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THE U.S. MILITARY JUST ANNIHILATED THREE RADAR STATIONS IN YEMEN
This study looks at Yemen, a small state which over the course of centuries has played a minor--but nonetheless important--part in the history of the Middle East. Yemen's importance derived from its strategic location. At various times great powers wishing to control the Red Sea/Indian Ocean area tried to take over Yemen. (See Figure 1.)
Now that the Soviet Union is no more and the United States alone is a superpower, Yemen's strategic value seemingly is at an end; U.S. policymakers apparently believe that, with Moscow out of the picture, the importance of Yemen has declined.
At the same time, however, tensions between Yemen and its neighbors have recently disturbed relations in the crucial Persian Gulf region. This study argues that, unless these tensions are resolved, the whole Persian Gulf system could be destablized, and thus U.S. policymakers must rethink relations with Sana'a. The study tracks how the current disputes over Yemen developed, and then describes how they are likely to affect Gulf stability, which America has pledged to uphold.
Introduction.
Under the New World Order, American interest in the Middle East has undergone fundamental change. Whereas in the past the area was of great strategic importance to Washington, now the strategic aspect is no longer of such concern. With the Soviet Union gone, the United States does not need to buttress its military might in obscure corners of southwest Asia. Economics is what counts today, and only those countries that are strong trading partners of the United States remain of interest.
In the Middle East only a handful of countries are commercially important to the United States;1 these are the so-called Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states.2 The United States has undertaken extraordinary measures to show its support of these small, but extremely influential, entities.
At the same time, other countries in the region, once the recipients of Washington's special regard, now are out of favor. One such state--which once was a key ally of the West--is Yemen. Situated on the Bab al Mandab (see Figure 1), Yemen formerly was the object of an intense struggle between the Soviet Union and the United States. Both tried to lure the Yemenis into an alliance, plying them with offers of military and economic assistance. This enabled Sana'a to maintain itself despite the fact that Yemen is among the poorest countries in the world.3
As soon as the Cold War ended, the United States found that it could dispense with having to worry lest Yemen fall into Soviet hands. In 1991, Washington cut Agency for International Development (AID) funds to Sana'a from $50 millon to just under $3 million.4
This was a blow to the Yemenis. Suddenly Sana'a was forced to depend on its own meager resources. To be sure, Yemen has oil, but this has only recently been discovered, and the Yemenis have scant infrastructure with which to develop their finds (a matter to be discussed below).
Not long after the cut was made, several disturbing events occurred--first, a major civil war blew up in Yemen, which the government barely was able to quell; next, Saudi Arabia tried to take over territory claimed by its neighbor; and, finally, Eritrea, at the end of last year, seized an island (Hanish al Kabir) garrisoned with Yemeni troops (see Figure 1).
Given the seriousness of these incidents, Washington's apparent continued indifference toward Yemen was hard to fathom.5
But then, just as this study was being readied for the printer, Washington did take action. It moved indirectly (through the International Monetary Fund [ IMF] ), but the effect was to bolster the regime in Sana'a, and this could only be welcomed.
Nonetheless, the study goes on to argue that Washington's moves may not be enough. More needs to be done, if this problem is not to fester, and ultimately grow into something large and dangerous.
U.S. policymakers seem to believe that threats to Gulf security come only from without, specifically from Iraq and Iran. In fact, significant dangers are developing from within the Gulf, and one of the most dangerous involves local discontents over Yemen.
Stability in the region requires adequate responses to the Saudi-Yemeni, Eritrean-Yemeni discords, and a changed approach to dealing with area security problems in general.
In the New World Order, policymakers must think systemically. If the United States is to maintain stability in the Gulf, it must be concerned with all of the states in the area; Washington cannot restrict its concern to the narrow focus of just a few. A seemingly inconsequential entity like Yemen can bring the whole Gulf system crashing down if its problems are not attended to.
