built within the existing base perimeter. Officials say two housing towers scheduled for completion in December should raise the percentage of families living on base from 74 percent to 79 percent, edging closer to a goal of 90 percent.

Yokosuka is an accompanied tour area with concurrent travel of dependents authorized. On- base housing is authorized for accompanied personnel of grades GS-12 and above. The current waiting period is from 27 to 40 months for 3-bedroom housing and 10 to 15 months for 4-bedroom housing. There is a five-year occupancy limit for civilians due to the critical shortage of Navy Family housing in the Yokosuka/Yokohama area. Waiting lists for housing in other areas of Japan vary. Residence in the BOQ is authorized for unaccompanied personnel of grades GS-7 and above. Quarters will be furnished free of charge with the exception of a one- time fee of $50 for housekeeping when you vacate the premises. If Bachelor Quarters are not available, the employee may be authorized a living quarters allowance.

Navy Family Housing at the Yokosuka, Ikego, and Negishi areas total about 2,469 homes and apartments during 1977, They all differ widely in age, construction, and layout. In Yokosuka there are several variants of three and four bedroom concrete town houses usually in groups of four or six. Sizes and floor plans vary. Older units are provided with central steam heat and government furnished window air conditioners for each bedroom plus one for the living room. The newest town houses have central heat and air and vinyl tile floors. All have small fenced yards and limited storage. Many have patio covers for backyard enjoyment. Two domesticated pets (e.g., cats and dogs) are permitted. Presently, there are 10, nine-story towers with 48, two-bedroom apartments for junior enlisted. The four newly constructed nine-story towers consist of 68, three-

bedroom apartments, and house all ranks and grades: Sakura Heights houses officers and civilians, Himawari Heights houses only senior enlisted, and Asagao and Ajisai and Fuji towers house a combination of senior and junior enlisted. All tower apartments are centrally heated/air conditioned houses only senior enlisted, and Asagao and Ajisai towers house a combination of senior and junior enlisted. All tower apartments are centrally heated/air conditioned and are equipped with attractive mini-blinds or pull-down shades in each room . All tower apartments have tile flooring. Each tower has a playground area equipped with modern playground equipment. All towers are pet restricted. No dogs of any size are allowed Up to two oneuted or spayed cats are allowed.

The port of Yokosuka is located on the southeast coast of Honshu, the largest of the four main Japanese islands. The U. S. Navy port is situated adjacent to the central part of the Miura Peninsula on the southwest side of landlocked Tokyo Bay. A separate, commercial port of Yokosuka is located southeast of the U. S. Navy port. Yokosuka is one of three major ports in the area; the ports of Yokohama and Tokyo are also located on Tokyo Bay. The harbor of Yokohama, a large commercial port, is about 10 nmi north of Yokosuka Bay, and Tokyo Harbor is about 20 nmi north-northeast of Yokosuka. Tokyo Bay is relatively large, being about 35 nmi long from north to south and, except for its 4.75 nmi wide southern entrance, is surrounded by land. Over 200 ships transit Uraga Suido, the entrance to Tokyo Bay, daily.

Yokosuka Harbor is entered through Yokosuka Bay in the southwestern part of Tokyo Bay. The harbor is bounded on the east by part of the Miura Peninsula, which is the site of U. S. Fleet Activities (FLEACTS) Yokosuka, and on the west by the island of Azuma Hanto. Azuma Hanto separates Yokosuka Harbor from Nagura Harbor which is a commercial port and is also used by the Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force (JMSDF). Nagura Harbor is entered from the southwestern part of Yokosuka Bay. A small, narrow channel separates Azuma Hanto at its southwestern end from the mainland. The entrance to the harbor is about 440 yd (400 m) wide between the 5-fathom (10 m) curves. Depths in the harbor range from 12 fathoms (22 m) in the harbor entrance to less than 4 fathoms (7 m) at the south end. The harbor can accommodate about 12 to 15 ships of various types at any one time. An average of about 35 to 40 ships enter or leave the port each month.

The Port of Yokosuka is located at the entrance to Tokyo Bay and continues to draw attention as the marine gateway to the Tokyo Metropolitan Area.

Yokosuka is a very densely populated city on the Kanto Plain. The city became a municipal on February 15, 1907, the second city so designated in Kanagawa Prefecture following Yokohama City. The population then totaled 62,876. As of October 1, 1996, the population of Yokosuka City is estimated to be 431,334. The climate is similar to the Washington D.C. and Norfolk, VA areas; however, the spring and fall rainy seasons may be compared to the wet climate of Seattle, Washington. The seasons are well defined and are divided into six distinctive periods, unlike the four seasons we are familiar with in the United States.

Yokosuka is an ever changing and very improving Navy Community located near the cosmopolitan centers of Tokyo and Yokohama, ideally situated to encourage both local and international touring. Yokosuka was also the 1998 winner of the Chief of Naval Operations' Installation Excellence Award given annually to the best base in the Navy.



ANNEX-1: Japanese Bureaucrats Hide Decision to Move All US Marines out of Okinawa to Guam [Japanese original text at Tanaka News (tanakanews.com)]

Tanaka Sakai
Translation by William Steele
Introduction by Gavan McCormack
SOURCE: http://japanfocus.org/-Gavan-McCormack/3250

The Japanese government announced on 15 December 2009 that it was postponing indefinitely any decision on the contentious issue of a "Replacement Facility" for the Futenma Marine base in Okinawa. The decision to make no decision was low-key and at first glance may seem inconsequential. Its symbolic importance, however, is huge, signalling a possible changing of the tide of history in East Asia, above all in the US-Japan relationship.

It meant that the Hatoyama government had withstood the most sustained barrage of US pressure, intimidation, insult, ultimatum, and threat, and decided, at least for the present, to say: "No." Hatoyama was telling the Obama government, in effect, that rather than rubber stamp an agreement made by the former ruling party, he would insist on renegotiating the 2005-6 "Reorganization of US Forces in Japan" and the "Guam Treaty" in which that agreement was incorporated. He was serving notice that the "Client State" relationship so carefully cultivated by the former (George W. Bush) administration and its successive LDP partners would be renegotiated and perhaps dismantled. How, was far from clear. But the US-Japan relationship can never be the same again.

The bottom line of the message was clear, even if it could only be read in the invisible ink of a bland announcement: if the Hayoyama administration prevails, no “Futenma Replacement Facility” will be built for the Marines in the waters off Cape Henoko in Northern Okinawa. A Pentagon dream since 1966, it had come close to realization under bilateral agreements in 1996, 2006, and 2009, only to be stalled each time by one of the most remarkable, non-violent political movements in modern Japanese history. Today this most unequal of struggles has reached a decisive moment.

Months of intense pressure (see "The Battle of Okinawa 2009") had brought the Hatoyama government close to capitulation. The bureaucrats in both the Defense and Foreign Ministries insisted that the national interest was at stake and required submission. Moreover, the Futenma Base was a quid pro quo for US plans to withdraw—at Japanese expense—an estimated 8,000 Marines and their families to Guam. US Ambassador Roos (known to be a close personal friend of President Obama) expostulated, red-faced (according to observers) to the Japanese Defense and Foreign Ministers on 4 December that trust between Obama and Hatoyama might be grievously damaged if agreement to construct the Henoko base was not reached before the end of 2009. In Okinawa the following day, Foreign Minister Okada could only beg his audiences of Democratic Party faithful to understand how important this issue was for the US, and therefore for the alliance and for Japan. All previous LDP-led governments had

submitted just as Okinawa had been forced to submit to American bases for more than six decades, unbroken by the 1972 “reversion” to Japan. The pressure applied to Hatoyama far exceeded that directed to any previous government of Japan, and many assumed that in due course he, too, would submit. He chose otherwise.

The mid-December decision was due to three factors, one long-term, one short-term, and one personal: the first and overwhelming one is the triumph of the non-violent resistance movement of the people of Okinawa itself, sustained since 1996; the second is the outcome of the 30 August Lower House national elections, which swept the Hatoyama DPJ to power nationally and especially in Okinawa gave them and other opponents of base construction a massive endorsement; the third is the strength of resolve by Prime Minister Hatoyama. He insisted throughout the crisis that he would personally make the key decision, and in the end that is what he has done, at least for the time being.

The decision was not solely shaped by US considerations. Japanese domestic politics played a critical role. Had Hatoyama submitted, however, and ordered work to commence on filling in the seas off Oura bay for the construction of a base, he would have faced the likely collapse of his coalition government (since both minor parties had said they would withdraw), the absolute alienation of the Okinawan people from him and his party (and in a sense from the Japanese national project itself), and the need to resort to martial law measures to enforce works whose legitimacy was accepted by virtually nobody in Okinawa. Submission, in other words, might over time not only have undermined the DPJ but might even have more seriously damaged the US-Japan relationship than resistance.

When Foreign Minister Okada visited Okinawa on 5 December, he was shocked to find nobody at all who would support the base construction project. His pleas to understand the American insistence that it proceed and his calls to recognize the importance of the US-Japan “alliance,” simply roused his DPJ audiences to anger. The Okinawan prefectural assembly is more than 90 percent opposed. Even the “conservative” Okinawan Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) League has said that it will switch from support to opposition to the base project if a decision is held off beyond the end of this year (as has now happened). Conservative mayors, including the Mayor of Naha, are increasingly lining up in support of the platform of anti-base meetings, while Futenma Mayor Iha, as Tanaka Sakai shows in the following report, has led the way in unmasking the machinations of Tokyo and Washington on the future of the base. The August election of the Hatoyama

government has given Okinawan people the sense that at last they have a government that might listen to them.

Options for an alternative “Futenma Replacement Facility” to Henoko have been canvassed in recent months and they will now be submitted to a ruling coalition commission for further investigation. They include Guam (discussed below), Kadena, the US Air Force base close to Futenma, the island of Umage, just 8 square kilometres in area and 12 kilometres west of Tanegashima in Kagoshima prefecture, the island of Io (once known as Iwojima) south of Tokyo, and various unused or much underused airports in mainland Japan itself, from Osaka’s Kansai International (offered for consideration by Osaka’s Governor) to the recently built “white elephant” Shizuoka or Ibaraki airports.

Okinawan sentiments are especially aroused today as the lies and deception they have been fed by LDP governments over the past half-century gradually come to light. The Okinawan “return” to Japan in 1972 is now known to have been a purchase, in which Japan paid huge sums to subsidize the US war effort in Vietnam, opening the path to a system of Japanese war subsidies paid to the Pentagon ever since in the guise of “omoiyari” (consideration or sympathy) payments. The Japanese government, contrary to its proud “three non-nuclear policies”, has long given covert permission to US vessels carrying nuclear weapons to pass through Japanese ports and signalled its readiness to allow them into Okinawa in advance of any renewed war in Korea. The details of the “secret nuclear agreements” are now being exposed by former Japanese government officials who were party to the arrangements. Most explosive is the fact that Okinawans continue to learn more details of the readiness of their government over decades to pay almost any price to keep the US forces in Okinawa while sparing mainland Japanese the inconvenience of having numerous GIs in residence. That sense of grievance cannot easily be assuaged.

One major new factor in the Okinawan equation is the revelation, flowing principally from the office of the Okinawan town mayor of Ginowan City (reluctant host to the Futenma Marine Air station), that the Henoko project itself rests on a massive deception. That revelation is the subject of the Tanaka Sakai text that follows.

The Marine Corps documents that Mayor Iha Yōichi analyses call into question the official Japanese government claim that the construction of a Futenma Replacement Facility at Henoko is necessary to accommodate the Marine helicopter force by showing that the 2006 Guam Integrated Military Development Plan is a design to accommodate those helicopter forces plus battle force, artillery

and supply units. If the Futenma Marines are designated under Pentagon plans for relocation to Guam anyway, the Henoko project loses its strategic purpose. And the foundations for Japanese government payments to maintain US forces in Okinawa, still less to pay for their transfer to Guam, are baseless. Even before the Iha revelations, military critics in Japan questioned the rationale behind the Agreement on Reorganization of US Forces in Japan and the Guam Treaty, many viewing them as new forms of coercion and of the secret diplomacy that has long characterized US-Japan dealings on Okinawa. If the Marines are going to Guam anyway, under Pentagon plans, the real design of the Guam Treaty agreements can only be to siphon off further substantial Japanese subsidies to the Pentagon, to provide a foothold for the Marines in an Okinawan resort location, or, perhaps, a fine new facility eventually for Japan's own Self Defense Forces.

The Government of Japan's initial response has been to deny Mayor Iha's claims and the national media has yet to pursue them seriously. They are, however, based on persuasive US documentation and on the evidence of Iha's investigations in Guam. Certainly, they sharply contradict the official rationale for the Henoko base construction and the official understanding of the Guam transfer. Now that the relocation issue has been returned to the drawing board, the newly established coalition body to study and report on the relocation issue has on the table many interesting and potentially explosive questions to examine.

GMcC

15 December 2009

Cape Henoko and Camp Schwab, 2009

After writing an article on Japan-China security arrangements that touched upon Okinawa and the Futenma debacle, I received feedback from readers and became aware that from the end of November 2009 the Mayor of Ginowan City, Iha Yōichi, has been pointing out something that will overturn the commonsense regarding American forces in Japan.

The Marines stationed on Okinawa are pushing forward a plan to move to Guam. In the Japanese mass media and in Diet deliberations it is usually stated that "the relocation from Okinawa to Guam will consist primarily of the Marine command unit," but that "active duty forces including the helicopter unit and ground combat forces will remain."

However, according to the investigations of Mayor Iha and members of the Ginowan City Assembly, American forces have already been implementing a plan to relocate to Guam not only the command unit but also, by 2014, the majority of combat forces and even logistic sections including supply units. Ginowan City Hall, having long dealt with the Futenma Air Station, has developed significant information-gathering skills and powers of analysis.

If the helicopter units and the ground combat units move almost all of their personnel to Guam, there is no longer any need to build a replacement site for

Futenma in Okinawa, be it Henoko in Nago city or for that matter anywhere in Japan. This means that the great fuss over the removal to Henoko that has been festering over the past few years may have been completely unnecessary from the beginning. In 2006 the American military came up with a plan to begin the complete transfer of the Marines from Okinawa to Guam. The Japanese government promised to provide a large sum of money for the removal of American troops to Guam; it can only be assumed, therefore, that the Japanese Foreign Ministry and other Japanese government officials knew of these plans to move to Guam in detail. Nonetheless, they have continued to spout the mantra that "the new base at Henoko is necessary for the helicopter units that will remain on Okinawa after Marineheadquarters moves to Guam."
(宜野湾市「普天間基地のグァム移転の可能性について」)
On November 26 Mayor Iha traveled to Tokyo and explained this to members of the ruling party. On December 9 Iha visited the Foreign Ministry and voiced his contention that all the Marines based at Futenma can be expected to move to Guam. The Foreign Ministry, however, dissented, saying that such information "is counter to our understanding." The meeting ended with the two sides talking past each other. (伊波市長が与党議員に説明した時に配布した資料)
(伊波宜野湾市長 政府にグアム移転を要請)

Of the 8000 troops to be relocated, Marine Headquarters amount to only 3000

One of the grounds for Mayor Iha's assertion that "the United States is sending the majority of Marines stationed on Okinawa to Guam" is derived from the draft of a report issued on November 20 by a U.S. environmental impact survey undertaken in conjunction with the expected relocation of Okinawa-based Marines to Guam (and to the nearby island of Tinian), which states that nearly all of the units of the Okinawa-based Marines will relocate to Guam. The environmental impact would be impossible to evaluate unless one knew which units will relocate. Thus the report gives details of the relocation, which the US military has been reluctant to publicize. (Guam and CNMI Military Relocation Draft EIS/OEIS)

The environmental impact report consists of 8,100 pages in 9 volumes. Volumes 2 and 3 of the report include details of the relocation of the Marine Corps from Okinawa. The Marine helicopter unit, for example, is (according to the draft report) scheduled for relocation, as are ground combat, assault, and supply forces. Listed for relocation from Okinawa to Guam are: 1) the Command Element, III Marine Expeditionary Force (CE, 3046 persons); 2) the Ground Combat Element, 3rd Marine Division Units (GCE, 1100); 3) Air Combat Element,

First Marine Aircraft Wing and subsidiary units (ACE, 1856); 4) and the Logistics Combat Element, 3D Marine Logistics Group (LCE, 2550). The total number of troops in these four Marine Corps units slated to move is 8552, roughly the same as the 8000 number that had been officially announced as the size of the move from Okinawa to Guam. It is thus clearly wrong for the Foreign Ministry and others to maintain that "the 8000 Marines to be relocated to Guam consist primarily of the command unit." The command unit itself consists of some 3046 persons; the remainder are combat and logistical forces. (VOLUME 2: MARINE CORPS - GUAM) (宜野湾市「普天間基地のグァム移転の可能性について」)

This is not the first time that the American side has reported that it plans to relocate the great majority of the Marines based on Okinawa to Guam. A September 2006 "Guam Integrated Military Development Plan" noted that a hangar, parking space, and helipad will be constructed for a maximum of 67 helicopters that will relocate along with the Marine Aircraft Groups. Since there are 56 helicopters in service at Futenma, this would mean that a greater number are to be moved to Guam. There is a high possibility that all of the helicopters stationed at Futenma will be moved to Guam (the rest may well arrive from the US). (Guam Integrated Military Development Plan)

This "Guam Integrated Military Development Plan" sought to develop Guam into one of the most modern integrated military facilities in the world. During the Cold War, when the United States created a "Eurasian network," it wanted to station troops in countries including Japan, Korea, and the Philippines, but after the Cold War, there is no longer a need to station troops in each country, making Guam, located at nearly equal distances within 2000 nautical miles from Japan, Korea, Taiwan, Philippines, and Indonesia, an ideal place to set up a new integrated facility that would allow troops to be withdrawn from bases in Japan and Korea. (グアムの戦略地図)



Map and location of Guam

In concrete terms, the plan not only sought to relocate all structural units of the Marine Corps, but to develop Guam into a major base of operations with joint use by the Navy and Air Force. As such, Guam would replace Okinawa as the true keystone of the Pacific, giving free rein to an integrated American global presence. It is natural to consider that the course this will take is that Okinawa-based Marines will be reduced to something like a remnant small branch, all the rest moving to Guam. (グアム統合軍事開発計画」より抜粋)

The Guam Plan that was Erased in One Week

The “Guam Integrated Military Development Plan” was drawn up in July of 2006 and released in September. A few months earlier, in May, the U.S.-Japan “Roadmap” was agreed upon in order to realize the relocation of American military forces in Okinawa. On this occasion, for the first time, it was decided that the Japanese government would pay most of the moving expenses for the removal of Okinawa-based Marines to Guam (6.1 billion dollars of the total estimated cost of 10.3 billion dollars). The American military, knowing that Japan would pay the construction costs, can be thought to have decided on a plan to

develop Guam as a unique global integrated military center.
(再編実施のための日米のロードマップ) (Link)
However, one week after the “Guam Integrated Military Development Plan” was posted on the Department of Defense website, it was deleted. The U.S.-Japan Roadmap had earlier called for the removal of Marines from Okinawa to Guam “in a manner that maintains unit integrity.” This also hinted that the transfer would not only involve Marine Corps headquarters but the relocation of combat units as well. At the same time it noted that “U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) forces remaining on Okinawa will consist of Marine Air-Ground Task Force elements, such as command, ground, aviation, and combat service support, as well as a base support capability.” “Marine Air-Ground Task Force,” however, is a term describing the principal organization for all missions across the range of military operations, and its meaning remains unclear. (Marine Air-Ground Task Force From Wikipedia)
It is suspected that the US and Japanese governments had agreed that, by deliberately keeping ambiguous which portions of the Okinawa-based Marines would relocate to Guam and which would remain, the Marines would continue to stay on Okinawa, the Japanese government would offer “sympathy monies” to the US military, the financially troubled US would divert these to the maintenance of the Guam base, and the Japanese government would maintain the blueprint of subordination to the US that it wished to continue as long as possible. Perhaps the “Guam Integrated Military Development Plan” revealed too much, causing fear that people would wake up to the fact that the Okinawa-based Marines were planning a complete withdrawal. It may have been this fear that caused the site to disappear so quickly. (日本の官僚支配と沖縄米軍)
After the plan was released in 2006, persons associated with the city of Ginowan, referring to the Guam Integrated Military Development Plan, asked the Consul General in Okinawa, “Isn’t there a plan for the Marine helicopter unit based in Futenma to relocate to Guam?” The Consul General replied that the plan they referred to was “a mere scrap of paper” and that “no formal decisions have been made.” He went on to insist that only the command element of the Okinawa-based Marines would be moving to Guam. However, three years later, on November 20, 2009, the draft environmental impact survey described above followed along lines laid out in the integrated development plan, allowing one to conclude that the American military authorities have been silently proceeding to move most of the Okinawa-based Marines to Guam.
(宜野湾市「普天間基地のグァム移転の可能性について」)

Ginowan joined neighboring cities and villages in August 2007 in an inspection tour of American bases on Guam, gathering information from American and Guam official sources. As a result, they came to know the following:
1) The Vice Commander of Andersen Air Force Base in Guam took them to see the site intended to house facilities for the Okinawa-based Marines Air unit and explained that “65 to 70 Marine aircraft would be coming.” At present there are 71 aircraft stationed at Futenma, allowing one to conclude that nearly all of them would be moving to Guam.