The study opens with a look at the early history of Yemen, which forms the basis of the Yemenis' fierce national pride, and also what makes them so dangerous to offend. It then proceeds to detail the long rivalry between Yemen and Saudi Arabia, in which the Yemenis consistently have given as good as they got.
Next, the study deals with the period of unification, when north and south Yemen--formerly two separate countries--allied themselves. For a time after that, the future of Yemen seemed full of promise, but then, with the outbreak of the Second Gulf War,6 the bright hopes perished. Yemen sided with Iraq in that struggle, a step which cost it dearly, as the study will show.
The study ends with a call for a critique of U.S. policy which I maintain is leading towards a dangerous situation, one that could quite easily get out of hand. Thus, there is a need for a review by U.S. policymakers of the policy of the United States, not only towards Yemen, but for the entire Gulf.
~~~
America, Saudi Arabia, and the Strategic Importance of Yemen | Center for Strategic and International Studies
Yemen is a growing reminder of just how important the strategic U.S. partnership with Saudi Arabia really is. It is one thing to talk about the war against ISIS, and quite another to realize that U.S. strategic interests require a broad level of stability in the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula and one that is dependent on Saudi Arabia as a key strategic partner.
Saudi Arabia has already taken an important lead in Yemen that will need U.S. support. Saudi Arabia and allies are now conducting air strikes in Yemen to try to halt the advance of a Houthi militia, with strong ties to Iran, which is attempting to end President Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi's efforts to relocate Yemen’s elected government to Aden.
Saudi Arabia has formed a coalition of more than 10 countries try to protect the Hadi government. It has also taken the lead in getting the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Bahrain, Kuwait, and Qatar to sign a joint statement supporting Saudi Arabia’s announcement of military action. Moreover, Reuters reports that Egypt, Jordan, and Sudan have said they have forces involved in the operation; that Sudan has pledged ground troops and warplanes; and that Pakistan is considering a Saudi request to send ground forces. Some reports say that Morocco will send combat aircraft as well.
The United States has already said it would give logistical and intelligence support, but the situation in Yemen may well come to require more than that, and some kind of U.S. combat support as well as U.S. diplomatic pressure on Iran. Once again, the United States is finding out that calling for strategic partnership is not a way of avoiding its role as a world power. One cannot establish partnerships without being a partner.
Saudi Arabia as a Strategic Partner
To put Yemen in a broader strategic context, the crisis in Yemen is only part of the U.S.-Saudi strategic equation. U.S.- Saudi partnership and cooperation is critical in building some form of deterrence and strategic stability to contain Iran in the Gulf. Any nuclear agreement will not affect the need for close cooperation between the United States, Saudi Arabia and other key members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) in dealing with the broader and active threat Iran poses in terms of conventional forces, asymmetric warfare, missiles, and strategic influence in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and the Gaza Strip.
Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Kuwait play a key role in stabilizing Egypt and Jordan, and U.S., Saudi, and UAE cooperation in arms transfers – along with bases and the force of the other Gulf states – are creating military capabilities and interoperability that both reduce the need for future U.S. power projection and greatly enhances the capability of any forces the United States deploys.
At the same time, Yemen is of major strategic importance to the United States, as is the broader stability of Saudi Arabia all of the Arab Gulf states. For all of the talk of U.S. energy “independence,” the reality remains very different. The increase in petroleum and alternative fuels outside the Gulf has not changed its vital strategic importance to the global and U.S. economy.
It has reduced the Gulf’s share of total global petroleum output, but the Middle East still produced 32.2% of the world total in 2013, amounting to 28.358 billion barrels per day (bbl/d). The GCC members (excluding Bahrain) produced 23.9% of the world’s total oil in 2013, amounting to 21.234 billion bbl/d, while Iran’s production amounted to another 4% of the global total, or 3.558 billion bbl/d.
The Broader Strategic Importance of the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula
From a strategic viewpoint, the flow of oil and gas tanker traffic out of the Gulf and through the Strait of Hormuz remains the world’s most important energy chokepoint. The Energy Information Administration (EIA) also reported in November 2014 that an average of 167 million barrels worth of oil a day passed through the Strait of Hormuz, and that:
The Strait of Hormuz is the world's most important oil chokepoint because of its daily oil flow of 17 million barrels per day in 2013. Flows through the Strait of Hormuz in 2013 were about 30% of all seaborne-traded oil.
EIA estimates that more than 85% of the crude oil that moved through this chokepoint went to Asian markets, based on data from Lloyd's List Intelligence tanker tracking service.6 Japan, India, South Korea, and China are the largest destinations for oil moving through the Strait of Hormuz.
Qatar exported about 3.7 trillion cubic feet (Tcf) per year of liquefied natural gas (LNG) through the Strait of Hormuz in 2013, according to BP's Statistical Review of World Energy 2014.7 This volume accounts for more than 30% of global LNG trade. Kuwait imports LNG volumes that travel northward through the Strait of Hormuz.
At its narrowest point, the Strait of Hormuz is 21 miles wide, but the width of the shipping lane in either direction is only two miles wide, separated by a two-mile buffer zone. The Strait of Hormuz is deep and wide enough to handle the world's largest crude oil tankers, with about two-thirds of oil shipments carried by tankers in excess of 150,000 deadweight tons.
The Strait of Hormuz and Continued U.S. Dependence on the Stable flow of Oil Exports
There are only a limited number of functioning pipelines that provide alternative export routes. They have limited capacity and most are currently operating to their present capacity or under serious military threat. The EIA reported in November 2014 that:
Most potential options to bypass Hormuz are currently not operational. OnlySaudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) presently have pipelines able to ship crude oil outside of the Persian Gulf and have additional pipeline capacity to circumvent the Strait of Hormuz. At the end of 2013, the total available unused pipeline capacity from the two countries combined was approximately 4.3 million bbl/d (see Table 2).
Saudi Arabia has the 746-mile Petroline, also known as the East-West Pipeline, which runs across Saudi Arabia from its Abqaiq complex to the Red Sea. The Petroline system consists of two pipelines with a total nameplate (installed) capacity of about 4.8 million bbl/d. The 56-inch pipeline has a nameplate capacity of 3 million bbl/d, and its current throughput is about 2 million bbl/d. The 48-inch pipeline had been operating in recent years as a natural gas pipeline, but Saudi Arabia converted it back to an oil pipeline. The switch increased Saudi Arabia's spare oil pipeline capacity to bypass the Strait of Hormuz from 1 million bbl/d to 2.8 million bbl/d, but this is only achievable if the system operates at its full nameplate capacity.
Saudi Arabia also operates the Abqaiq-Yanbu natural gas liquids pipeline, which has a capacity of 290,000 bbl/d. However, this pipeline is currently running at capacity and cannot move any additional oil.
The UAE operates the Abu Dhabi Crude Oil Pipeline (1.5 million bbl/d) that runs from Habshan, a collection point for Abu Dhabi's onshore oil fields, to the port of Fujairah on the Gulf of Oman, allowing crude oil shipments to circumvent the Strait of Hormuz. The pipeline can transport more than half of UAE's total net oil exports. The government plans to increase this capacity in the near future to 1.8 million bbl/d.
Other pipelines are currently unavailable as bypass options. Saudi Arabia also has two additional pipelines that run parallel to the Petroline system and bypass the Strait of Hormuz, but neither of the pipelines currently has the ability to transport additional volumes of oil if the Strait of Hormuz is closed.
The 1.65 million bbl/d, 48-inch Iraqi Pipeline in Saudi Arabia (IPSA), which runs parallel to the Petroline from pump station #3 (there are 11 pumping stations along the Petroline) to the port of Mu'ajjiz, just south of Yanbu, Saudi Arabia, was built in 1989 to carry 1.65 million bbl/d of crude oil from Iraq to the Red Sea. The pipeline closed indefinitely following the August 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. In June 2001, Saudi Arabia seized ownership of IPSA and converted it to transport natural gas to power plants. Saudi Arabia has not announced plans to convert the pipeline back to transport crude oil.