U.S. F-15E Strike Eagles and a B-2 Spirit bomber fly in formation over Andersen Air Force Base in Guam. MSNBC on October 7, 2009 reported that “With a planned transfer of the Third Marine Expeditionary Force from Japan, and expansion of military facilities, Guam is to be transformed into a key military hub in the Pacific.”

2) At Apra Harbor in Guam, a docking area will be newly constructed to allow for berthing facilities for the large amphibious assault ships that are now stationed at Sasebo: the USS Essex (LHD-2), the USS Juneau (LPD-10), the USS Germantown (LSD-42) and the USS Fort McHenry (LSD 43). Plans appear to be in the works to redeploy these ships from Sasebo to Guam. Moreover, it is likely that the 31st Expeditionary Force, consisting of the Marine combat and logistic units that, to prepare for emergencies, must stay near the landing craft, will also move to Guam from its base in Sasebo. (グァム米軍基地視察報告 2007年8月13日)

Apra Harbor on the West side of Guam

In September 2008 the Secretary of the U.S. Navy submitted a report to a House of Representatives Military Committee on plans to develop Guam entitled “The Current Situation of American Military planning in Guam.” In it, the names of the units that were to move from Okinawa to Guam were noted, making it further clear that the majority of the Futenma-based units including almost all combat and helicopter units would be moved to Guam.

(宜野湾市「普天間基地のグァム移転の可能性について」)

A Force of 10,000 Fabricated by the Japanese Foreign Ministry

According to Foreign Ministry reports and major news sources, some 18,000 Marines are stationed on Okinawa and only about 8,000 will be moved to Guam. This would leave about 10,000 Marines remaining on Okinawa. I too have written articles following this line. However, according to the American Military’s Japan headquarters, while the number of troops is “fixed” (teisū) at 18,000, the actual number presently in Okinawa is 12,500. Moreover, according to a May 17, 2006 article in the Okinawa Times, “The move to Guam involves a mysterious number,” the number of family dependents of Marines stationed in Okinawa is 8000. If 9000 family dependents move to Guam as announced, a negative number would remain in Okinawa.

(「在沖縄海兵隊のグアム移転に係る協定」の署名に抗議する)

The “actual numbers” of Okinawa-based Marines are: 12,500 on-duty personnel and 8,000 dependents, making a total of 20,500. Of these, the number going to Guam is approximately 8,000 on-duty personnel and 9000 dependents for a total of 17,000. Now, if we close our eyes to the negative number of family members,

the total number of Marines (and their dependents) remaining on Okinawa should only be 3,500. As part of an overall American military re-alignment, including the desire for cutbacks, there should be many key personnel who return to the United States, in the end making the number of those who remain on Okinawa even smaller. According to the aforementioned Ginowan City source, “the fixed number” of those Marines who remain on Okinawa is at present an empty number with no troops assigned to actual duties.” “An empty number” perhaps refers to the number of people (ghost members) who are not there in fact but are assumed to be there.

(宜野湾市「普天間基地のグァム移転の可能性について」)

The Japanese Foreign Ministry, for example, has fabricated the number of 10,000 phantom troops, and has succeeded in making Japanese citizens and politicians believe that 10,000 Marines will continue to remain on Okinawa after the transfer. U.S. Marines stationed on Okinawa serve as a symbol of the subordinate status of Japan to the United States. The Japanese Foreign Ministry has long exercised control of Japan’s power structure by threatening politicians and business circles with the message that “if we cross the United States there will be terrible consequences”, while at the same time, bribing the US military with the right of “continued stationing of 10,000 troops” so that the Japanese government will continue to support sympathy budgets. In this way, the Foreign Ministry maintains the “right to interpret what the US” thinks.

(日本の官僚支配と沖縄米軍)

In this fabricated blueprint, the Futenma base will never be returned. At Henoko, within Camp Schwab’s Marine base, quite a number of clean barracks and entertainment facilities are already being built. Because the Marines are to relocate to Guam by 2014, these new facilities would only be used for a short time. Because of the fraudulent acts of the Foreign Ministry, an exorbitant amount of tax money has been wasted. This is criminal waste of public funds meant for enhancing their own power. In April 2009 Mayor Iha gave testimony at the Diet saying that, “if the ghost fixed number were to be emphasized, 6.09 billion dollars (contributed by Japan for the relocation of the Marines to Guam) can only be seen as wasted money.” (○伊波参考人 2009年4月8日)

(Ultimately, after the Marines leave Okinawa, Camp Schwab may well become a base for the SDF, with the barracks at Henoko used to house SDF forces.)

Unwelcome Remarks by Governor Hashimoto on his Willingness to Consider the Relocation of Futenma to Kansai Airport

The Okinawa-based Marines are steadily moving to Guam while leaving a phantom force of 10,000 and continuing to receive huge sums of money from Japan. However, on the premise that 10,000 Marines will remain, talk continues about the need to build a new base in Henoko and the voices of opposition of the Okinawa people grow louder.

Hearing these cries of opposition, the Governor of Osaka, Hashimoto Tōru, made a statement on November 30 in which he said "he would accept the relocation of the U.S. Marine Corps Air Station Futenma to Kansai International Airport." In fact, two weeks earlier he made the same remarks to a group of reporters. Although his remarks became a topic of discussion in the Diet, the mass media kept totally silent about these happenings. The November 30 press conference was made public by a free lance journalist who posted it on YouTube. Only after people began to talk about it did the mass media, it is said, have no choice but to report on it. (大手マスコミ黙殺した橋下発言「普天間関西へ」浮上の舞台裏) (Link)

If we see the Japanese mass media as a sort of propaganda machine manipulated by the Foreign Ministry and other bureaucratic organizations, then the reasons for the silence on Governor Hashimoto's remarks can be understood. Because American military authorities intend to move nearly all Marines from Okinawa to Guam, there will be no need for Japan to have a facility to replace Futenma. The argument that "we must find a place to relocate Futenma" must not, in their view, be made concrete. If Hashimoto uses unwarranted care so that the suggestion about moving the Marines to the Kansai Airport really becomes concrete, then you never know if the structure of fraudulence may be exposed. Maybe that is why Hashimoto's speech was ignored as unwelcome.

Iwo Jima has been mentioned as a potential replacement site, and the plan of joining up with Kadena base has been proposed, but for the same reasons there has been little follow up.

(Governor Hashimoto called upon the citizens of Osaka to "think about Okinawa together." This seems to represent the trend of Japanese awakening that connects the Okinawan base problem and division of power, which I have written about in two blogs "Japan waking up to Okinawa" and "The Hidden Multipolarism of the DJP")

Off to the Showdown that will Determine Japan's future

The contention of the mayor of Ginowan City that "The Marines intend to pull out completely from Okinawa to go to Guam" also has been conspicuously absent from the mass media. However, since Mayor Iha discussed these issues with

members of the ruling party in late November, Prime Minister Hatoyama has begun to say that “Japan must in the near future make a decision on the Futenma Problem,” or that “a complete removal to Guam is under consideration,” making the situation suddenly fluid. It is hard to tell whether Prime Minister Hatoyama’s mention of the possibility of a complete removal to Guam may have some relation to what Mayor Iha had been pointing out for some time. In the end, all will have to agree that what happens is “the complete relocation to Guam.” So the government is beginning to stifle opposing views.

(普天間移設「新しい場所を」首相が指示)

The idea of “complete removal to Guam” was not initially advanced by Japan, but came from the United States. Yet people act upon the idea that mass media reports are “facts,” and the fabricated story that 10,000 Marines will remain in Okinawa is a “fact” in the head of citizens. As long as this function is sufficiently powerful that even the Prime Minister cannot alert citizens about the mass media playing a propaganda role, Hatoyama has no choice but to use the gesture of “suggesting to the US” the complete relocation to Guam.

Hatoyama has stated that “concerning the removal from Futenma, agreement within the government has to be the first priority, and if necessary and the opportunity arises, he wishes to discuss the issue with the President of the United States.” But what is really important is not to re-negotiate the issue with the United States, but rather to coordinate the thinking of the Japanese government and to stop padding the number of Marines involved. If the Foreign Ministry and other bureaucratic organizations were to agree, the Japanese government could set a course of action so that “Okinawa-based Marines would completely relocate to Guam by the year 2014.” This would allow Japan to finally be in line with plans the American forces have already been advancing.

(日米首脳会談、要請もできず…米側も消極的)

If the complete relocation of Marines to Guam becomes official Japanese government policy, Japan’s subordination to the United States based on the fabricated number of 10,000 Marines remaining on Okinawa will evaporate; in turn this will cause the Foreign Ministry to lose power. Therefore, the Foreign Ministry and other organizations under its umbrella are resisting this with full force. What is in store is a major showdown that will determine the future of Japan. The LDP have taken this chance to criticize the Democrat administration. The LDP should adopt a new policy as a conservative party, ridding itself of the subordinate relationship with the United States and its dependence on the

bureaucracy, but it is foolish for it to remain the servant of the bureaucrats.
(自民が民主批判の大号令、問題指摘のメモ作成)
Within the government, Defense Minister Kitazawa Toshimi has visited Guam. He may well have gone there to see if it is possible for all of the Marines to move from Okinawa to Guam, but it would seem that he was pushed around by the American military authorities there, for while in Guam, he reported that "a complete relocation to Guam is impossible. This would mean a departure from the US-Japan agreement." In response to this, lower house representatives from the Social Democratic Party criticized Kitazawa saying "how could he stay so briefly, see so little, and conclude that it was impossible?" Fighting has broken out within the ruling coalition as well.
(社民・重野氏「ちょろっと見て結論出るのか」
グアム移設で防衛相に不快感)
If the Japanese government came together on a policy of "complete relocation to Guam" then whether Japan would continue to pay for the relocation expenses after 2014 would naturally emerge as a problem for Japan and the US. The American military at the outset announced plans to build a large military facility on Guam at a cost of 10.7 billion dollars (of which 6.1 billion would be paid by Japan). However this cost does not include the construction of new roads and water and sewage systems, electric power supply and other additional construction costs that will result from an increase of military-related personnel and vehicles on the island. In July 2008 the American GAO (Government Accountability Office) issued a report that criticized the military saying that the relocation to Guam would increase the island's population by 14 percent. (GAO says cost of Guam move will exceed estimate)
The American military has a habit of operating beyond budget; from around thirty years ago its operations have greatly exceed its budget. The American military may have been looking to Japan to make up for the shortfall, but the Hatoyama government is seeking to withdraw from a position of subordination to the United States and to emphasize its autonomy or independence, so it will be reluctant to dole out funds, using the pretext of financial difficulties. During the recent visit to Guam by Defense Minister Kitazawa, the Governor of Guam for the first time announced his opposition to the relocation of Marines from Okinawa to Guam, but behind his opposition can be seen a request to Japan to help pay for the costs of infrastructure and new facilities.
The American government is also experiencing financial difficulties, and if Japan is unwilling to pay the costs of relocating the Marines to Guam, they may well not

send them, remaining instead in Futenma. However, if they do this, popular opposition in Okinawa will grow louder and the Hatoyama administration may well demand, without giving money, that the Marines leave. This is a demand that the Philippines and other so-called “normal countries” have made. Ultimately, the US military had no choice but to leave without receiving additional funds from Japan. In this case, it is conceivable that it will be taken care of by reducing the number of Marines who relocate to Guam and increasing the number of people returning to the United States. The common sense of the world that “a one-time resolution by the government or the congress can make the US military leave”, which the Japanese have been made to consider impossible, will now be put into practice.

There will be an election for the governor of Okinawa in 2010. Many people support a movement to urge Ginowan City Mayor Iha to stand as a candidate. If Mayor Iha becomes governor, Okinawa Prefecture will undoubtedly urge an early removal of American forces from Okinawa that Tokyo cannot ignore. This may lead to Okinawa’s freeing itself from its status as an island of American military bases.

This article was originally published at Tanaka Sakai’s website on December 10, 2009. 官僚が隠す沖縄海兵隊グアム全移転

Tanaka Sakai is the creator, researcher, writer and editor of Tanaka News (www.tanakanews.com), a Japanese-language news service on Japan and the world. This is the sequel to an earlier article called “China-Japan Defense Cooperation and the Okinawa-based US Military Base.” Both of the original Japanese texts of December 10 and December 15, 2009 are available at his site, 田中宇の国際ニュース解説

Tanaka Sakai's new book is 『日本が「対米従属」を脱する日』― 多極化する新世界秩序の中で―
The Day Japan Breaks with "Subordination to the US": Amidst the Multipolarizing New World Order

Gavan McCormack is emeritus professor at Australian National University, coordinator of The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus, author, most recently, of Client State: Japan in the American Embrace (in English, Japanese, Chinese, and Korean.

William Steele, professor of history, International Christian University, is author of Alternative Narratives in Modern Japanese History . His most recent book is Japan and Russia: Three Centuries of Mutual Images.

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For all articles by this author click here

ANNEX-2: United States Forces Japan

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

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The **United States Forces Japan**, or **USFJ** (在日米軍 *Zainichi Beigun*?) refers to the various divisions of the United States Armed Forces that are stationed in Japan. Under the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan, the United States is obliged to defend Japan in close cooperation with the Japan Self-Defense Forces for maritime defense, ballistic missile defense, domestic air control, communications security (COMSEC) and disaster response operations.

Contents

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History

JGSDF soldiers at Camp Kinser

After the Japanese surrender in World War II, the United States Armed Forces acquired the overall administrative authority in Japan. All of the Japanese Imperial Army and Navy were decommissioned and all of their military bases were taken over by the United States Armed Forces. The allied countries planned to demilitarize Japan, and the U.S. imposed the Constitution of Japan with a no-armed-force clause in 1947.

After the Korean War began in 1950, Douglas MacArthur, the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers in Japan, ordered the Japanese government to

establish the paramilitary "National Police Reserve", which was later developed into the Japan Self-Defense Forces.

In 1951, the Treaty of San Francisco was signed by the allied countries and Japan, which restored its formal sovereignty. At the same time, the U.S. and Japan signed the Japan-America Security Alliance. By this treaty, the USFJ are legally responsible for the defense of Japan and in return for this, the Japanese government has offered military bases, funds and various interests as defined by the Status of Forces Agreement.

In 1960, at the expiration of the treaty, the new Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan was signed between the United States and Japan. The status of the United States Forces Japan was defined in the U.S.-Japan Status of Forces Agreement. The treaty is still in effect and the Japanese foreign policy is based on these reciprocal obligations.

In the Vietnam War, the USFJ military bases in Japan, especially those in Okinawa, were used as important strategic and logistic bases. The USAF strategic bombers were deployed in the bases in Okinawa, which was still administered by the U.S. government. In the 1960s, 1,200 nuclear weapons were stored in the Kadena Air Base, Okinawa.[1] The U.S. military removed all nuclear weapons from Okinawa before the reversion to Japanese administration in 1972.

As of December 2009, there are 35,688 U.S. military personnel stationed in Japan, and another 5,500 American civilians employed there by the United States Department of Defense. The United States Seventh Fleet is based in Yokosuka. The 3rd Marine Expeditionary Force (III MEF) is based in Okinawa. 130 USAF fighters are stationed in the Misawa Air Base and Kadena Air Base.

- Army: 2,541
- Navy: 3,740
- Air Force: 12,398
- Marines: 17,009
- Total: 35,688[2]

The Japanese government paid 217 billion Yen (US$ 2.0 billion) in 2007[3] as annual host-nation support called Omoiyari Yosan (思いやり予算?, sympathy budget or compassion budget).[4]

Currently the US government employs over 8,000 MLC/IHA workers on Okinawa (per the LMO) this does not include Okinawan contract workers.

Exercise participation

The scope and frequency of U.S. Forces Japan participation in major exercises has been in decline since the late 1990s. This is largely attributable to the DoD combatant command reorganizations that took place in the years following the terror attacks of September 11. United States Pacific Command (US PACOM), the parent command of U.S. Forces Japan, has taken on larger and broader roles during exercises in Japan, particularly in those exercises on mainland Japan.

Of note is the Keen X series of exercises, which includes Keen Edge, Keen Sword, and Keen Blade. Keen Blade exercises no longer exist due to funding limitations, but Keen Edge (a biannual command post exercise) and Keen Sword (a biannual field exercise) still do take place, albeit at significantly reduced levels from years past. The late 1980s and early 1990s saw the high-water marks for these exercises. According to the Federation of American Scientists, US PACOM will likely assume control of all Keen X exercises by 2009.

U.S. Forces Japan has no control or authority over subordinate command exercises beyond manipulation of Force Protection Condition levels, which is the only area of tactical control residing with U.S. Forces Japan. Current fiscal realities and the declining role of US Force Japan as a center of gravity for U.S. military policy in Japan may guide future leaders to question a continued need for the organization.

Controversy

Okinawa International University, where a U.S. Marines helicopter crashed in 2004.

While 73.4% of Japanese citizens appreciate the mutual security treaty with the U.S. and the presence of the USFJ,[5] a portion of the population demand a reduction in the amount of U.S. military bases in the region.[6] Many of the bases, such as Yokota Air Base, Naval Air Facility Atsugi and Kadena Air Base, are located in the vicinity of residential districts, and local citizens have complained about excessive aircraft noise as well as various crimes perpetrated against local civilians.[7][8][9]

From 1952 to 2004, there were approximately 200,000 accidents and crimes involving U.S. soldiers, in which 1,076 Japanese civilians died. Over 90% of the incidents were vehicle or traffic related.[10] According to the U.S.-Japan Status of Forces Agreement U.S. personnel have partial extraterritorial right, so in most cases suspects were not arrested by Japanese authorities.[10] In 1995, the abduction and rape of a 12-year-old Okinawan schoolgirl by two U.S. Marines and one U.S. sailor led to demands for the removal of all U.S. military bases in Japan. Other controversial incidents include helicopter crashes, the Girard incident, the Michael Brown Okinawa assault incident, the death of Kinjo family and the death of Yuki Uema. In February 2008, a 38-year-old U.S. Marine based on Okinawa was arrested in connection with the reported rape of a 14-year-old Okinawan girl.[11] This triggered waves of protest against American military presence in Okinawa and led to tight restrictions on off-base activities.[12][13] Although the accuser withdrew her charges the U.S. military court marshalled the suspect and sentenced him to 4 years in prison under the stricter rules of the military justice system.[14] U.S. Forces Japan designated February 22 as a *Day of Reflection* for all U.S. military facilities in Japan, setting up a Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Task Force in an effort to prevent similar incidents.[15] In November 2009, Staff Sgt. Clyde "Drew" Gunn, a U.S. Army Soldier stationed at Torii Station was involved in a hit and run accident of Okinawan member in Yomitan Village on Okinawa, in April 2010 the soldier was later charged with failing to render aid and vehicular manslaughter.[16] Staff Sgt. Clyde "Drew" Gunn, of Ocean Springs, MS was eventually sentenced to 2 years and 8 months in jail on Oct 15, 2010.[17]

Facilities

List of current facilities

U.S. military bases in Japan



U.S. military facilities in Okinawa

The USFJ headquarters is at Yokota Air Base, about 30 km west of central Tokyo.

The U.S. military installations in Japan and their managing branches are:

Air Force:

- Camp Chitose, Chitose, Hokkaido
- Kadena Air Base, Okinawa Prefecture
- Kadena Ammunition Storage Area, Okinawa Prefecture
- Okuma Recreational Facility, Okinawa Prefecture
- Yaedake Communication Site, Okinawa Prefecture
- Misawa Air Base, Aomori Prefecture
- Yokota Air Base, Fussa, Tokyo
- Fuchu Communications Station, Fuchu, Tokyo
- Tama Service Annex, Inagi, Tokyo
- Yugi Communication Site, Hachioji, Tokyo
- Camp Asaka AFN Transmitter Site, Saitama Prefecture
- Tokorozawa Transmitter Site, Saitama Prefecture
- Owada Communication Site, Saitama Prefecture

Army:

- Fort Buckner, Okinawa Prefecture
- Army POL Depots, Okinawa Prefecture
- White Beach Area, Okinawa Prefecture
- Naha Port Facility, Okinawa Prefecture (return after relocation to the Urasoe Pier area)
- Torii Station, Okinawa Prefecture
- Tengan Pier, Okinawa Prefecture
- Camp Zama, Zama, Kanagawa
- Yokohama North Dock, Yokohama, Kanagawa Prefecture
- Sagami General Depot, Sagamihara, Kanagawa
- Sagamihara Housing Area, Sagamihara, Kanagawa
- Akizuki Ammunition Depot, Hiroshima Prefecture
- Hiro Ammunition Depot, Hiroshima Prefecture
- Kawakami Ammunition Depot, Hiroshima Prefecture
- Hardy Barracks, Minato, Tokyo

Marine Corps:

- Camp Smedley D. Butler, Okinawa Prefecture, Yamaguchi Prefectures. (Although these camps are dispersed throughout Okinawa and the rest of Japan they are all under the heading of Camp Smedley D. Butler):
    - Camp McTureous, Okinawa Prefecture
    - Camp Courtney, Okinawa Prefecture
    - Camp Foster, Okinawa Prefecture
    - Camp Kinser, Okinawa Prefecture
    - Camp Hansen, Okinawa Prefecture
    - Camp Schwab, Okinawa Prefecture
    - Camp Gonsalves (Jungle Warfare Training Center), Okinawa Prefecture
    - Kin Blue Beach Training Area, Okinawa Prefecture
    - Kin Red Beach Training Area, Okinawa Prefecture
    - NSGA Hanza
    - Higashionna Ammunition Storage Point II
    - Henoko Ordnance Ammunition Depot
- Marine Corps Air Station Futenma, Okinawa Prefecture (return after the MCAS Futenma relocates to Camp Schwab)
- Marine Corps Air Station Iwakuni
- Camp Fuji, Shizuoka Prefecture
- Numazu Training Area, Shizuoka Prefecture
- Ie Jima Auxiliary Airfield, Okinawa Prefecture
- Tsuken Jima Training Area, Okinawa Prefecture

Navy:

- Naval Air Facility Atsugi, Ayase, Kanagawa
- United States Fleet Activities Sasebo, Sasebo, Nagasaki
- United States Fleet Activities Yokosuka, Yokosuka, Kanagawa
- Urago Ammunition Depot, Yokosuka, Kanagawa Prefecture
- Tsurumi POL Depot, Yokohama, Kanagawa Prefecture
- Naval Housing Annex Negishi, Yokohama, Kanagawa Prefecture
- Naval Transmitter Station Totsuka, Yokohama, Kanagawa Prefecture
- Naval Support Facility Kamiseya, Yokohama, Kanagawa Prefecture
- Tomioka Storage Area, Yokohama, Kanagawa Prefecture
- Naval Housing Annex Ikego, Zushi, Kanagawa
- White Beach Area, Okinawa Prefecture
- Camp Shields, Okinawa Prefecture

- Camp Lester, Okinawa Prefecture (return after the Naval Hospital relocates to Camp Foster)
- Awase Communication Station, Okinawa Prefecture
- New Sanno Hotel, Tokyo

JSDF–USFJ Areas:

- Tori Shima Range, Okinawa Prefecture
- Kume Jima Range, Okinawa Prefecture
- Kisarazu Auxiliary Landing Field, Kisarazu, Chiba Prefecture
- Camp Hansen (small portion in central area of Camp Hansen), Okinawa Prefecture
- Ukibaru Jima Range, Okinawa Prefecture
- Kadena Air Base (small areas outside of the base that are supported by Kadena—these areas are located on the southern portion of Okinawa), Okinawa Prefecture
- Jungle Warfare Training Center (formerly known as Northern Training Area—four thin elongated areas embedded and distributed evenly within JWTC), Okinawa Prefecture

In Okinawa, U.S. military installations occupy about 10.4 percent of the total land usage. Approximately 74.7 percent of all the U.S. military facilities in Japan are located on the island of Okinawa.

List of former facilities

The United States has returned some facilities to Japanese control. Some are used as military bases of the JSDF; others have become civilian airports or government offices; many are factories, office buildings or resential developments in the private sector. Due to the Special Actions Committee on Okinawa, more land in Okinawa is in the process of being returned. These areas include—Camp Kuwae [also known as Camp Lester], MCAS Futenma, areas within Camp Zukeran [also known as Camp Foster], about 9,900 acres (40 km^2) of the Northern Training Area, Aha Training Area, Gimbaru Training Area (also known as Camp Gonsalves), small portion of the Makiminato Service Area (also known as Camp Kinser), and Naha Port.

Army:

- RYCOM
- Camp Chickamunga, 19th Infantry (Beppu)[18]
- Camp Drake, Asaka, Saitama Prefecture
- Camp Drew, Gunma Prefecture
- Camp Fuchinobe, Sagamihara, Kanagawa Prefecture
- Camp Gifu, Gifu Prefecture
- Camp Hakata[18]
- Camp Katagai, Toyoumi, Kujukuri-Machi, Chiba Prefecture
- Camp Kokura, Fukuoka Prefecture
- Camp Mcgill, Yokosuka, Kanagawa Prefecture
- Camp Moore, Kawasaki, Kanagawa Prefecture
- Camp Mower, 34th Infantry (Sasebo, Nagasaki Prefecture)[18]
- Camp Nara, Nara Prefecture
- Camp Oji (Army Hospital), Higashi-Jujo, Tokyo
- Camp Omiya, Omiya, Saitama Prefecture
- Camp Palmer, Narashino, Chiba Prefecture
- Camp Sendai, Nigatake, Miyagi Prefecture
- Camp Whittington, Kumagaya, Saitama Prefecture
- Camp Wood, 21st Infantry (Kumamoto)[18]
- Chuo Kogyo (ACAN Station), Wako, Saitama Prefecture
- Division School Center, Kokura[18]
- Kishine Barracks, Yokohama, Kanagawa Prefecture
- Pershing Heights (Hq FEC), Ichigaya, Tokyo
- Grant Heights, Hikarigaoka, Tokyo
- Washington Heights, Yoyogi, Tokyo
- U.S. Army Medical Center, Sagami Ono, Kanagawa Prefecture
- Yokohama Ordnance Depot (YOD), Yokohama, Kanagawa Prefecture
- Yokohama Signal Supply Depot, Yokohama, Kanagawa Prefecture
- Hamby AAF, Okinawa Prefecture
- Deputy Division Engineer Office, Okinawa Prefecture
- Gesaji Communication Site, Okinawa Prefecture (transferred to the 11th Regional Maritime Safety Headquarters of Japan's Self Defense Force)

Navy:

- Honmoku Housing Area, Yokohama, Kanagawa Prefecture
- Naval Air Facility Oppama, Yokosuka, Kanagawa Prefecture
- Kishine

- Sobe Communication Site, Okinawa Prefecture (returned to the Japanese government in December 2006)

Air Force:

- Ashiya Air Base
- Brady Air Base
- Chitose Air Base
- Gannosu Air Station
- Fuchu Air Station
- Haneda Air Base
- Itami Air Base
- Itazuke Air Base
- Johnson Air Base
- Naha Air Base
- Miho Air Base
- Showa Air Station
- Shiroi Air Base
- Tachikawa Air Base
- Wakkanai Air Station
- Yamato Air Station (TAB add.)
- Senaha Communication Station, Okinawa Prefecture (returned to the Japanese government in September 2006)
- Yomitan Auxiliary Airfield, Okinawa Prefecture (returned to the Japanese government in 1972, parachute drop training ended in March 2001)

Marines:

- Makiminato Housing Area, Okinawa Prefecture
- Awase Golf Course, Okinawa Prefecture (returned to the Japanese government in April 2010)

See also

- United States Forces Korea (USFK)
- United States Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands

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External links

Wikimedia Commons has media related to: ***United States Forces Japan***

- United States Forces Japan
- U.S. Naval Forces Japan
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ANNEX-3: US Military Bases in JAPAN



AIR FORCE Bases (3)


Kadena Air Base Okinawa
Kadena, Chatan and the city of Okinawa play host to the United States Air Force Base, Kadena Air Bas...


Misawa Air Base Misawa
Misawa Air Base is located in the north of Japan and is the only joint service base in the Western P...


Yokota Air Base Fussa
West of Tokyo you will find Fussa City, home to Yokota Air Base. The Base is one of the most state o...

Army Bases (3)


Camp Zama Zama
United States Army outpost Camp Zama is located in and around the city of Zama, around 40 miles outs...


Fort Buckner Okinawa
Though Fort Buckner is in fact part of Camp Foster of the Marine Corps, and as such shares many of i...


Torii Station Okinawa

Torii Station is located in the Yomitan area of Okinawa Island in Japan. The base is used as a U.S. ...

Marine Bases (13)


Camp Courtney Uruma

Uruma city is the locale for Camp Courtney, a United States Marine Base which is the part of the ove...


Camp Foster Ginowan

The United States Marine Corps base Camp Foster was once known as Camp Zukeran. The base is in Ginow...


Camp Fuji Shizuoka Prefecture

Camp Fuji is located at the base of Mount Fuji and was once part of a larger facility that has now b...


Camp Gonsalves Northern Okinawa

Located in the Northern Okinawa Region, Camp Gonsalves occupies around 17,500 acres of two level can...


Camp Hansen Okinawa

Camp Hansen is the main base of operations that is known as the central training area. Included in t...

 Camp Kinser Okinawa

Camp Kinser is the main base of operations for United States Marine Corp Logistical operations on Ok...

 Camp Lester Chatan Town

Camp Lester which is also known as Camp Kuwea is situated in Chatan Town positioned ideally on a fla...

 Camp McTureous Kawasaki Village

Located in Kawasaki Village near Uruma city on Okinawa Island, Japan, Camp McTureous is part of the ...

 Camp S.D. Butler Okinawa

Camp S.D. Butler is the name given to a collection of facilities used by United States Marines on th...

 Camp Schwab Okinawa

Located in the North Eastern Regions of Okinawa Island, Camp Schwab is a United States Marine Corps ...

 MCAS Futenma Ginowan

Located in Ginowan city, MCAS Futenma is home to around 4,000 marines, most of which are part of the...

 MCAS Iwakuni Nishiki

Located in the Nishiki river delta, Marine Corps Air Station Iwakuni is the ideal base for an accomp...

 Yontan Airfield Okinawa

Yontan Air Field has had an interesting history, once known as Yontan Airport it was a civilian airp...

Navy Bases (4)

 Fleet Activities Okinawa Okinawa

Commanding officers in Okinawa are learning to place a great deal of resources on making sure that s...

 Fleet Activities Sasebo Sasebo

Fleet Activities Sasebo was officially established 1946 one year after the landing of the 5th Marine...

Fleet Activities Sasebo

Fleet Activities Sasebo was officially established 1946 one year after the landing of the 5th Marine Division at Sasebo. The port and surrounding bases was used as a main launching platform for United States forces in the war with Korea in 1950. The staff placed at Sasebo grew to around 20,000 troops very quickly as the need to supply ammunitions, vehicles and fuel grew dramatically. Once the Korean War was over and Japan and American entered into the SOFA agreement Sasebo became the home to not only United States Units but also the Japanese Ground Self Defense Force and the Japanese Maritime Defense Forces. Many units now call Sasebo home and we are proud to offer them the best facilities available and making their lives away from home as comfortable as possible.

Fleet Activities Yokosuka Yokosuka

Fleet Activities Yokosuka is the main hub of operations in the support of naval forces posted in Jap...

Naval Air Facility Atsugi Kanagawa

Atsugi is home to the units of carrier 5th wing and is the largest facility of its kind in the pacif...

ANNEX-4: 134 AFTERSHOCK after 8.9 HONSHU JAPAN Earthquake

MASSIVE Aftershock after 8.9 Earthquake in Japan on 11March 2100							
	MAP	5.2	2011/03/12 02:34:05	36.738	141.411	22.2	NEAR THE EAST COAST OF HONSHU, JAPAN
1							
	MAP	5.2	2011/03/12 01:59:44	37.522	142.783	24.5	OFF THE EAST COAST OF HONSHU, JAPAN
2							
	MAP	6.8	2011/03/12 01:47:16	37.588	142.682	24.8	OFF THE EAST COAST OF HONSHU, JAPAN
3							
	MAP	6.2	2011/03/12 01:46:21	37.354	141.998	25.4	NEAR THE EAST COAST OF HONSHU, JAPAN
4							
	MAP	5.2	2011/03/12 01:43:20	36.321	141.753	27.7	NEAR THE EAST COAST OF HONSHU, JAPAN
5							
	MAP	6.0	2011/03/12 01:34:10	38.748	142.853	24.5	NEAR THE EAST COAST OF HONSHU, JAPAN
6							
	MAP	5.1	2011/03/12 01:25:04	36.425	141.605	27.5	NEAR THE EAST COAST OF HONSHU, JAPAN
7							
	MAP	6.1	2011/03/12 01:19:07	-16.727	-173.174	10.9	TONGA
8							
	MAP	5.7	2011/03/12 01:17:41	-16.661	-173.066	31.5	TONGA
9							
	MAP	5.4	2011/03/12 01:17:02	38.095	142.702	24.6	NEAR THE EAST COAST OF HONSHU, JAPAN
10							
	MAP	5.1	2011/03/12 01:03:59	37.939	141.556	26.0	NEAR THE EAST COAST OF HONSHU, JAPAN
11							
	MAP	5.5	2011/03/12 00:45:10	36.041	141.815	23.7	NEAR THE EAST COAST OF HONSHU, JAPAN
12							
	MAP	5.0	2011/03/12 00:39:37	37.317	142.450	25.0	OFF THE EAST COAST OF HONSHU, JAPAN
13							
	MAP	5.0	2011/03/12 00:25:08	37.803	141.894	29.8	NEAR THE EAST COAST OF HONSHU, JAPAN
14							
	MAP	5.0	2011/03/12 00:21:25	36.475	143.586	24.5	OFF THE EAST COAST OF HONSHU, JAPAN
15							
18	MAP	5.4	2011/03/11 23:59:21	36.499	141.441	22.6	NEAR THE EAST COAST OF

							HONSHU, JAPAN
	MAP	5.3	2011/03/11 23:58:04	38.460	143.530	29.1	OFF THE EAST COAST OF HONSHU, JAPAN
19							
	MAP	5.1	2011/03/11 23:53:29	38.858	142.452	25.3	NEAR THE EAST COAST OF HONSHU, JAPAN
20							
	MAP	5.1	2011/03/11 23:40:12	37.073	143.529	25.3	OFF THE EAST COAST OF HONSHU, JAPAN
21							
	MAP	5.3	2011/03/11 23:26:51	39.178	142.709	24.9	NEAR THE EAST COAST OF HONSHU, JAPAN
22							
	MAP	5.0	2011/03/11 23:21:22	39.161	143.296	25.0	OFF THE EAST COAST OF HONSHU, JAPAN
23							
	MAP	5.4	2011/03/11 22:54:28	36.494	142.267	25.4	OFF THE EAST COAST OF HONSHU, JAPAN
24							
	MAP	5.8	2011/03/11 22:51:18	37.806	144.967	25.0	OFF THE EAST COAST OF HONSHU, JAPAN
25							
	MAP	5.3	2011/03/11 22:42:59	37.627	143.801	27.4	OFF THE EAST COAST OF HONSHU, JAPAN
26							
	MAP	5.0	2011/03/11 22:36:57	37.097	143.796	25.0	OFF THE EAST COAST OF HONSHU, JAPAN
27							
	MAP	5.2	2011/03/11 21:41:58	37.279	142.351	10.1	OFF THE EAST COAST OF HONSHU, JAPAN
28							
	MAP	5.4	2011/03/11 21:00:46	39.048	142.477	24.9	NEAR THE EAST COAST OF HONSHU, JAPAN
29							
	MAP	5.1	2011/03/11 20:41:24	37.675	143.698	25.0	OFF THE EAST COAST OF HONSHU, JAPAN
30							
	MAP	5.5	2011/03/11 20:36:10	37.838	142.847	24.9	OFF THE EAST COAST OF HONSHU, JAPAN
31							
	MAP	5.1	2011/03/11 20:34:40	36.993	140.985	25.2	NEAR THE EAST COAST OF HONSHU, JAPAN
32							
	MAP	5.5	2011/03/11 20:23:44	35.818	141.583	24.2	NEAR THE EAST COAST OF HONSHU, JAPAN
33							
	MAP	6.3	2011/03/11 20:11:23	39.025	142.645	8.7	NEAR THE EAST COAST OF HONSHU, JAPAN
34							
	MAP	6.6	2011/03/11 19:46:49	40.472	139.070	10.0	NEAR THE WEST COAST OF HONSHU, JAPAN
35							
	MAP	5.2	2011/03/11 19:45:24	37.653	141.548	25.2	NEAR THE EAST COAST OF HONSHU, JAPAN
36							
	MAP	5.5	2011/03/11 19:31:56	36.962	138.367	10.3	EASTERN HONSHU, JAPAN
37							
	MAP	5.5	2011/03/11 19:24:29	35.770	140.639	24.9	NEAR THE EAST COAST OF HONSHU, JAPAN
38							
	MAP	6.1	2011/03/11 19:02:59	39.372	142.900	24.8	NEAR THE EAST COAST OF HONSHU, JAPAN
39							
	MAP	6.2	2011/03/11 18:59:15	37.037	138.355	10.0	NEAR THE WEST COAST OF HONSHU, JAPAN
40							
	MAP	5.1	2011/03/11 18:44:06	36.858	141.029	25.5	NEAR THE EAST COAST OF HONSHU, JAPAN
41							
42	MAP	5.9	2011/03/11 18:17:06	36.218	141.685	25.4	NEAR THE EAST COAST OF