Other pipelines, such as the Trans-Arabian Pipeline (TAPLINE) running from Qaisumah in Saudi Arabia to Sidon in Lebanon, or a strategic oil pipeline between Iraq and Turkey, have been out of service for years because of war damage, disuse, or political disagreements. These pipelines would require extensive renovation before they can transport oil. Relatively small quantities, several hundred thousand barrels per day at most, could also be transported by truck if the Strait of Hormuz is closed.
These petroleum exports play a critical role in providing energy to key global economies like China, India, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, as well as in limiting the global price of oil, gas, and petroleum products. They also affect the global price of oil and petroleum products in regards of where they come from, and the health of a global economy where every business and job in the United States is steadily becoming more dependent on the flow of imports and exports. Some 15.2 million barrels a day of the 17 million barrels a day of oil flowing out of the Strait of Hormuz go on through the Strait of Malacca to support the economy of key exports to the United States and the other significant amount goes to India.
The United States has sharply reduced its dependence on direct petroleum imports, but the EIA reported in early 2015 that the United States still imported 27% of its petroleum in 2014. Its Annual Energy Outlook still calculated that the United States would remain dependent on imports for some of its liquid fuels – which are critical to the transport sector – through 2040, with a rise in import dependence to 32% towards the end of the period.
These calculations are uncertain and continue to shift over time. What is far more of a constant is that reductions in direct U.S. imports do not affect the steady growth of the overall dependence of the U.S. economy on the health of the global economy and our imports and manufactured goods . Estimates of this dependence differ even within the U.S. government, but the latest CIA reporting available in March 2015 indicated that U.S. imports totaled $2.273 trillion in 2013 – the latest year for which data were available.
These imports equaled 13.6% of a total GDP of $16.72 trillion. Only 8.2% of these imports were petroleum. Some 86.9% were manufactured goods, and at least 35% were from countries like China, Japan, and Korea that are dependent on Gulf oil imports. This indirect U.S. dependence on imports had a net impact on the U.S. economy of at least $690 billion versus $186 billion for crude oil imports.
The Strategic Importance of Yemen
Yemen does not match the strategic importance of the Gulf, but it is still of great strategic importance to the stability of Saudi Arabia and the Arabian Peninsula. For all of the attention to the Houthi and Yemen’s growing civil conflict, Yemen also became the base of Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) after Saudi counterterrorism forces largely drove it out of Saudi Arabia. It remains the most powerful terrorist threat to Saudi Arabia and the other Southern Gulf states, and both the State Department and National Counter Terrorism Center report that it is the most active single extremist movement in planning terrorist attacks against the United States. Any serious rise of ISIS in Yemen can only make this worse.
As the CIA World Factbook makes clear, Yemen also poses a more direct threat to Saudi Arabia, Oman, and the other GCC states. Yemen may be a small country, but it has a population of 26.1 million, with one of the highest population growth rates in the world. Nearly 63% of its population is 24 years of age or younger. It is deeply divided between Sunnis (65%) and Shiites, like the Houthis, (35%). It is incredibly poor, running out of water, crippled by a drug oriented Qat economy, and facing a steady decline in its already limited petroleum exports.
Even before the current civil war, Yemen was a nation with a doubtful future for anyone who emigrated or had a source of income from family working outside the country. Its per capita income was only around $2,500 – ranking only 187th in the world. Its direct unemployment rate was at least 35% — giving it a global ranking of only 188th in the world — and youth direct and disguised unemployment was probably around 50%. Its agriculture sector was so unproductive that the CIA estimate it accounted for over 70% of the jobs, but less than 8% of the GDP. More than 45% of the population was calculated to live below a dismally low national poverty line, while the elite 10% accounted for over 30% of national consumption.