							HONSHU, JAPAN
43	MAP	**5.7**	2011/03/11 18:11:24	37.118	142.160	13.8	**OFF THE EAST COAST OF HONSHU, JAPAN**
44	MAP	**5.0**	2011/03/11 17:50:01	37.648	144.991	25.8	**OFF THE EAST COAST OF HONSHU, JAPAN**
45	MAP	**5.4**	2011/03/11 17:32:14	37.137	144.572	24.8	**OFF THE EAST COAST OF HONSHU, JAPAN**
46	MAP	**5.1**	2011/03/11 17:30:48	37.418	141.099	24.9	**NEAR THE EAST COAST OF HONSHU, JAPAN**
47	MAP	**5.0**	2011/03/11 17:23:57	36.015	141.888	24.9	**NEAR THE EAST COAST OF HONSHU, JAPAN**
48	MAP	**5.5**	2011/03/11 17:17:00	37.111	144.145	26.4	**OFF THE EAST COAST OF HONSHU, JAPAN**
49	MAP	**5.0**	2011/03/11 17:12:41	37.564	144.069	25.1	**OFF THE EAST COAST OF HONSHU, JAPAN**
50	MAP	**5.0**	2011/03/11 16:55:53	37.779	143.171	25.1	**OFF THE EAST COAST OF HONSHU, JAPAN**
51	MAP	**5.0**	2011/03/11 16:34:22	39.376	143.405	40.8	**OFF THE EAST COAST OF HONSHU, JAPAN**
52	MAP	**5.0**	2011/03/11 16:20:52	36.157	141.877	25.3	**NEAR THE EAST COAST OF HONSHU, JAPAN**
53	MAP	**5.5**	2011/03/11 16:11:27	39.463	143.577	9.2	**OFF THE EAST COAST OF HONSHU, JAPAN**
54	MAP	**5.3**	2011/03/11 16:04:53	39.236	144.320	25.5	**OFF THE EAST COAST OF HONSHU, JAPAN**
55	MAP	**5.0**	2011/03/11 15:55:23	36.626	142.162	24.8	**OFF THE EAST COAST OF HONSHU, JAPAN**
56	MAP	**5.0**	2011/03/11 15:50:59	37.409	142.217	24.9	**OFF THE EAST COAST OF HONSHU, JAPAN**
57	MAP	**5.0**	2011/03/11 15:46:02	36.022	141.958	19.7	**NEAR THE EAST COAST OF HONSHU, JAPAN**
58	MAP	**5.4**	2011/03/11 15:42:05	36.066	141.515	15.8	**NEAR THE EAST COAST OF HONSHU, JAPAN**
59	MAP	**5.2**	2011/03/11 15:32:34	37.216	142.233	25.0	**OFF THE EAST COAST OF HONSHU, JAPAN**
60	MAP	**5.6**	2011/03/11 15:19:38	36.233	141.856	25.0	**NEAR THE EAST COAST OF HONSHU, JAPAN**
61	MAP	**6.2**	2011/03/11 15:13:15	35.997	141.796	18.9	**NEAR THE EAST COAST OF HONSHU, JAPAN**
62	MAP	**5.0**	2011/03/11 15:01:39	39.082	142.383	26.0	**NEAR THE EAST COAST OF HONSHU, JAPAN**
63	MAP	**5.8**	2011/03/11 14:56:16	35.979	141.367	25.0	**NEAR THE EAST COAST OF HONSHU, JAPAN**
64	MAP	**5.4**	2011/03/11 14:54:04	35.919	141.819	24.9	**NEAR THE EAST COAST OF HONSHU, JAPAN**
65	MAP	**5.1**	2011/03/11 14:44:08	36.655	140.769	25.1	**NEAR THE EAST COAST OF HONSHU, JAPAN**
66	MAP	**5.4**	2011/03/11 14:26:31	37.431	142.254	13.2	**OFF THE EAST COAST OF**

							HONSHU, JAPAN
67	MAP	**5.1**	2011/03/11 14:20:20	37.947	143.183	25.2	**OFF THE EAST COAST OF HONSHU, JAPAN**
68	MAP	**5.2**	2011/03/11 14:10:39	37.575	141.963	25.5	**NEAR THE EAST COAST OF HONSHU, JAPAN**
69	MAP	**5.5**	2011/03/11 14:00:38	36.151	140.845	30.8	**NEAR THE EAST COAST OF HONSHU, JAPAN**
70	MAP	**5.2**	2011/03/11 13:55:28	38.039	142.831	24.9	**NEAR THE EAST COAST OF HONSHU, JAPAN**
71	MAP	**5.3**	2011/03/11 13:48:38	38.426	143.061	25.1	**OFF THE EAST COAST OF HONSHU, JAPAN**
72	MAP	**5.6**	2011/03/11 13:43:10	38.972	144.209	25.2	**OFF THE EAST COAST OF HONSHU, JAPAN**
73	MAP	**5.6**	2011/03/11 13:34:36	36.249	141.850	35.5	**NEAR THE EAST COAST OF HONSHU, JAPAN**
74	MAP	**5.1**	2011/03/11 13:31:55	39.152	142.837	25.0	**NEAR THE EAST COAST OF HONSHU, JAPAN**
75	MAP	**5.8**	2011/03/11 13:16:50	36.304	141.730	30.1	**NEAR THE EAST COAST OF HONSHU, JAPAN**
76	MAP	**5.1**	2011/03/11 13:15:45	37.393	141.882	30.1	**NEAR THE EAST COAST OF HONSHU, JAPAN**
77	MAP	**5.3**	2011/03/11 13:02:43	36.755	141.885	30.2	**NEAR THE EAST COAST OF HONSHU, JAPAN**
78	MAP	**5.3**	2011/03/11 12:59:21	36.128	141.768	24.9	**NEAR THE EAST COAST OF HONSHU, JAPAN**
79	MAP	**5.4**	2011/03/11 12:54:52	38.502	142.120	36.7	**NEAR THE EAST COAST OF HONSHU, JAPAN**
80	MAP	**5.6**	2011/03/11 12:49:01	36.158	141.711	25.0	**NEAR THE EAST COAST OF HONSHU, JAPAN**
81	MAP	**5.3**	2011/03/11 12:34:22	36.912	143.736	39.0	**OFF THE EAST COAST OF HONSHU, JAPAN**
82	MAP	**5.2**	2011/03/11 12:33:19	38.374	142.590	29.7	**NEAR THE EAST COAST OF HONSHU, JAPAN**
83	MAP	**5.2**	2011/03/11 12:28:45	36.166	141.664	29.3	**NEAR THE EAST COAST OF HONSHU, JAPAN**
84	MAP	**5.3**	2011/03/11 12:24:37	36.525	141.707	27.8	**NEAR THE EAST COAST OF HONSHU, JAPAN**
85	MAP	**5.9**	2011/03/11 12:12:53	38.052	142.542	21.6	**NEAR THE EAST COAST OF HONSHU, JAPAN**
86	MAP	**5.1**	2011/03/11 12:04:16	36.351	142.700	38.4	**OFF THE EAST COAST OF HONSHU, JAPAN**
87	MAP	**5.5**	2011/03/11 11:56:16	36.356	141.504	39.4	**NEAR THE EAST COAST OF HONSHU, JAPAN**
88	MAP	**5.1**	2011/03/11 11:54:02	36.982	142.535	45.0	**OFF THE EAST COAST OF HONSHU, JAPAN**
89	MAP	**5.8**	2011/03/11 11:46:47	36.034	141.055	47.5	**NEAR THE EAST COAST OF HONSHU, JAPAN**
90	MAP	**5.8**	2011/03/11 11:44:28	36.709	142.231	31.0	**OFF THE EAST COAST OF**

							HONSHU, JAPAN
91	MAP	6.5	2011/03/11 11:36:39	39.276	142.521	11.6	NEAR THE EAST COAST OF HONSHU, JAPAN
92	MAP	5.7	2011/03/11 11:21:02	35.759	140.913	25.2	NEAR THE EAST COAST OF HONSHU, JAPAN
93	MAP	5.5	2011/03/11 11:16:51	36.614	141.894	36.6	NEAR THE EAST COAST OF HONSHU, JAPAN
94	MAP	5.5	2011/03/11 11:13:12	36.451	141.789	18.2	NEAR THE EAST COAST OF HONSHU, JAPAN
95	MAP	5.5	2011/03/11 11:10:58	35.534	141.856	27.7	NEAR THE EAST COAST OF HONSHU, JAPAN
96	MAP	5.6	2011/03/11 11:00:51	37.813	141.481	28.7	NEAR THE EAST COAST OF HONSHU, JAPAN
97	MAP	5.1	2011/03/11 10:58:06	39.060	142.213	30.3	NEAR THE EAST COAST OF HONSHU, JAPAN
98	MAP	5.0	2011/03/11 10:52:08	38.534	143.346	29.9	OFF THE EAST COAST OF HONSHU, JAPAN
99	MAP	5.5	2011/03/11 10:45:46	38.466	143.591	41.1	OFF THE EAST COAST OF HONSHU, JAPAN
100	MAP	5.3	2011/03/11 10:35:36	37.044	141.298	25.8	NEAR THE EAST COAST OF HONSHU, JAPAN
101	MAP	5.9	2011/03/11 10:28:44	39.447	143.531	29.3	OFF THE EAST COAST OF HONSHU, JAPAN
102	MAP	5.6	2011/03/11 10:20:27	36.966	142.289	21.7	OFF THE EAST COAST OF HONSHU, JAPAN
103	MAP	6.0	2011/03/11 10:10:35	39.248	142.779	28.9	NEAR THE EAST COAST OF HONSHU, JAPAN
104	MAP	5.2	2011/03/11 09:59:57	36.703	142.207	41.6	OFF THE EAST COAST OF HONSHU, JAPAN
105	MAP	5.5	2011/03/11 09:47:02	39.685	142.938	29.7	NEAR THE EAST COAST OF HONSHU, JAPAN
106	MAP	5.2	2011/03/11 09:42:22	39.438	142.749	30.2	NEAR THE EAST COAST OF HONSHU, JAPAN
107	MAP	5.4	2011/03/11 09:37:08	35.877	141.585	29.9	NEAR THE EAST COAST OF HONSHU, JAPAN
108	MAP	5.5	2011/03/11 09:09:15	37.717	143.267	36.2	OFF THE EAST COAST OF HONSHU, JAPAN
109	MAP	5.4	2011/03/11 09:04:10	37.299	142.655	30.5	OFF THE EAST COAST OF HONSHU, JAPAN
110	MAP	5.2	2011/03/11 09:00:20	37.056	141.966	20.0	NEAR THE EAST COAST OF HONSHU, JAPAN
111	MAP	5.4	2011/03/11 08:52:26	36.763	141.910	35.8	NEAR THE EAST COAST OF HONSHU, JAPAN
112	MAP	5.5	2011/03/11 08:46:48	37.421	142.453	37.3	OFF THE EAST COAST OF HONSHU, JAPAN
113	MAP	5.9	2011/03/11 08:40:56	37.465	141.122	38.6	NEAR THE EAST COAST OF HONSHU, JAPAN
114	MAP	6.1	2011/03/11 08:31:08	37.428	141.200	25.0	NEAR THE EAST COAST OF

							HONSHU, JAPAN
	MAP	6.5	2011/03/11 08:19:24	36.200	142.000	19.9	OFF THE EAST COAST OF HONSHU, JAPAN
115							
	MAP	6.2	2011/03/11 08:15:41	37.034	144.612	27.8	OFF THE EAST COAST OF HONSHU, JAPAN
116							
	MAP	6.2	2011/03/11 08:12:05	36.606	141.557	19.8	NEAR THE EAST COAST OF HONSHU, JAPAN
117							
	MAP	5.5	2011/03/11 08:10:31	36.394	140.631	30.4	NEAR THE EAST COAST OF HONSHU, JAPAN
118							
	MAP	5.9	2011/03/11 08:01:59	37.071	142.734	22.6	OFF THE EAST COAST OF HONSHU, JAPAN
119							
	MAP	5.6	2011/03/11 07:56:16	37.130	142.305	34.0	OFF THE EAST COAST OF HONSHU, JAPAN
120							
	MAP	5.7	2011/03/11 07:54:45	37.742	141.565	45.3	NEAR THE EAST COAST OF HONSHU, JAPAN
121							
	MAP	5.8	2011/03/11 07:42:55	36.406	141.919	29.9	NEAR THE EAST COAST OF HONSHU, JAPAN
122							
	MAP	5.9	2011/03/11 07:38:27	39.250	142.783	29.1	NEAR THE EAST COAST OF HONSHU, JAPAN
123							
	MAP	6.1	2011/03/11 07:28:12	36.802	141.911	24.0	NEAR THE EAST COAST OF HONSHU, JAPAN
124							
	MAP	6.1	2011/03/11 07:25:33	37.916	144.621	15.0	OFF THE EAST COAST OF HONSHU, JAPAN
125							
	MAP	6.3	2011/03/11 07:14:59	36.648	141.811	25.0	NEAR THE EAST COAST OF HONSHU, JAPAN
126							
	MAP	5.9	2011/03/11 07:13:47	36.051	142.347	28.5	OFF THE EAST COAST OF HONSHU, JAPAN
127							
	MAP	5.8	2011/03/11 07:11:00	37.899	142.734	30.0	OFF THE EAST COAST OF HONSHU, JAPAN
128							
	MAP	6.3	2011/03/11 06:57:15	35.758	140.992	30.2	NEAR THE EAST COAST OF HONSHU, JAPAN
129							
	MAP	6.3	2011/03/11 06:48:47	37.993	142.764	22.3	OFF THE EAST COAST OF HONSHU, JAPAN
130							
	MAP	7.1	2011/03/11 06:25:51	38.106	144.553	19.7	OFF THE EAST COAST OF HONSHU, JAPAN
131							
	MAP	6.8	2011/03/11 06:15:40	36.186	141.192	35.0	NEAR THE EAST COAST OF HONSHU, JAPAN
132							
	MAP	6.4	2011/03/11 06:07:22	36.401	141.862	35.4	NEAR THE EAST COAST OF HONSHU, JAPAN
133							
	MAP	6.4	2011/03/11 06:06:11	39.025	142.316	25.1	NEAR THE EAST COAST OF HONSHU, JAPAN
134							
	MAP	8.9	2011/03/11 05:46:24	38.322	142.369	24.4	NEAR THE EAST COAST OF HONSHU, JAPAN

ANNEX-5: Mount Pinatubo Volcanic Eruption during the Senate & Congress proceedings not to renew the US Military Bases in Subic and Clark

Mount Pinatubo Volcanic Eruption

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

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SOURCE: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mount_Pinatubo

Mount Pinatubo

The eruption column of Mount Pinatubo on June 12, 1991, three days before the climactic eruption.

Elevation	1,485 m (4,872 ft) (current) 1,745 m (5,725 ft) (before 1991 eruption)
Pronunciation	[English: /ˌpiːnəˈtuːboʊ/]
Location	
Location	Zambales, Luzon, Philippines Tarlac, Luzon, Philippines Pampanga, Luzon, Philippines
Range	Zambales Mountains
Coordinates	15°08′30″N 120°21′00″E15.14167°N 120.35°ECoordinates: 15°08′30″N 120°21′00″E15.14167°N 120.35°E

Geology	
Type	Stratovolcano
Age of rock	Between 635,000 ± 80,000 and 1.1 ±; 0.09 million years[1]
Last eruption	1991[2] (deaths reached to 847)[3]

Mount Pinatubo is an active stratovolcano located on the island of Luzon, at the intersection of the borders of the Philippine provinces of Zambales, Tarlac, and Pampanga. It is located in the Tri-Cabusilan Mountain range separating the west coast of Luzon from the central plains, and is 42 km (26 mi) west of the dormant and more prominent Mount Arayat,[4] occasionally mistaken for Pinatubo. Ancestral Pinatubo was a stratovolcano made of andesite and dacite. Before 1991, the mountain was inconspicuous and heavily eroded. It was covered in dense forest which supported a population of several thousand indigenous people, the Aeta, who had fled to the mountains from the lowlands during the protracted Spanish conquest of the Philippines which began in 1565.

The volcano's Plinian/ Ultra-Plinian eruption (~VEI 6) in June 1991 produced the second largest terrestrial eruption of the 20th century (after the 1912 eruption of Novarupta) and the largest eruption in living memory.[5] The colossal 1991 eruption had a Volcanic Explosivity Index (VEI) of 5 or 6, and came some 450–500 years after the volcano's last known eruptive activity (estimated as VEI 5, the level of the 1980 eruption of Mount St. Helens), and some 1000 years after previous VEI 6 eruptive activity.[2] A VEI of 6 corresponds to 10 to 100 cubic km of released material (Pinatubo released an estimated 6 to 16 cubic km of ash). Successful predictions of the onset of the climactic eruption led to the evacuation of tens of thousands of people from the surrounding areas, saving many lives, but surrounding areas were severely damaged by pyroclastic flows, ash deposits, and later by lahars caused by rainwater remobilizing earlier volcanic deposits: thousands of houses and other buildings were destroyed.[5]

The effects of the eruption were felt worldwide. It ejected roughly 10 billion metric tonnes (10 cubic kilometres) of magma, and 20 million tons of SO_2, bringing vast quantities of minerals and metals to the surface environment. It injected large amounts of aerosols into the stratosphere – more than any eruption since that of Krakatoa in 1883. Over the following months, the aerosols formed a global layer of sulfuric acid haze. Global temperatures dropped by about 0.5 °C (0.9 °F), and ozone depletion temporarily increased substantially.[6]

Contents

[hide]

Overview of the area



Location of Mount Pinatubo, showing area over which ash from the 1991 eruption fell

Mount Pinatubo is part of a chain of volcanoes which lie along the western side of the edge of the island of Luzon. They are subduction volcanoes, formed by the Philippine Mobile Belt sliding over the Eurasian Plate along the Manila Trench to the west.[7] Mount Pinatubo and the other volcanoes of the West Luzon volcanic arc arise due to magma occlusion from this subduction plate boundary.

The volcano is located 87 km (55 miles) northwest of Manila, 14 km (9 miles) west of the former Clark Air Base, and 37 km (23 mi) north of the former U.S. Naval Base Subic Bay.[4] Clark Air Base's residential areas and petroleum storage facilities were in much closer proximity to the volcano than the airfield complex and neighboring Angeles City.

Several important river systems have their sources on Pinatubo, with the major rivers being the Bucao, Santo Tomas, Maloma, Tanguay, Ashley, and Kileng rivers. Before the eruption, these river systems were important ecosystems, but the eruption filled many valleys with deep pyroclastic deposits. Since 1991, the rivers have been clogged with sediment, and the valleys have seen frequent lahars. Studies show that the river systems will take many years yet to recover from the 1991 eruption.

About 500,000 people continue to live within 40 km of the mountain, with population centres including the 150,000 in Angeles City, and 30,000 at Clark Freeport Zone.

Cultural history

The word *pinatubo* means "grown" in Tagalog and Sambal, which may suggest a knowledge of its previous eruption in about AD 1500, although there is no oral tradition among local people of earlier large eruptions. *Pinatubo* might instead mean a fertile place where crops can be made to grow. An indigenous group of people, the Aetas (also spelled as Ayta), had lived on the slopes of the volcano and in surrounding areas for several centuries, having fled the lowlands to escape persecution by the Spanish. They were a hunter-gatherer people who were extremely successful in surviving in the dense jungles of the area. These people also grew some staple crops such as wheat, barley, and rice.

Before the catastrophic eruption of 1991, Pinatubo was an inconspicuous volcano, unknown to most people in the surrounding areas. Its summit was 1,745 m (5,725 ft) above sea level, but only about 600 m above nearby plains, and about 200 m higher than surrounding peaks, which largely obscured it from view. Philippine President Ramon Magsaysay, a native of Zambales, named his C-47 presidential plane "Mt. Pinatubo". The plane crashed in 1957, killing the President and 24 others onboard.[8]

In total, about 30,000 people lived on the flanks of the volcano in barangays (villages) and other small settlements. The dense jungle covering most of the mountain and surrounding peaks supported the hunter-gathering Aeta, while on the surrounding flatter areas, the abundant rainfall (almost 4 m annually) provided by the monsoon climate and the fertile volcanic soils provided excellent conditions for agriculture, and many people grew rice and other staple foods.

Aetas living near Pinatubo worship the creator named Apo na Malyari who lives at the peak. According to them, this creator caused the 1991 eruption because of displeasure toward illegal loggers and Philippine National Oil Company executives who have drilled into the mountain for geothermal heat. Some of the Aetas stayed on the mountainside, hiding in caves; only three

people survived.[*citation needed*] However after the quake, they felt as if their god had betrayed them.[9]

Geological history

Although there seems to be no local knowledge of the previous large eruptions in the Pinatubo area, several Aeta residents reported in 1991 that their elders recalled small explosions in the past. Pinatubo was a known geothermal area before the 1991 eruption, and small steam explosions are quite common in such areas. It was only after volcanic activity began in 1991 that geologists studied the eruptive history of the region in any detail. Eruptions at the site can be divided into two major eras.

Ancestral Pinatubo

Pinatubo before the major eruption of 1991.

Much of the rugged land surrounding the present volcano consists of remnants of 'ancestral' Pinatubo. This volcano was located roughly in the same place as the present mountain, and activity seems to have begun about 1.1 million years ago. Ancestral Pinatubo may have reached a height of up to 2,300 m (7,550 ft) above sea level, based on profile fitting to the remaining lower slopes.

Several mountains near modern Pinatubo are old satellite vents of ancestral Pinatubo, formed from volcanic plugs and lava domes. Some nearby peaks are also remnants of ancestral Pinatubo, formed from erosion-resistant parts of the old mountain slopes left behind when the less resistant parts were eroded by weathering.

The eruptive activity of ancestral Pinatubo was much less explosive than modern Pinatubo, and probably ended about 45,000 years ago. After a long period of dormancy, modern Pinatubo was born in eruptions beginning about 35,000 years ago.

Peaks like Mt. Negron, Mt. Cuadrado, Mt. Dorst and Mt Donald are believed to have been part of the volcano's original peak. Despite becoming heavily silted with mud deposits, rivers like Tarlac River and Abacan River still flow through the mountain's summit.

Modern Pinatubo

The birth of modern Pinatubo occurred in the most explosive eruption in its history, which deposited pyroclastic flow material up to 100 meters thick on all sides of the mountain. The total volume of material erupted may have been up to 25 cubic kilometers (6 mile³), and the removal of this amount of material from the underlying magma chamber led to the formation of a large caldera which was filled with water by monsoon rains several months after the climatic eruption, Lake Pinatubo has since become a good tourist attraction, the preffered route is through Barangay Santa Juliana in Capas, Tarlac.

Earlier large eruptions occurred 17,000, 9000, 6000 – 5000, and 3900 – 2300± years ago. Each of these eruptions seems to have been very large, ejecting more than 10 km³ of material and covering large parts of the surrounding areas with pyroclastic flow deposits. Scientists estimate that the most recent eruption before 1991 happened about 450 years ago, and after that, the volcano lay dormant. Its slopes became completely covered in dense rainforest and eroded into gullies and ravines.[10]

1991 awakening

On July 16, 1990, the major 1990 Luzon earthquake of magnitude 7.7 struck central Luzon. This was the largest earthquake recorded in 1990,[11][12] comparable in size to the 1906 San Francisco earthquake and the 2008 Sichuan earthquake. Its epicenter was in Rizal, Nueva Ecija municipality,[13] about 100 km northeast of Pinatubo, and faulted northwest-southeast through three provinces. It also followed the Philippine Fault System west as far as Baguio City, which was devastated, and is located about 80 km north-northeast of Pinatubo, leading volcanologists to speculate that it might ultimately have triggered the 1991 eruption, although this is impossible to prove conclusively. Two weeks after the earthquake, local residents reported steam coming from the volcano, but scientists who visited the mountain in response found only small landslides rather than any eruptive activity.

On March 15, 1991, a succession of earthquakes was felt by villagers on the northwestern side of the volcano. Further earthquakes of increasing intensity were felt over the next two weeks, and it became clear some kind of volcanic activity was likely. On April 2, the volcano awoke, with phreatic eruptions occurring near the summit along a 1.5 km long fissure. Over the next few weeks, small eruptions continued, dusting the surrounding areas with Volcanic ash. Seismographs recorded hundreds of small earthquakes every day.

Scientists immediately installed monitoring equipment and analyzed the volcano for clues as to its previous eruptive history. Radiocarbon dating of charcoal found in old volcanic deposits revealed three major explosive eruptions in recent millennia, about 5500, 3500 and 500 years ago. Geological mapping showed that much of the surrounding plains were formed by lahar deposits from previous eruptions.

Volcanic activity increased throughout May. Measurements of sulfur dioxide emissions showed a rapid increase from 500 tons per day by May 13 to 5,000 tons/day by May 28. This implied that there was a rising column of fresh magma beneath the volcano. After May 28, the amount of SO_2 being emitted decreased substantially, raising fears that the degassing of the magma had been blocked somehow, leading to a pressure build-up in the magma chamber and a high likelihood of explosive eruptions.

The first magmatic eruptions occurred on June 3, and the first large explosion on June 7 generated an ash column 7 km (4.5 miles) high. The Philippine Institute of Volcanology and Seismology (PHIVOLCS) issued a warning indicating the possibility of a major eruption within two weeks.

Evacuation



Pinatubo evacuation zones

Given all the signs that a very large eruption was imminent, PHIVOLCS – assisted by the U.S. Geological Survey – worked to convince local inhabitants of the severity of the threat. A false warning might have led to cynicism about any later warnings, but delaying a warning until an eruption began might lead to thousands of deaths, so the volcanologists were under some pressure to deliver a timely and accurate assessment of the volcanic risk.

Three successive evacuation zones were defined, the innermost containing everything within 10 km of the volcano's summit, the second extending from 10 to 20 km from the summit, and the third extending from 20 to 40 km from the summit (Clark Air Base and Angeles City were in this zone). The 10 km and 10–20 km zones had a total population of about 40,000, while some 331,000 people lived in the 20–40 km zone. Five stages of volcanic alert were defined, from level 1 (low level seismic disturbances) up to level 5 (major eruption in progress). Daily alerts were issued stating the alert level and associated danger area, and the information was announced in major national and local newspapers, on radio and television stations, by nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and directly to the endangered inhabitants.

Many of the Aeta who lived on the slopes of the volcano left their villages of their own volition when the first explosions began in April, gathering in a village about 12 km from the summit. They moved to increasingly distant villages as the eruptions escalated, some Aeta moving up to nine times in the two months preceding the cataclysmic eruption

The first formal evacuations were ordered from the 10 km zone on April 7. Evacuation of the 10–20 km zone was ordered when a level 4 alert was issued on June 7. A level 5 alert triggered evacuation of the 20–40 km zone on June 13, and in all some 60,000 people had left the area within 30 km of the volcano before June 15. Most people temporarily relocated to Manila and Quezon City, with some 30,000 using the Amoranto Velodrome in Quezon City as an evacuee camp.

Eruptions' climactic buildup

The eruption cloud shortly before the climactic eruption

In early June, tiltmeter measurements had shown that the volcano was inflating, evidently due to growing amounts of magma filling the reservoir beneath the summit. At the same time, seismic activity, previously concentrated at a depth of a few kilometers below a point about 5 km northwest of the summit, shifted to shallow depths just below the summit. On June 7, the first magmatic eruptions took place with the formation of a lava dome at the summit of the volcano. The dome grew substantially over the next five days, reaching a maximum diameter of about 200 m and a height of 40 m.

A small explosion at 03:41 on June 12 marked the beginning of a new, more violent phase of the eruption. A few hours later, large explosions lasting about half an hour generated an eruption column which quickly reached heights of over 19 km, and which generated pyroclastic flows extending up to 4 km from the summit in some river valleys. Fourteen hours later, a 15-minute eruption hurled ash to heights of 24 km. Friction in the uprushing ash column generated abundant lightning.

A third large eruption began at 08:41 on June 13, after an intense swarm of small earthquakes over the previous two hours. It lasted about five minutes, and the eruption column once again reached 24 km. After three hours of quiet, seismic activity began, growing more and more

intense over the next 24 hours, until a three-minute eruption generated a 21 km-high eruption column at 13:09 on June 14.

Tephra fall from these four large eruptions was extensive to the southwest of the volcano. Two hours after the last of these four explosions, a series of eruptions began which lasted for the next 24 hours, and which saw the production of much larger pyroclastic flows and surges which travelled several kilometres down river valleys on the flanks of the volcano.

Dacite was the igneous rock making up the tephra in these eruptions and in the following climactic event. The most abundant phenocryst minerals were hornblende and plagioclase, but an unusual phenocryst mineral was also present—the calcium sulfate, anhydrite. The dacite magma was more oxidized than most magmas, and the sulfur-rich nature of the eruption was probably causally related to the redox state.

The climactic eruption

All the seismographs at Clark Air Base had been rendered inoperative by 14:30 on June 15, mostly by pyroclastic density currents. Intense atmospheric pressure variation was also recorded.

On June 15, 1991, the eruption plume hours after the climactic eruption.

On the same day, Typhoon Yunya struck the island, passing about 75 km (50 miles) north of the volcano. The typhoon rains made direct visual observations of the eruption impossible, but measurements showed that ash was ejected to heights of 34 km (21 miles) by the most violent phase of the eruption, which lasted about three hours. Pyroclastic flows poured from the summit, reaching as far as 16 km away from it. Typhoon rains mixed with the ash deposits caused massive lahars.

The ash cloud from the volcano covered an area of some 125,000 km² (50,000 mi²), bringing total darkness to much of central Luzon. Almost all of the island received some ashfall, which formed a heavy, rain-saturated snow-like blanket. Tephra fell over most of the South China Sea and ashfall was recorded as far away as Vietnam, Cambodia and Malaysia.

Twelve days after the first magmatic eruptions of June 3, on June 15, 1991, by about 22:30, and about nine hours after the onset of the most recent climactic phase, atmospheric pressure waves had decreased to the pre-eruption levels. No seismic records were available at this time, but volcanologists believe 22:30 marked the end of the climactic eruption.

Vast quantities of minerals and metals were brought to the surface. Overall, introduced to the surface environment, was an estimated 800,000 tons of zinc, 600,000 tons of copper, 550,000 tons of chromium, 300,000 tons of nickel, 100,000 tons of lead, 10,000 tons of arsenic, 1000 tons of cadmium, and 800 tons of mercury.[14]

Aftermath

Summit caldera as seen on Aug. 1, 1991

In all, the eruption ejected about ten cubic kilometres (2.5 mile³) of material, making it the largest eruption since that of Novarupta in 1912 and some ten times larger than the 1980 eruption of Mount St. Helens. Ejected material such as tephra fallout and pyroclastic flow deposits are much less dense than magma, and the volume of ejected material was equivalent to about four cubic kilometres (1 mile³) of unerupted material. This colossal eruption had a Volcanic Explosivity Index of 6.[15] The former summit of the volcano was replaced by a caldera 2.5 km wide. The highest point on the caldera rim now stood 1,485 m above sea level, some 260 m lower than the pre-eruption summit.

Over 800 people were killed by the eruption,[16] mostly by roofs collapsing under the weight of accumulated wet ash, a hazard that was greatly exacerbated by the simultaneous arrival of Typhoon Yunya. The evacuation in the days preceding the eruption certainly saved tens of thousands of lives, and has been hailed as a great success for volcanology and eruption prediction.

Before and after the eruption: a river valley filled in by pyroclastic flow deposits

However, since the eruption, each rainy season has brought further lahars, which have caused the displacement of thousands of people. Hundreds have died from poor sanitation in relocation camps. Agriculture in the region also suffered badly from the effects of the eruption, with hundreds of square kilometres of formerly arable land being rendered infertile, destroying the livelihoods of thousands of farmers.

The United States maintained two large military bases in the region; U.S. Naval Base Subic Bay was 75 km (50 mi.) to the southwest, while Clark Air Base was less than 25 km (16 mi.) to the east of the volcano's summit. The United States Air Force initiated a massive airlift effort to evacuate American service members and their families during and immediately following the eruption, named Operation Fiery Vigil. Most personnel were initially relocated to Guam, Okinawa, and Hawaii, although some returned to the continental United States. Clark Air Base was ultimately abandoned by the United States military, and Subic Bay reverted to Philippines control the next year following the breakdown of lease negotiations.

Local economic and social effects

The eruption of Pinatubo severely hampered the economic development of the surrounding areas. Extensive damage to buildings and infrastructure cost billions of pesos to repair, and further costs were incurred in constructing dikes and dams to control the post-eruption lahars.

In total, 364 communities and 2.1 million people were affected by the eruption, with livelihoods and houses being damaged or destroyed. More than 8,000 houses were completely destroyed, and a further 73,000 were damaged. In addition to the severe damage sustained by these communities, roads and communications were damaged or destroyed by pyroclastic flows and

lahars throughout the areas surrounding the volcanoes. The estimated cost of repairing the damage to infrastructure was 3.8 billion pesos.

Many reforestation projects were destroyed in the eruption, with a total area of 150 square kilometres (37,000 acres) valued at 125 million pesos destroyed. Agriculture was heavily disrupted, with 800 square kilometres (200,000 acres) of rice-growing farmland destroyed, and almost 800,000 head of livestock and poultry killed. The cost to agriculture of eruption effects was estimated to be 1.5 billion pesos.

Space Shuttle (Mission STS-43) photograph of the Earth over South America taken on August 8, 1991, showing double layer of Pinatubo aerosol cloud (dark streaks) above high cumulonimbus tops

Damage to healthcare facilities, and the spread of illnesses in relocation facilities, led to soaring death rates in the months following the eruption. Education for thousands of children was seriously disrupted by the destruction of schools in the eruption. The gross regional domestic product of the Pinatubo area accounted for about 10% of the total Philippine gross domestic product. The GRDP had been growing at 5% annually before the eruption, but fell by more than 3% from 1990 to 1991.

Global environmental effects

The powerful eruption of such an enormous volume of lava and ash injected significant quantities of aerosols and dust into the stratosphere. Sulfur dioxide oxidised in the atmosphere to produce a haze of sulfuric acid droplets, which gradually spread throughout the stratosphere over the year following the eruption. The injection of aerosols into the stratosphere is thought to have been the largest since the eruption of Krakatoa in 1883, with a total mass of SO_2 of about 17 million tons being injected—the largest volume ever recorded by modern instruments (see chart and figure).

This very large stratospheric injection resulted in a reduction in the normal amount of sunlight reaching the Earth's surface by roughly 10% (see figure). This led to a decrease in northern hemisphere average temperatures of 0.5–0.6 °C (0.9–1.1 °F), and a global fall of about 0.4 °C (0.7 °F).[17][18] At the same time, the temperature in the stratosphere rose to several degrees

higher than normal, due to absorption of radiation by the aerosols. The stratospheric cloud from the eruption persisted in the atmosphere for three years after the eruption.



Satellite measurements of ash and aerosol emissions from Mount Pinatubo.

The eruption had a significant effect on ozone levels in the atmosphere, causing a large increase in the destruction rate of ozone. Ozone levels at mid-latitudes reached their lowest recorded levels, while in the southern hemisphere winter of 1992, the ozone hole over Antarctica reached its largest ever size until then, with the fastest recorded ozone depletion rates. The eruption of Mount Hudson in Chile in August 1991 also contributed to southern hemisphere ozone destruction, with measurements showing a sharp decrease in ozone levels at the tropopause when the aerosol clouds from Pinatubo and Hudson arrived.

Another noticeable effect of the dust in the atmosphere was the appearance of lunar eclipses. Normally even at mid-eclipse, the moon is still visible although much dimmed, but in the year following the Pinatubo eruption, the moon was hardly visible at all during eclipses, due to much greater absorption of sunlight by dust in the atmosphere.

The area since 1991

Following the climactic eruption of June 15, 1991, activity at the volcano continued at a much lower level, with continuous ash eruptions lasting until August 1991 and episodic eruptions continuing for another month. Activity then remained low until July 1992 when a new lava dome started growing in the caldera. Volcanologists suspected that further violent eruptions could be possible, and some areas were evacuated. However, the eruption was only minor and since that episode, the volcano has been quiet.

Lake Pinatubo, the resulting crater lake of the 1991 eruption pictured here in 2008

After eruptions ended, a crater lake, Lake Pinatubo, formed in the 1991 caldera, with the 1992 lava dome forming an island. Initially, the lake was hot and highly acidic, with a minimum pH of 2 and a temperature of about 40 °C. Subsequent rainfall cooled and diluted the lake, lowering the temperature to 26 °C and raising the pH to 5.5 by 2003.

The lake increased in depth by about 1 meter per month on average, until September 2001, when fears that the walls of the crater might be unstable prompted the Philippine government to order a controlled draining of the lake. 9,000 people were once again evacuated from surrounding areas in case a large flood was accidentally triggered. Workers cut a 5 m notch in the crater rim, and successfully drained about a quarter of the lake's volume.[19]

The Aeta people were the hardest hit by the eruption. After the areas surrounding the volcano were declared safe, many Aetas returned to their old villages only to find them destroyed by pyroclastic and lahar deposits. Some were able to return to their former way of life, but most moved instead to government-organized resettlement areas. Conditions on these were poor, with each family receiving only small plots of land not ideal for growing crops. Many Aeta found casual labor working for lowland farmers, and overall Aeta society became much more fragmented, and reliant on and integrated with lowland culture.[20]

Activity since 1991

Since 1991, Pinatubo has remained active, with twenty activity events reported in 1992, three in 1993, four in 1994, two in 1995, and one each in 1996 and 2002.[21]

Gallery

- 

  Explosive eruption, early June 1991

- 

  Snow-like ashfall caused by heavy rain mixing with ash columns

- 

  Erosional dissection of ash deposits on Pinatubo

- 

  Aircraft hangars at Clark Air Base destroyed by ashfall

- 

  Pinatubo crater lake in Sep. 2006

- 

  Lahars from Pinatubo volcano fill the broad Santo Tomás River valley SW of the volcano

See also

- Active volcanoes in the Philippines
- Inactive volcanoes in the Philippines
- Potentially active volcanos in the Philippines
- List of volcanic eruptions by death toll
- Timetable of major worldwide volcanic eruptions

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ANNEX-5: The Withdrawal of US Military Bases in the Philippines

U.S. Naval Base Subic Bay

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(Redirected from Subic Naval Base)

Jump to: navigation, search

For the body of water, see Subic Bay, Philippines.

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U.S. Naval Base Subic Bay
Subic Bay, Philippines

An aerial view of Naval Station Subic Bay (right) and Naval Air Station Cubi Point (left).

Type	Naval Base
Built	1885
Built by	Spain
In use	1885-1898 (Spain), 1898-1899 (Filipino), 1899-1992

	(US)
Current condition	some of the areas have covered in ash while the others are renovated
Current owner	Philippine Government
Controlled by	Philippines

An aerial view of Cubi Point, and in the background, Naval Station Subic Bay.

U.S. Naval Base Subic Bay was a major ship-repair, supply, and rest and recreation facility of the United States Navy located in Zambales, Philippines. It was the largest U.S. Navy installation in the Pacific and was the largest overseas military installation of the United States Armed Forces after Clark Air Base in Angeles City was closed in 1991.

Contents

[hide]

Spanish period

Subic Bay's famous strategic location, sheltered anchorages, and deep water was first made known when the Spanish explorer Juan de Salcedo reported its existence to the Spanish authorities upon his return to Manila after Salcedo arrived in Zambales to establish the Spanish crown but it would be a number of years before the Spanish would consider establishing a base there.

Cavite, which had been home to most of the Spanish fleet in the Philippines, suffered from unhealthy living conditions and was vulnerable in time of war and bad weather because of its shallow water and lack of shelter. Because of these, a military expedition was sent to Subic Bay in 1868 with orders to survey the bay to find out if it would be a suitable site for a naval yard. The Spanish explored the entire bay and concluded that it had much promise and thus reported their findings to Cavite. This report was not well-accepted in Manila as the Spanish command was reluctant to move to the provincial isolation of Subic. Finally, in 1884, a Royal Decree declared Subic Bay as a naval port.

On March 8, 1885, the Spanish Navy authorized construction of the *Arsenal en Olongapo* and by the following September, work started at Olongapo. Both the harbor and its inner basin were dredged and a drainage canal was built, as the Spanish military authorities were planning to make Olongapo and their Navy yard an "island." This canal also served as a line of defense and over which the bridge at the base's Main Gate passes. When the Arsenal was finished, the *Caviteño*, the *Santa Ana*, and the *San Quentin*, all of which were gunboats, were assigned for its defense. To complement these gunboats, coastal artilleries were planned for the east and west ends of the station, as well as on Grande Island.

Seawalls, causeways and a short railway were built across the swampy tidal flats. To finish these projects, thousands of tons of dirt and rock from Kalalake in Olongapo had to be brought in to be used as fill. The magnitude of this quarrying was so huge that a hill eventually disappeared and became a lagoon in the area now known as Bicentennial Park.

The main entrance to the Arsenal was the West Gate, which still stands at present. This gate was equipped with gunports and also served as a jail. This gate was connected to the South Gate, which was near the water front, by a high wall of locally-quarried stone.

Inside the Arsenal, the Spanish constructed a foundry, as well as other shops, which were necessary for the construction and repair of ships. The buildings were laid out in two rows on Rivera Point, a sandy patch of land jutting into the bay, and named after the incumbent Captain-General of the Philippines, Fernando Primo de Rivera. The Arsenal's showpiece was the

station commandant's headquarters, which was a one-storey building of molave and narra, and stood near today's Alava Pier and had colored glass windows.

The Spanish navy yard was constructed in the area that was last occupied by the U.S. Naval Ship Repair Facility.

Battle of Manila Bay

On April 25, 1898, Commodore George Dewey, Commander of the U.S. Asiatic Fleet, received word that war with Spain had been declared and was ordered to leave Hong Kong and attack the Spanish fleet in Manila Bay.

In the Philippines, Rear Admiral Patricio Montojo, realizing that Subic Bay would provide a more defensible position than Cavite, ordered his smaller ships and the batteries in Manila Bay to resist the Dewey's fleet and deny them the entrance to Manila Bay. His other units would then use Subic Bay as a sally port, with which he could attack the American fleet's rear and cut off its supplies. On the April 26, Montojo arrived at Subic Bay aboard the *Reina Christina*, with seven other ships.

On the morning of the April 27, the *Castilla* was towed northeast of Grande Island to help control the western entrance to Subic Bay. The eastern entrance, which was between Grande and Chiquita Islands, had been blocked by the scuttling of the *San Quentin* and two other vessels. On Grande Island, the four six-inch (15.2 cm) guns that had been shipped from Sangley Point were not yet installed. Meanwhile, a cable-laying ship, which was commandeered to lay mines ended up putting only four of the 15 available mines in place.

In Hong Kong, Dewey purposely delayed his sailing until he received news from the U.S. Consul at Manila, Oscar F. Williams, about information about the strength and positions of the Spanish fleet. Williams told Dewey that Montojo and his fleet had sailed to Subic Bay.

On April 30, Dewey sighted the islands of Luzon and thus ordered the *Boston* and the *Concord* to sail at full speed to Subic Bay to hunt for enemy ships. After seeing no enemy vessels at Subic, the *Boston* and the *Concord* signaled the *Olympia* of their findings and rejoined the squadron underway to Manila.

Dawn of May 1, 1898, the American fleet entered Manila Bay and once the ships closed to within 5,000 yards (4,600 m) of the Spanish fleet, Dewey ordered the Captain of the *Olympia* to fire when ready. Montojo's fleet was totally destroyed, losing 167 men and wounding 214. The Americans only suffered a handful of wounded.

In June 1898, nearly a thousand Spanish nationals left Olongapo and took refuge at Grande Island. By July, Dewey ordered the *Raleigh* and the *Concord* to sail for Subic Bay to demand the surrender of Grande Island. When the American ships arrived, they saw the German cruiser *Irene* at the island. But as the Americans cleared for action and started to head for the Irene,

she fled around the other end of Grande. The Spanish garrison on the island did not resist and immediately surrendered to Captain Joseph Coghlan of the *Raleigh*.

Philippine-American War

During the Philippine-American War, the Americans focused on using the Spanish naval station at Sangley Point and largely ignored Subic Bay and the arsenal was occupied by Filipino forces. The Filipinos constructed a gun battery on top of a ridge using one of the six-inch (15.2 cm) guns on Grande Island.

In the summer of 1899, gunboats started patrolling Subic Bay and after realizing that the patrols would not stop, the Filipinos started to prepare to confront the Americans. During a routine patrol, the supply ship *Zafiro* entered Subic Bay and came under fire from the newly-constructed battery. The *Zafiro* withdrew to Cavite and reported the incident to headquarters. The cruiser *Charleston* was then sent to Subic to silence the battery, but as she was withdrawing, the battery gave out one last shot, provoking the Americans.

On September 23, 1899, the *Charleston*, the *Concord*, the *Monterey*, and the *Zafiro* sailed into Subic Bay to destroy the battery. Upon clearing Kalaklan Point, the *Monterey*, equipped with 10- and 12-inch (25.4 and 30.5 cm) guns, opened fire. Under this barrage, the battery was only able to fire one shot.

The *Charleston* then sent a signal for 180 sailors and 70 Marines to land on Subic. Meanwhile the other ships continued firing. The Filipinos then deployed into the town of Olongapo, returning fire with small arms. When the entire landing force was ashore, the ships ceased firing and the landing party entered the battery. In all, three charges of guncotton were placed on the battery, completely destroying it. The party then went back to their ships and sailed for Manila. While the battery was destroyed, the Filipino forces still held the navy yard as well as Olongapo.

In December 1899, the U.S. Army launched an operation to clear the countryside of insurgents; 90 soldiers from the 32d U.S. Volunteers set out to capture Olongapo. As the soldiers were entering Santa Rita, just outside of Olongapo, they met a pocket of resistance but after returning fire, the insurgents quickly scattered. The soldiers then proceeded to capture the navy yard.

When Rear Admiral John C. Watson learned of this action against the navy yard, he set out for Subic aboard the *Baltimore*, accompanied by the *Oregon*. When the ships arrived, Watson was surprised that the U.S. Army was in complete possession of the navy yard. Watson then ordered Marine Captain John Myers ashore with 100 marines to secure the navy yard.

When the marines found the highest flagpole on the navy yard, which was in front of the hospital, they immediately raised the American flag on December 10, 1899, one year after the

Treaty of Paris was signed. The Marines then took responsibility for the navy yard while the Army took over administrative and operational control of Olongapo.

Drinking water was not available on the navy yard and so water details had to be sent to the village of Binictican, near the mouth of the river of the same name. Early during the occupation of Olongapo, the town was offered as a place of refuge for Filipinos who were unsympathetic to the insurgents. After an ambush of seven Marines, the inhabitants of the villages of Binictican and Boton were ordered to move into Olongapo or be declared outlaws. Those people who owned property in the two villages were given houses in Olongapo. Six days after the villagers settled in Olongapo, the *Nashville* shelled Binictican and Boton and later 100 Marines completed the destruction.

The Marines then exercised civil authority over Olongapo and ordered municipal elections, appointed local policemen, gave away food to supplement poor harvests, supplied medical care and supplies, and set up a school for the teaching of the English language.

In 1900, the General Board of the United States Navy made a thorough study of the naval base building program and decided that the American fleet in the Philippines could be easily bottled up in either the Manila or Subic bays. They instead recommended Guimaras Island, south of Manila, as the most suitable site for the main American naval base in the Philippines. Admiral of the Navy George Dewey and Admiral George C. Remey, Commander of the Asiatic Fleet, disagreed. They thought Subic Bay held the greatest potential.

The Navy then called for another study with Remey as the senior member. This board then decided that Subic Bay was the most suitable and practicable place to build a naval base. A board of officers under Rear Admiral Henry C. Taylor was then appointed to develop a plan for the naval station. Extensive plans for fortifications, dockyards, drydocks, workshops, a hospital, a railroad linking Olongapo with Manila and storage facilities for 20,000 tons[*vague*] (18,000 metric tons) of coal were drawn up and submitted to the Congress.

The board requested an appropriation of one million dollars to begin building the naval station. President Theodore Roosevelt, a strong supporter of the establishment of a naval station at Subic Bay, issued an Executive Order establishing the Subic Bay Naval Reservation.

Because of the establishment of the Subic Bay Naval Reservation in November 1901 more troops were assigned to Subic. When the Samar force returned at the beginning of March 1902, its personnel were divided between Olongapo and Cavite. Cavite, however, still continued to have the largest number of Marines anywhere in the Philippines and continued to be the headquarters of the U.S. Navy because of its proximity to Manila.

In December 1902, Rear Admiral Robley D. Evans, Commander of the Asiatic Fleet, directed the first fleet exercise in Asian waters. An expeditionary force of 200 Marines occupied and erected guns on Grande Island. The channels on each side of the island were mined, while vessels of the

fleet operated in the bay itself. The exercise was highly successful and confirmed the Admiral's opinion of the strategic advantage of Subic Bay.

The value of Subic Bay as a training area was recognized as the Marines practiced movements in wild and difficult environment. Their building of bridges and roads was also considered to be excellent training.

In June 1907, as tensions with Japan mounted, orders were secretly issued for Army and Navy forces in the Philippines to concentrate at Subic Bay. A large supply of coal and certain advanced base materials including coastal defense guns were to be moved from Cavite. This plan, however, would be opposed by other military leaders and by Governor-General Leonard Wood. An acrimonious debate would emerge and plans to build a major base in the Philippines would be discarded. Roosevelt would be disappointed by this, wrote that the aforementioned decision was a humiliating experience, and instead pushed for the development of Pearl Harbor in Hawaii.

World War I and Inter-War Years

1933: Vought O3U-1 "Corsair" observation planes aboard the *Augusta* during exercises in Subic Bay.

In 1917, as the United States was drawn into World War I, all the Navy's shipyards including Subic Bay began working at a feverish pace to prepare ships for sea. American and Filipino workers would take pride in their workmanship such that destroyers that were overhauled in Subic Bay became the vanguard of Admiral William Sims's convoy.

The Washington Naval Treaty of 1922 called for the limitation of naval armaments and included provisions that facilities for the repair and maintenance of American naval forces in the Philippines would be reduced. Shops were dismantled at the navy yard at Subic Bay and Fort Wint was reduced to caretaker status and personnel levels were cut.

The Japanese government kept a close eye on activities in the Philippines for violations of the 1922 treaty. During the typhoon season of 1928, VT Squadron Five which operated Martin

torpedo aircraft out of Manila, arrived in Subic Bay on a routine training flight. A typhoon suddenly veered toward Subic Bay and the plane crews had to lay down ramps to haul the seaplanes up on the beach. The pontoons were filled with water and the planes lashed down. When the typhoon had passed, the undamaged planes were refloated and returned to their tenders at Manila.

Within three weeks, the squadron commander was informed of a Japanese complaint that the Navy had violated the treaty by increasing the facilities for plane handling at Subic Bay. The squadron commander was to provide all facts concerning the incident to the Office of the Governor-General of the Philippines so that a response could be made to the Tokyo government.

Even though the facilities at Subic Bay were greatly reduced under the Coolidge administration, some ship repair capability remained, including the Dewey Drydock. An earthquake on August 30, 1923, devastated Yokohama, Japan and in 72 hours, the transport ship *Merritt* set sail from Subic Bay, loaded with Red Cross relief supplies and 200 Filipino nurses.

In the 1930s a tree-planting program was begun, transforming the naval station into a virtual tropical garden, with streets lined with coconut palms, hibiscus, and gardenias. Outside activities and sports were also promoted, with a golf course being laid out where Lowry Hall last stood.

World War II

By mid-1940, the Nazis had overrun Europe and Japan was beginning to flex its military muscle. The United States Congress therefore authorized the release of funds with which to update the Coast Defenses of Manila and Subic Bays. President Franklin D. Roosevelt would complement this by ordering the integration of Filipino military forces into the newly-created U.S. Army Forces in the Far East. General Douglas MacArthur, who had been serving as a military advisor to the government of the Commonwealth of the Philippines and was also Field Marshal of the Philippines, was ordered back to active duty with the rank of Lieutenant General with the title of Commander of the United States Army Forces in the Far East.

To prepare for eventual war, Dewey Drydock, which had been at Subic Bay for 35 years was towed to Mariveles Harbor, on the tip of the Bataan Peninsula, and scuttled there on April 8, 1942 to prevent the Japanese from deriving benefit from it.

The 4th Marine Regiment, which had been withdrawn from Shanghai in China, was ordered to withdraw to the Philippines. The first members of the regiment disembarked from the *President Madison* at Subic Bay early in the morning of November 1, 1941. The remainder arrived on December 1. The marines were housed in temporary wooden barracks and in tents at the naval station and the rifle range.

The freshly-arrived Marines were assigned to provide land defense for Subic Bay. Seaward defenses included the batteries at Fort Wint on Grande Island and a minefield, which had been laid off the entrance to Subic Harbor. As the Marines built beach defenses, Consolidated PBY-4 Catalinas from VP-102 of Patrol Wing 10, which was stationed at Subic Bay, were conducting daily patrols off Luzon as a response to rumors that the Japanese were approaching the Philippines. On December 11, seven Catalinas had just returned from patrol when Japanese Zeroes appeared and strafed the aircraft. One ensign was killed and all Catalinas sank to the bottom of Subic Bay's inner basin.

As the Japanese continued their advance through Luzon, telephone and telegraph lines between Manila and Olongapo were sabotaged; as a result, all Japanese in Olongapo were rounded up and turned over to the Provost Marshal. A priest had also been questioning Marines and Filipinos about sensitive matters such as troop positions and strength and after the Marines became suspicious, a search of the priest's belongings was ordered and a shortwave radio was found. Right there and then, the battalion commander convened a hearing and after intense interrogation, the priest confessed to being a member of the German-American Bund and had been a spy for the Japanese. The man was then brought to the back of the church and shot by a Marine firing squad.

By December 24, the situation at Subic had become hopeless and an order to destroy the station and withdraw was given. All buildings on the station were torched while Filipinos burned the entire town of Olongapo. All that remained on Subic was the former *New York*, and she was towed into a deep part of the bay and scuttled. All Marines withdrew to Bataan and eventually to Corregidor where they made their last stand.

Fort Wint, under the command of Colonel Napoleon Boudreau of the U.S. Army, was evacuated on December 25. All equipment and supplies were destroyed. On January 10, 1942, soldiers of the Japanese Imperial Army's 14th Infantry Division marched into Olongapo and on the 12th, the Japanese commandeered native fishing boats to seize Grande Island. Subic Bay Naval Station was established with four companies of soldiers and a company of Kempeitai.

Within one week of the Japanese's occupation of Subic Bay and Grande Island, American PT Boats at Cavite were ordered to attack a Japanese ship, which was anchored at Subic Bay, that was shelling American positions. PT-31 and PT-34 entered the bay separately. PT-31 suffered engine trouble and ran aground on a reef. She was abandoned and destroyed. PT-34 entered undetected and sunk a 5,000-long-ton (5,000-metric-ton) transport that was off-loading supplies. She was then taken under heavy fire but managed to escape undamaged.

PT-32 was then ordered into Subic Bay and attacked and hit a light cruiser on February 1. On the 17th, PT-34 made a final but unsuccessful attack at Subic Bay after which all PT Boats were ordered to leave the Philippines.

To protect Subic Bay, the Japanese garrisoned Fort Wint with anti-aircraft artillery and automatic weapons but did not repair the American guns nor build permanent fortification.

The Japanese then started shipbuilding at Subic Bay and began constructing wooden auxiliary vessels. Several hundred workers from occupied-China and Formosa were brought in as laborers, in addition to 1,000 Filipinos. Nine ships were built and shipped to Cavite for engine installation, however, none of the ships would see active service as they were destroyed by U.S. Navy aircraft.

One of the few buildings that were left standing from the bombing and subsequent torching of the station was the Catholic Church. The Japanese removed all religious articles and converted it into a movie theater and was later used to imprison Americans and Filipinos that had been captured. Those who died were buried behind the church in a common cemetery. When all the prisoners were shipped to Manila, the Japanese used the church as a stable for horses.

On October 20, 1944, four U.S. Army divisions aboard 650 U.S. Navy vessels landed at Palo, Leyte, fulfilling MacArthur's promise to return to the Philippines. On December 13, the Japanese began evacuating civilians and non-essentials from Manila aboard the *Oryoku Maru* and four other merchant ships. As the ship was heading for Japan, fighter aircraft from the *Hornet* attacked the ships and left hundred of Japanese dead or wounded. The Oryoku Maru, heavily damaged with a destroyed steering gear, pulled into Subic Bay. Throughout the night, the Japanese disembarked while the American and Allied prisoners, that were carried below decks, were left aboard.

The next morning, Japanese guards ordered the prisoners to come up on deck. As Navy aircraft began to strafe the ships, the prisoners started frantically running about. As the pilots approached, they recognized the white shapes as Americans or Allies and sharply pulled up, rocking their wings in recognition. Afterwards, the 1,360 surviving Allied prisoners were forced to strip and swim ashore where they were crowded into a fenced tennis court near the Spanish Gate.

Early the succeeding morning, three fighters scored two direct hits on the Oryoku Maru and she burst into flames. After burning for two hours, she settled into the water about 100 yards (91 m) off Alava Pier.

When the planes had left the Japanese served the prisoners their first meal since leaving Manila 2 days before: 2 teaspoons of dry, raw rice. There was only one faucet from which the water trickled out so slowly that a prisoner was lucky if he managed one drink every 18 hours. Roll call was taken each morning. Those that had died during the night were buried in an improvised cemetery next to the seawall. After four days at Subic, only 450 survived the makeshift prison; they were subsequently sent to the labor camps in Japan.

By January 1945, the Japanese had all but abandoned Subic Bay. The U.S. Fifth Air Force had dropped 175 tons of bombs on Grande Island evoking only light fire from the skeleton Japanese force manning the anti-aircraft guns. The commander of Japanese forces in the Philippines, General Tomoyuki Yamashita, had withdrawn his forces into defensive mountain positions and ordered Colonel Sanenbou Nagayoshi to block Highway 7 near Subic Bay.

On January 29, 40,000 American troops of the 38th Division and 34th Regimental Combat Team came ashore without resistance at San Antonio, Zambales, by the site of what became known as the San Miguel Naval Communications Station. The column advanced toward Subic Bay, meeting their first resistance at the bridge spanning the Kalaklan River near the Olongapo Cemetery. The Japanese, knowing that they would imminently lose the town, decided to destroy Olongapo. Eventually, the Japanese evacuated the town and the 34th Regiment took over.

The following day, Grande Island was taken and Navy minesweepers began clearing the bay. Engineers of the 38th Division remained in Olongapo to begin reactivation of Subic Bay Naval Station. Bridges, buildings and the water distilling plant were repaired and the beaches and streets were cleared. Soon enough, LSTs were making dry-ramp landings near the town of Subic.

While Army engineers were busy around Subic Bay, the remaining troops moved east along Highway 7, planning to cross the base of Bataan to meet elements of the Army's XIV Corps, which were moving west on the same road. On the morning of January 31, 1945, the Americans began climbing the forested hills of Zig Zag Pass and into a hornet's nest of Japanese.

In the first three days at Zig Zag Pass the U.S. 152nd had more casualties than during 78 days of combat in Leyte. General Henry L. C. Jones was relieved and command of the 38th was given to General Roy W. Easley who used P-47s for air support. The planes began an intensive strafing and bombing of the jungle and dropped napalm on the Japanese positions.

After 15 days of fighting the enemy positions were finally overrun. The Japanese had succeeded in their mission to slow the American advance but lost more than 2,400 troops. American losses had been 1,400 killed.

After the war

Welcome sign.

Immediately after the liberation of the Philippines, Subic Bay was designated Naval Advance Unit No. 6, housing a submarine and a motor torpedo boat base unit. Grande Island was

reoccupied and garrisoned with 155 mm. guns and anti-aircraft guns but was never developed again as a permanent coastal defense fort. In 1963, most of the remaining guns were moved back to the United States to be displayed in coastal defense parks. A few years after the war and until Subic Bay was handed over to the Philippine government, Grande Island was used as a fleet recreation area.

Marines destined for the occupation of Subic Bay landed at Manila on September 26, 1945. They were designated as the 26th Provisional Company and assumed naval base security duties from the Army.

In July 1945 a naval supply depot was established at Maquinaya, about 3 miles (5 km) from the main base, along with an Advance Base Construction Depot and the 115th Seabees. These combined activities boosted the number of civilian personnel to a peak of 9,000 in 1946.

The town of Olongapo was re-established across the drainage canal on its present site, about 1,000 yards (910 m) inland from where it stood before the War. The town was patterned after an American town with streets laid out along straight lines, both horizontally and vertically. Even though Philippine Independence was granted on July 4, 1946, Olongapo remained under the administration of the U.S. Naval Reservation. The Commanding Officer of the Naval Station was also chairman of the town council, the school board, the hospital board and other governing bodies.

On March 14, 1947 the Military Bases Agreement was signed granting the United States a 99-year lease for 16 bases or military reservations including Subic Bay as well as the administration of the town of Olongapo.

The need for a naval air station was realized during the Korean War. Admiral Arthur W. Radford, Chief of Naval Operations conceived of the construction of a naval air station at Cubi Point, which was then a rugged and jungle covered finger of land 3 miles (5 km) from Subic Naval Base. He pictured the air station as a vital link in the defense of the Southwest Pacific.

In spite of the magnitude of the job and the tremendous difficulties the construction involved, the project was approved by The Pentagon. Civilian contractors were initially tapped to fulfill the project but after seeing the forbidding Zambales Mountains and the maze of jungle at Cubi Point, they claimed it could not be done. The Navy's Seabees were then given the project and in 1951, the Seabees began the first phase of the project. The first Seabees to arrive were MCB-3 on October 2, 1951; the second, MCB-5, arrived on November 5, 1951.

The first problem encountered was the transfer of an entire town. The town of Banicain stood on the site of the proposed airfield and so had to be moved to the community of Olongapo where it became New Banicain. The former Banicain now lies under 45 feet (14 m) of earth.

The next problem involved the moving of mountains and the building of a 10,000 feet (3,000 m) long airstrip that stretches out into Subic Bay, along the waterfront and out into the sea. It was

one of the largest earthmoving projects in the world, equivalent to the construction of the Panama Canal.

In all, it took five years and an estimated 20-million man-hours to build this Navy base. At Cubi Point Seabees cut a mountain in half to make way for a nearly two-mile (3.2 km) long runway. They blasted coral to fill a section of Subic Bay, filled swampland, moved trees as much as 150 feet (46 m) tall and six to eight feet in diameter, and relocated a native fishing village.

The $100 million facility was commissioned on July 25, 1956 and comprised an air station and an adjacent pier that was capable of docking the Navy's largest carriers.

By the mid-1950s Olongapo grew rapidly as the naval station expanded in response to the communist threat in Southeast Asia. The Navy began a $1.5 million construction plan for the development of the town.

It was also during the 1950s that Subic Bay became home to the major medical facility, the U.S. Naval Hospital, Subic Bay. On 13 July 1956, the hospital first opened its doors as U.S. Naval Station Hospital, Subic Bay and was designated for 90 operating beds with facilities for expansion to 141 beds, covering all primary clinical specialties.

Olongapo and the bridge leading to NS Subic Bay, 1981.

At the same time, a growing number of Filipinos, both in Olongapo and Manila, began to call for the separation of Olongapo from the naval reservation and return the town to Filipino control. They felt that Olongapo, for all practical purposes, was American territory where the 60,000 Filipino inhabitants were aliens. As a result of negotiations, certain reforms were instituted:

- Olongapo High School was turned over to the Philippine government, and
- membership in the town council was made elective.

On December 7, 1959, under provisions of the RP-US Military Bases Agreement, the United States relinquished Olongapo to the Philippine government. Included in the turnover were water, electrical and telephone systems valued at $6 million.

[edit] The Vietnam War

The *Klondike* beside the *Taussig*, the *Bole*, the *Lofberg*; and the *John W. Thomason* in Subic Bay.

The Vietnam War placed tremendous workload on Subic Bay. The base became the service station and supermarket for the U.S. Seventh Fleet after the Gulf of Tonkin incident in 1964. From an average of 98 ship visits a month in 1964, the average shot up to 215 by 1967, with about 30 ships in port on any given day. A new record was set in October 1968 with 47 ships in port.

More than $63 million of construction projects were contracted between 1964 and 1968. The Main Exchange and recreation complex near the main gate as well as 100 housing units were constructed. The 4,224,503 sailors who visited Subic Bay in 1967 helped the Navy Exchange record the largest volume of sales of any exchange in the world, more than $25 million.

Although the American military and civilian population totaled about 4,300 and Filipino workers numbered more than 15,000, the Ship Repair Facility (SRF) was neither outfitted or manned for the increasing workload and emergency peaks generated by the war. SRF workers worked 12-hour shifts for an average of over 60 hours per week. The physical plant consisted of quonset huts, which were put up after World War II, and workers used obsolete tools and equipment. To increase the capabilities of the repair facility, the number of repair ships and tenders was increased from 2 to 3. When the New York Navy Yard was decommissioned, it provided a quick source of needed machine tools and equipment and additional floating drydocks were activated.

The fire-ravaged *Forrestal* was repaired in August 1967 before her return to the United States for a complete overhaul. Destroyers *O'Brien*, *Ozbourn*, *Turner Joy* and *Edson*, damaged by North Vietnamese shore batteries, were repaired, as were amphibious assault craft, river patrol boats and other small craft. A 600-foot (183 m) extension to Alava pier was completed in 1967 significantly increasing berthing capacity.

The Royal Australian Navy destroyer *Hobart* was repaired at Subic following the attack by USAF aircraft on June 17, 1968.

The Naval Supply Depot (NSD) handled the largest volume of fuel oil of any Navy facility in the world, with more than 4 million barrels (640,000 m^3) of fuel oil processed each month. An offshore fueling terminal began operation in September 1967, allowing commercial tankers to unload fuel oil and aviation gas without docking at the busy fuel pier. The depot also supplied Clark Air Base with aviation fuel through a 41-mile (66 km) pipeline. In addition to its fuel operations, NSD also stocked over 200,000 various items for use by the fleet. In June 1968 a fire of unknown origin destroyed a warehouse with the loss of 18,000 line items worth more than $10 million.

NAS Cubi Point served as the primary maintenance, repair and supply center for the 400 carrier based aircraft of the Seventh Fleet's carrier force. The jet engine shop turned out two jet engines a day to keep pace with the demands of the air war in Vietnam.

Harbor Clearance Unit One was activated at Subic Bay in 1966 with the mission of salvaging ships from the rivers and harbors of Vietnam. Two of the biggest jobs were the salvaging of the *Baton Rouge Victory* from the Saigon River and the raising of the 170-foot (52 m) dredge *Jamaica Bay* from the Mỹ Tho River. Both jobs were accomplished despite continuous harassment by enemy sniper fire.

An aerial view of Naval Base Subic Bay, 1981.

On June 3, 1969 the Royal Australian Navy carrier HMAS *Melbourne* was involved in a collision with USS *Frank E. Evans* about 240 miles (390 km) southwest of Manila. The USS *Kearsarge* brought 196 of the 199 survivors to Subic Bay. A Joint Australian/U.S. Board of Inquiry convened on June 9 in the library of George Dewey High School, the same day the stern section of the Evans arrived under tow by a tug. It was stripped and towed to sea as a gunnery target.

On June 12, 1968 General William Westmoreland visited Subic Bay and thanked its personnel for their support while he was the commander of the American forces in Vietnam. During the first six months of 1968, Subic Bay had supplied allied ships in Vietnam that had fired 600,000

rounds of naval ordnance at the enemy. A total of 5,077 underway replenishments had been performed by supporting ships out of Subic Bay.

The Naval Station Subic Bay pier area, 1981.

Following the fall of Saigon in the summer of 1975 hundreds of thousands of refugees fled Vietnam. Thousands of these refugees were rescued at sea by U.S. Navy ships and taken to Subic Bay. A temporary processing center that handled thousands of refugees was set up on Grande Island in 1975. They were later taken to the Philippine Refugee Processing Center in Morong, Bataan. The Military Bases Agreement of 1947 was amended in 1979, changing the role of the Americans at Subic Bay from landlord to guest. The amendment confirmed Philippine sovereignty over the base and reduced the area set aside for U.S. use from 244 to 63 square kilometres. Philippine troops assumed responsibility for the perimeter security of the base to reduce incidents between U.S. military and Philippine civilians. The unhampered operation of U.S. forces was assured. The U.S. granted the Philippines $500 million in military sales credits and supporting assistance.

Closure

This section **reads like a news release** and needs to be rewritten.

Ash from Mount Pinatubo covers Naval Station Subic Bay.

On June 15, 1991, Mount Pinatubo, just 20 miles (32 km) from Subic Bay, exploded with a force 8 times greater than the Mount St. Helens eruption. Day turned to night as volcanic ash blotted out the sun. Volcanic earthquakes and heavy rain, lightning and thunder from Typhoon *Yunya* passing over northern Luzon made Black Saturday a 36-hour nightmare.

By the morning of June 16, when the volcano's fury subsided, Subic Bay, once one of the most beautiful and well-maintained Navy bases in the Pacific, lay buried under a foot of rain-soaked, sandy ash.

Buildings everywhere collapsed under the weight of the coarse gray ash. Two girls, one a nine-year-old American and the other a Filipino citizen, died when trapped under a falling roof at George Dewey High School. In the city of Olongapo, more than 60 volcano-related deaths were reported, including eight who were crushed when part of Olongapo General Hospital collapsed.

That night, the threat of continued eruptions combined with the lack of water and electricity led to the decision to evacuate all dependents. U.S. warships and cargo planes began the emergency evacuation of thousands of Navy and Air Force dependents. Seven Navy ships sailed Monday, June 17, with 6,200 dependents. A total of 17 ships, including the aircraft carriers, USS *Abraham Lincoln* and USS *Midway* evacuated all 20,000 dependents over the next few days. The evacuees were taken by ship to Mactan Air Base and then were airlifted by U.S. Air Force C-141 Starlifters to Andersen Air Force Base at Guam.

After the dependents were evacuated, an intense clean-up was begun. All hands, American service members and Filipino base employees, worked around the clock to restore essential services.

Clark Air Base, much closer to Mount Pinatubo, was declared a total loss and plans for a complete closure were started.

Within two weeks NAS Cubi Point was back in limited operation. Soon, most buildings had electricity and water restored. By mid-July service had been restored to most family housing units. The dependents began returning September 8, 1991 and by the end of the month almost all were back at Subic Bay from the United States.

Many months before the expiration of the Military Bases Agreement of 1947 intense negotiations between the governments of the United States and the Philippines began. These negotiations resulted in the Treaty of Friendship, Peace and Cooperation between the United States and the Republic of the Philippines. This would have extended the lease of the American bases in the Philippines.

On September 13, 1991, the Philippine Senate rejected the ratification of this treaty, citing a number of reasons for the rejection. This was a devastating blow to the Aquino administration, who were strongly pro-treaty and even called for a referendum by the Filipino people; a move that was declared unconstitutional.

The American Flag is lowered and Philippine flag is raised during turnover of Naval Station Subic Bay.

In December 1991, the two governments were again in talks to extend the withdrawal of American forces for three years but this broke down as the United States refused to detail their withdrawal plans or to answer if nuclear weapons were kept on base. Finally on December 27, President Corazon Aquino, who had previously fought to delay the U.S. pullout to cushion the country's battered economy, issued a formal notice for the U.S. to leave by the end of 1992. Naval Station Subic Bay was the U.S.'s largest overseas defense facility after Clark Air Base was closed.

During 1992, tons of material including drydocks and equipment, were shipped to various Naval Stations. Ship-repair and maintenance yards as well as supply depots were relocated to other Asian countries including Japan and Singapore. Finally, on November 24, 1992, the American Flag was lowered in Subic for the last time and the last 1,416 Sailors and Marines at Subic Bay Naval Base left by plane from NAS Cubi Point and by the USS *Belleau Wood*. This withdrawal marked the first time since the 16th Century that no foreign military forces were present in the Philippines.

See also

Other former United States Navy installations::

- Naval Air Station Cubi Point
- U.S. Naval Hospital, Subic Bay
- U.S. Naval Radio Facility Bagobantay
- U.S. Naval Station Sangley Point
- San Miguel Naval Communications Station
- Mount Santa Rita Naval Link Station

Currently:

- Education Primary
- Subic Bay Freeport Zone

- Subic Bay Tourism Information
- Subic Bay Area Tourist and Visitor Information
- Source of more information about Subic Bay

ANNEX-6: Khazar & Rothschild Silent war against the entire Humanity as documented in the “REPORT FROM THE IRON MOUNTAIN”

SOURCE:
http://www.bibliotecapleyades.net/sociopolitica/esp_sociopol_ironmountain08.htm

by **Leonard Lewin**
Spanish version
from AMPP Website

Regresar a Report From Iron Mountain

SECTION 6: Substitutes for the Functions of War

By now it should be clear that the most detailed and comprehensive master plan for a transition to world peace will remain academic if it fails to deal forthrightly with the problem of the critical nonmilitary functions of war. The social needs they serve are essential; if the war system no longer exists to meet them, ***substitute institutions*** will have to be established for the purpose.

These surrogates must be "realistic," which is to say of a scope and nature that can be conceived and implemented in the context of present-day social capabilities. This is not the truism it may appear to be; the requirements of radical social change often reveal the distinction between a most conservative projection and a wildly utopian scheme to be fine indeed.

In this section we will consider some possible substitutes for these functions. Only in rare instances have they been put forth for the purposes which concern us here, but we see no reason to limit ourselves to proposals that address themselves explicitly to the problem as we have outlined it. We will disregard the ostensible, or military, functions of war; it is a premise of this study that the transition to peace implies absolutely that they will no longer exist in any relevant sense. We will also disregard the noncritical functions exemplified at the end of the preceding section.

Economic

Economic surrogates for war must meet two principal criteria. They must be "wasteful," in the common sense of the word, and they must operate outside the normal supply-demand system. A corollary that should be obvious is that the magnitude of the waste must be sufficient to meet the needs of a particular society. An economy as advanced and complex as our own requires the planned average annual destruction of not less than 10 percent of gross national product [29] if it is effectively to fulfill its stabilizing function. When the mass of a balance wheel is inadequate to the power it is intended to control, its effect can be self-defeating, as with a runaway locomotive. The analogy, though crude, [30] is especially apt for the American economy, as our record of cyclical depressions shows. All have taken place during periods of grossly inadequate military spending.

Those few economic conversion programs which by implication acknowledge the nonmilitary economic function of war (at least to some extent) tend to assume that so-called social-welfare expenditures will fill the vacuum created by the disappearance of military spending. When one considers the backlog of unfinished business - proposed but still unexecuted

- in this field, the assumption seems plausible. Let us examine briefly the following list, which is more or less typical of general social welfare programs. [31]

- **Health**. Drastic expansion of medical research, education, and training facilities; hospital and clinic construction; the general objective of complete government-guaranteed health care for all, at a level consistent with current developments in medical technology.

- **Education**. The equivalent of the foregoing in teacher training; schools and libraries; the drastic upgrading of standards, with the general objective of making available for all an attainable educational goal equivalent to what is now considered a professional degree.

- **Housing**. Clean, comfortable, safe, and spacious living space for all, at the level now enjoyed by about 15 percent of the population in this country (less in most others).

- **Transportation**. The establishment of a system of mass public transportation making it possible for all to travel to and from areas of work and recreation quickly, comfortably, and conveniently, and to travel privately for pleasure rather than necessity.

- **Physical environment**. The development and protection of water supplies, forests, parks, and other natural resources; the elimination of chemical and bacterial contaminants from air, water, and soil.

- **Poverty**. The genuine elimination of poverty, defined by a standard consistent with current economic productivity, by means of guaranteed annual income or whatever system of distribution will best assure its achievement.

This is only a sampler of the more obvious domestic social welfare items, and we have listed it in a deliberately broad, perhaps extravagant, manner. In the past, such a vague and ambitious-sounding "program" would have been dismissed out of hand, without serious consideration; it would clearly have been, prima facie, far too costly, quite apart from its political implications. [32] Our objection to it, on the other hand, could hardly be more contradictory. As an economic substitute for war, it is inadequate

because it would be far too cheap.

If this seems paradoxical, it must be remembered that up to now all proposed social-welfare expenditures have had to be measured within the war economy, not as a replacement for it. The old slogan about a battleship or an ***ICBM*** costing as much as x hospitals or y schools or z homes takes on a very different meaning if there are to be no more battleships or ***ICBM***'s.

Since the list is general, we have elected to forestall the tangential controversy that surrounds arbitrary cost projections by offering no individual cost estimates. But the maximum program that could be physically effected along the lines indicated could approach the established level of military spending only for a limited time - in our opinion, subject to a detailed cost-and-feasibility analysis, less than ten years. In this short period, at this rate, the major goals of the program would have been achieved. Its capital-investment phase would have been completed, and it would have established a permanent comparatively modest level of annual operating cost - within the framework of the general economy.

Here is the basic weakness of the ***social-welfare surrogate***. On the short-term basis, a maximum program of this sort could replace a normal military spending program, provided it was designed, like the military model, to be subject to arbitrary control. Public housing starts, for example, or the development of modern medical centers might be accelerated or halted from time to time, as the requirements of a stable economy might dictate.

But on the long-term basis, social-welfare spending, no matter how often redefined, would necessarily become an integral, accepted part of the economy, of no more value as a stabilizer than the automobile industry or old age and survivors' insurance. Apart from whatever merit social-welfare programs are deemed to have for their own sake, their function as a substitute for war in the economy would thus be self-liquidating. They might serve, however, as expedients pending the development of more durable substitute measures.

Another economic surrogate that has been proposed is a series of giant "***space research***" ***programs***. These have already demonstrated their utility

in more modest scale within the military economy. What has been implied, although not yet expressly put forth, is the development of a long-range sequence of space-research projects with largely unattainable goals.

This kind of program offers several advantages lacking in the social welfare model. First, it is unlikely to phase itself out, regardless of the predictable "surprises" science has in store for us: the universe is too big. In the event some individual project unexpectedly succeeds there would be no dearth of substitute problems. For example, if colonization of the moon proceeds on schedule, it could then become "necessary" to establish a beachhead on Mars or Jupiter, and so on. Second, it need be no more dependent on the general supply-demand economy than its military prototype. Third, it lends itself extraordinarily well to arbitrary control.

Space research can be viewed as the nearest modern equivalent yet devised to the pyramid-building, and similar ritualistic enterprises, of ancient societies. It is true that the scientific value of the space program, even of what has already been accomplished, is substantial on its own terms. But current programs are absurdly and obviously disproportionate, in the relationship of the knowledge sought to the expenditures committed.

All but a small fraction of the space budget, measured by the standards of comparable scientific objectives, must be charged de facto to the military economy. Future space research, projected as a war surrogate, would further reduce the the "scientific" rationale of its budget to a minuscule percentage indeed. As a purely economic substitute for war, therefore, extension of the space program warrants serious consideration.

In Section 3 we pointed out that certain disarmament models, which we called conservative, postulated extremely expensive and elaborate inspection systems. Would it be possible to extend and institutionalize such systems to the point where they might serve as economic surrogates for war spending? The organization of failsafe inspection machinery could well be ritualized in a manner similar to that of established military processes. "***Inspection teams***" might be very like armies, and their technical equipment might be very like weapons. Inflating the inspection budget to military scale presents no difficulty. The appeal of this kind of scheme lies in

the comparative ease of transition between two parallel systems.

The "***elaborate inspection***" ***surrogate*** is fundamentally fallacious, however. Although it might be economically useful, as well as politically necessary, during the disarmament transition, it would fail as a substitute for the economic function of war for one simple reason. ***Peacekeeping inspection*** is part of a war system, not of a peace system. It implies the possibility of weapons maintenance or manufacture, which could not exist in a world at peace as here defined. Massive inspection also implies sanctions, and thus war-readiness.

The same fallacy is more obvious in plans to create a patently useless "defense conversion" apparatus. The long-discredited proposal to build "total" civil defense facilities is one example; another is the plan to establish a giant antimissile missile complex (Nike-X, et al.). These programs, of course, are economic rather than strategic. Nevertheless, they are not substitutes for military spending but merely different forms of it.

A more sophisticated variant is the proposal to establish the "***Unarmed Forces***" of the United States. [33] This would conveniently maintain the entire institutional military structure, redirecting it essentially toward social-welfare activities on a global scale. It would be, in effect, a giant military ***Peace Corps***. There is nothing inherently unworkable about this plan, and using the existing military system to effectuate its own demise is both ingenious and convenient. But even on a greatly magnified world basis, social-welfare expenditures must sooner or later reenter the atmosphere of the normal economy.

The practical transitional virtues of such a scheme would thus be eventually negated by its inadequacy as a permanent economic stabilizer.

Political

The ***war system*** makes the stable government of societies possible. It does this essentially by providing an external necessity for a society to accept

political rule. In so doing, it establishes the basis for nationhood and the authority of government to control its constituents. What other institution or combination of programs might serve these functions in its place?

We have already pointed out that the end of war means the end of national sovereignty, and thus the end of nationhood as we know it today. But this does not necessarily mean the end of nations in the administrative sense, and internal political power will remain essential to a stable society. The emerging "nations" of the peace epoch must continue to draw political authority from some source.

A number of proposals have been made governing the relations between nations after total disarmament; all are basically juridical in nature. They contemplate institutions more or less like a ***World Court***, or a ***United Nations***, but vested with real authority. They may or may not serve their ostensible postmilitary purpose of settling international disputes, but we need not discuss that here. None would offer effective external pressure on a peace-world nation to organize itself politically.

It might be argued that a well-armed international police force, operating under the authority of such a supranational "court," could well serve the function of external enemy. This, however, would constitute a military operation, like the inspection schemes mentioned, and, like them, would be inconsistent with the premise of an end to the war system. It is possible that a variant of the "***Unarmed Forces***" idea might be developed in such a way that its "constructive" (i.e., social welfare) activities could be combined with an economic "***threat***" of sufficient size and credibility to warrant political organization. Would this kind of threat also be contradictory to our central premise? - that is, would it be inevitably military? Not necessarily, in our view, but we are skeptical of its capacity to evoke credibility. Also, the obvious destabilizing effect of any global social welfare surrogate on politically necessary class relationships would create an entirely new set of transition problems at least equal in magnitude.

Credibility, in fact, lies at the heart of the problem of developing a political substitute for war. This is where the space-race proposals, in many ways so well suited as economic substitutes for war, fall short. The most ambitious

and unrealistic space project cannot of itself generate a believable external menace. It has been hotly argued [34] that such a menace would offer the "last, best hope of peace," etc., by uniting mankind against the danger of destruction by "creatures" from other planets or from outer space.

Experiments have been proposed to test the ***credibility of an out-of-our-world invasion threat;*** it is possible that a few of the more difficult-to-explain "***flying saucer***" ***incidents*** of recent years were in fact early experiments of this kind. If so, they could hardly have been judged encouraging. We anticipate no difficulties in making a "***need***" for a giant super space program credible for economic purposes, even were there not ample precedent; extending it, for political purposes, to include features unfortunately associated with science fiction would obviously be a more dubious undertaking.

Nevertheless, an effective political substitute for war would require "***alternate enemies***," some of which might seem equally farfetched in the context of the current war system. It may be, for instance, that gross pollution of the environment can eventually replace the possibility of mass destruction by nuclear weapons as the principal apparent threat to the survival of the species.

Poisoning of the air, and of the principal sources of food and water supply, is already well advanced, and at first glance would seem promising in this respect; it constitutes a threat that can be dealt with only through social organization and political power. But from present indications it will be a generation to a generation and a half before environmental pollution, however severe, will be sufficiently menacing, on a global scale, to offer a possible basis for a solution.

It is true that the ***rate of pollution could be increased selectively*** for this purpose; in fact, the mere modifying of existing programs for the deterrence of pollution could speed up the process enough to make the threat credible much sooner. But the pollution problem has been so widely publicized in recent years that it seems highly improbable that a program of deliberate environmental poisoning could be implemented in a politically acceptable manner.

However unlikely some of the possible alternate enemies we have mentioned may seem, we must emphasize that one must be found, of credible quality and magnitude, if a transition to peace is ever to come about without social disintegration. It is more probable, in our judgment, that such a threat will have to be invented, rather than developed from unknown conditions. For this reason, we believe further speculation about its putative nature ill-advised in this context. Since there is considerable doubt, in our minds, that any viable political surrogate can be devised, we are reluctant to compromise, by premature discussion, any possible option that may eventually lie open to our government.

Sociological

Of the many functions of war we have found convenient to group together in this classification, two are critical. In a world of peace, the continuing stability of society will require:

1) an ***effective substitute for military institutions*** that can neutralize destabilizing social elements and

2) a ***credible motivational surrogate for war*** that can insure social cohesiveness.

The first is an essential element of social control; the second is the basic mechanism for adapting individual human drives to the needs of society.

Most proposals that address themselves, explicitly or otherwise, to the postwar problem of controlling the socially alienated turn to some variant of the ***Peace Corps*** or the so-called ***Job Corps*** for a solution. The socially disaffected, the economically unprepared, the psychologically unconformable, the hard-core "*delinquents*," the incorrigible "*subversives*," and the rest of the unemployable are seen as somehow transformed by the disciplines of a service modeled on military precedent into more or less dedicated social service workers. This presumption also informs the otherwise hardheaded ratiocination of the "***Unarmed Forces***" ***plan***.

The problem has been addressed, in the language of popular sociology, by

Secretary McNamara.

> "Even in our abundant societies, we have reason enough to worry over the tensions that coil and tighten among underprivileged young people, and finally flail out in delinquency and crime. What are we to expect ... where mounting frustrations are likely to fester into eruptions of violence and extremism?"

In a seemingly unrelated passage, he continues:

> "It seems to me that we could move toward remedying that inequity [of the ***Selective Service System***] by asking every young person in the United States to give two years of service to his country - whether in one of the military services, in the ***Peace Corps***, or in some other volunteer developmental work at home or abroad. We could encourage other countries to do the same." [35]

Here, as elsewhere throughout this significant speech, **Mr. McNamara** has focused, indirectly but unmistakably, on one of the key issues bearing on a possible transition to peace, and has later indicated, also indirectly, a rough approach to its resolution, again phrased in the language of the current war system.

It seems clear that **Mr. McNamara** and other proponents of the peace-corps surrogate for this war function lean heavily on the success of the paramilitary Depression programs mentioned in the last section. We find the precedent wholly inadequate in degree. Neither the lack of relevant precedent, however, nor the dubious social-welfare sentimentality characterizing this approach warrant its rejection without careful study. It may be viable - provided, first, that the military origin of the Corps format be effectively rendered out of its operational activity, and second, that the transition from paramilitary activities to "developmental work" can be effected without regard to the attitudes of the Corps personnel or to the "value" of the work it is expected to perform.

Another possible surrogate for the control of potential enemies of society is the reintroduction, in some form consistent with modern technology and political processes, ***of slavery***. Up to now, this has been suggested only in fiction, notably in the works of **Wells**, **Huxley**, **Orwell**, and others engaged

in the imaginative anticipation of the sociology of the future. But the fantasies projected in *Brave New World* and 1984 have seemed less and less implausible over the years since their publication.

The traditional association of slavery with ancient preindustrial cultures should not blind us to its adaptability to advanced forms of social organization, nor should its equally traditional incompatibility with Western moral and economic values. It is entirely possible that the development of a sophisticated form of slavery may be an absolute prerequisite for social control in a world at peace. As a practical matter, conversion of the code of military discipline to a euphemized form of enslavement would entail surprisingly little revision; the logical first step would be the adoption of some form of "***universal*** ***military service***.

When it comes to postulating a credible substitute for war capable of directing human behavior patterns in behalf of social organization, few options suggest themselves. Like its political function, the motivational function of war requires the existence of a genuinely menacing social enemy. The principal difference is that for purposes of motivating basic allegiance, as distinct from accepting political authority, the "***alternate enemy***" must imply a more immediate, tangible, and directly felt threat of destruction. It must justify the need for taking and paying a "blood price" in wide areas of human concern.

In this respect, the possible substitute enemies noted earlier would be insufficient. One exception might be the ***environmental-pollution model***, if the danger to society it posed was genuinely imminent. The fictive models would have to carry the weight of extraordinary conviction, underscored with a not inconsiderable actual sacrifice of life; the construction of an up-to-date ***mythological*** or ***religious structure*** for this purpose would present difficulties in our era, but must certainly be considered.

Games theorists have suggested, in other contexts, the development of "***blood games***" for the effective control of individual aggressive impulses. It is an ironic commentary on the current state of war and peace studies that it was left not to scientists but to the makers of a commercial film [36] to develop a model for this notion, on the implausible level of popular

melodrama, as a ritualized manhunt.

More realistically, such a ***ritual*** might be socialized, in the manner of the ***Spanish Inquisition*** and the less formal witch trials of other periods, for purposes of "***social purification***," "***state security***," or other rationale both acceptable and credible to postwar societies. The feasibility of such an updated version of still another ancient institution, though doubtful, is considerably less fanciful than the wishful notion of many peace planners that a lasting condition of peace can be brought about without the most painstaking examination of every possible surrogate for the essential functions of war. What is involved here, in a sense, is the quest for **William James**'s "***moral equivalent of war***."

It is also possible that the two functions considered under this heading may be jointly served, in the sense of establishing the antisocial, for whom a control institution is needed, as the "***alternate enemy***" needed to hold society together. The relentless and irreversible advance of unemployability at all levels of society, and the similar extension of generalized alienation from accepted values [37] may make some such program necessary even as an adjunct to the ***war system***.

As before, we will not speculate on the specific forms this kind of program might take, except to note that there is again ample precedent, in the treatment meted out to disfavored, allegedly menacing, ethnic groups in certain societies during historical periods. [38]

Ecological

Considering the the shortcomings of war as a mechanism of selective population control, it might appear that devising substitutes for this function should be comparatively simple. Schematically this so, but the problem of timing the transition to a new ecological balancing device makes the feasibility of substitution less certain.

It must be remembered that the limitation of war in this function is entirely

eugenic. War has not been genetically progressive. But as a system of ***gross population control*** to preserve the species it cannot fairly be faulted. And, as has been pointed out, the nature of war is itself in transition. Current trends in warfare - the increased strategic bombing of civilians and the greater military importance now attached to the destruction of sources of supply (as opposed to purely "military" bases and personnel) - strongly suggest that a truly qualitative improvement is in the making. Assuming the war system is to continue, it is more than probable that the regressively selective quality of war will have been reversed, as its victims become more genetically representative of their societies.

There is no question but that a universal requirement that procreation be limited to the products of artificial insemination would provide a fully adequate substitute control for population levels. Such a reproductive system would, of course, have the added advantage of being susceptible of direct eugenic management. Its predictable further development - conception and embryonic growth taking place wholly under laboratory conditions - would extend these controls to their logical conclusion. The ecological function of war under these circumstances would not only be superseded but surpassed in effectiveness.

The indicated intermediate step - total control of conception with a variant of the ubiquitous "pill," via water supplies or certain essential foodstuffs, offset by a controlled "antidote" - ***is already under development***. [39] There would appear to be no foreseeable need to revert to any of the outmoded practices referred to in the previous section (infanticide, etc.) as there might have been if the possibility of transition to peace had arisen two generations ago.

The real question here, therefore, does not concern the viability of this war substitute, but the political problems involved in bringing it about. It cannot be established while the war system is still in effect. The reason for this is simple: ***excess population is war material.*** As long as any society must contemplate even a remote possibility of war, it must maintain a maximum supportable population, even when so doing critically aggravates an economic liability. This is paradoxical, in view of war's role in reducing excess population, but it is readily understood. War controls the general

population level, but the ecological interest of any single society lies in maintaining its hegemony *vis-a-vis* other societies.

The obvious analogy can be seen in any free-enterprise economy. Practices damaging to the society as a whole - both competitive and monopolistic - are abetted by the conflicting economic motives of individual capital interests. The obvious precedent can be found in the seemingly irrational political difficulties which have blocked universal adoption of simple birth-control methods. Nations desperately in need of increasing unfavorable production-consumption ratios are nevertheless unwilling to gamble their possible military requirements of twenty years hence for this purpose. Unilateral population control, as practiced in ancient Japan and in other isolated societies, is out of the question in today's world.

Since the eugenic solution cannot be achieved until the transition to the peace system takes place, why not wait? One must qualify the inclination to agree. As we noted earlier, a real possibility of an unprecedented global crisis of insufficiency exists today, which ***the war system*** may not be able to forestall. If this should come to pass before an agreed-upon transition to peace were completed, the result might be irrevocably disastrous. There is clearly no solution to this dilemma; it is a risk which must be taken. But it tends to support the view that if a decision is made to eliminate the war system, it were better done sooner than later.

Cultural and Scientific

Strictly speaking, the function of war as the determinant of cultural values and as the prime mover of scientific progress may not be critical in a world without war. Our criterion for the basic nonmilitary functions of war has been: Are they necessary to the survival and stability of society? The absolute need for substitute cultural value-determinants and for the continued advance of scientific knowledge is not established. We believe it important, however, in behalf of those for whom these functions hold subjective significance, that it be known what they can reasonably expect in culture and science after a transition to peace.

So far as the creative arts are concerned, there is no reason to believe they would disappear, but only that they would change in character and relative social importance. The elimination of war would in due course deprive them of their principal conative force, but it would necessarily take some time for the effect of this withdrawal to be felt. During the transition, and perhaps for a generation thereafter, themes of sociomoral conflict inspired by the war system would be increasingly transferred to the idiom of purely personal sensibility.

At the same time, a new aesthetic would have to develop. Whatever its name, form, or rationale, its function would be to express, in language appropriate to the new period, the once discredited philosophy that art exists for its own sake. This aesthetic would reject unequivocally the classic requirement of paramilitary conflict as the substantive content of great art. The eventual effect of the peace-world philosophy of art would be democratizing in the extreme, in the sense that a generally acknowledged subjectivity of artistic standards would equalize their new, content-free "values."

What may be expected to happen is that art would be reassigned the role it once played in a few primitive peace-oriented systems. This was the function of pure decoration, entertainment, or play, entirely free of the burden of expressing the sociomoral values and conflicts of a war-oriented society. It is interesting that the groundwork for such a value-free aesthetic is already being laid today, in growing experimentation in art without content, perhaps in anticipation of a world without conflict.

A cult has developed around a new kind of cultural determinism, [40] which proposes that the technological form of a cultural expression determines its values rather than does its ostensibly meaningful content. Its clear implication is that there is no "good" or "bad" art, only that which is appropriate to its (technological) times and that which is not. Its cultural effect has been to promote circumstantial constructions and unplanned expressions; it denies to art the relevance of sequential logic. Its significance in this context is that it provides a working model of one kind of value-free culture we might reasonably anticipate in a world at peace.

So far as science is concerned, it might appear at first glance that a giant space-research program, the most promising among the proposed economic surrogates for war, might also serve as the basic stimulator of scientific research. The lack of fundamental organized social conflict inherent in space work, however, would rule it out as an adequate motivational substitute for war when applied to "pure" science. But it could no doubt sustain the broad range of technological activity that a space budget of military dimensions would require. A similarly scaled social-welfare program could provide a comparable impetus to low-keyed technological advances, especially in medicine, rationalized construction methods, educational psychology, etc. The eugenic substitute for the ecological function of war would also require continuing research in certain areas of the life sciences.

Apart from these partial substitutes for war, it must be kept in mind that the momentum given to scientific progress by the great wars of the past century, and even more by the anticipation of World War III, is intellectually and materially enormous. It is our finding that if the war system were to end tomorrow this momentum is so great that the pursuit of scientific knowledge could reasonably be expected to go forward without noticeable diminution for perhaps two decades. [41]

It would then continue, at a progressively decreasing tempo, for at least another two decades before the "bank account" of today's unresolved problems would become exhausted. By the standards of the questions we have learned to ask today, there would no longer be anything worth knowing still unknown; we cannot conceive, by definition, of the scientific questions to ask once those we can not comprehend are answered.

This leads unavoidably to another matter: ***the intrinsic value of the unlimited search for knowledge***. We of course offer no independent value judgments here, but it is germane to point out that a substantial minority of scientific opinion feels that search to be circumscribed in any case. This opinion is itself a factor in considering the need for a substitute for the scientific function of war. For the record, we must also take note of the precedent that during long periods of human history, often covering

thousands of years, in which no intrinsic social value was assigned to scientific progress, stable societies did survive and flourish.

Although this could not have been possible in the modern industrial world, we cannot be certain it may not again be true in a future world at peace.

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