These steadily deteriorating economic realities have dropped to an absolute crisis level because of the current political divisions and fighting, and have created one of the world’s most fertile grounds for political extremism, terrorism, sectarian struggles between Sunni and Shi’ite and even more intense effort to leave the country and find jobs in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf. Saudi Arabia, and to a lesser extent Oman, face the fact that Saudi Arabia has a 1,458 kilometer border with Yemen and Oman has a 288 kilometer border.
Saudi Arabia has faced a major threat from Yemeni illegal immigration, smuggling, and hostile terrorist and political forces for decades. These not only include hundreds of thousands of illegal immigrants from Yemen, but other illegal immigrants and extremists from unstable countries like Somalia, who move into the other Arab Gulf states. Saudi Arabia already had to try to expel them from the Kingdom when Yemen supported Iraq in the Gulf War in 1990 and 1991, and instability in Yemen may well now pose a more immediate threat to Saudi Arabia and the other Arab Gulf petroleum exporting states than the instability in Syria and Iraq.
The Houthi, Iran, and the Bab el Mandab
At the same time, the growing ties between Yemen’s Houthi Shi’ites and Iran poses another threat to both Saudi Arabia and the United States. It potentially could allow Iran to outflank the Gulf, and deploy air and naval forces to Yemen. This threat still seems limited, but it is important to note that Yemen’s territory and islands play a critical role in the security of another global chokepoint at the southeastern end of the Red Sea called the Bab el Mandab or “gate of tears.”
It is critical to note that far more is involved than energy: the cost and security of every cargo that goes through the Suez canal, the security of U.S. and other allied combat ships moving through the canal, the economic stability of Egypt, and the security of Saudi Arabia’s key port at Jeddah and major petroleum export facility outside the Gulf. The EIA describes the energy impact of importance of this chokepoint as follows:
The Bab el-Mandeb Strait is a chokepoint between the Horn of Africa and the Middle East, and it is a strategic link between the Mediterranean Sea and the Indian Ocean. The strait is located between Yemen, Djibouti, and Eritrea, and connects the Red Sea with the Gulf of Aden and the Arabian Sea. Most exports from the Persian Gulf that transit the Suez Canal and SUMED Pipeline also pass through Bab el-Mandeb.
An estimated 3.8 million bbl/d of crude oil and refined petroleum products flowed through this waterway in 2013 toward Europe, the United States, and Asia, an increase from 2.9 million bbl/d in 2009. Oil shipped through the strait decreased by almost one-third in 2009 because of the global economic downturn and the decline in northbound oil shipments to Europe. Northbound oil shipments increased through Bab el-Mandeb Strait in 2013, and more than half of the traffic, about 2.1 million bbl/d, moved northbound to the Suez Canal and SUMED Pipeline.
The Bab el-Mandeb Strait is 18 miles wide at its narrowest point, limiting tanker traffic to two 2-mile-wide channels for inbound and outbound shipments. Closure of the Bab el-Mandeb could keep tankers from the Persian Gulf from reaching the Suez Canal or SUMED Pipeline, diverting them around the southern tip of Africa, adding to transit time and cost. In addition, European and North African southbound oil flows could no longer take the most direct route to Asian markets via the Suez Canal and Bab el-Mandeb.
Any hostile air or sea presence in Yemen could threaten the entire traffic through the Suez Canal, as well as a daily flow of oil and petroleum products that the EIA estimates increased from 2.9 mmb/d in 2009 to 3.8 mmb/d in 2013. Such a threat also can be largely covert or indirect. Libya demonstrated this under Qaddafi when he had a cargo ship drop mines in the Red Sea.
Next Steps
There is still hope for a diplomatic solution, and Saudi Arabia may not have to escalate their military action. Securing the Saudi border and putting pressure on Yemen’s factions may be enough. Americans need to be ready for the fact, however, that the United States cannot call for strategic partners unless it is prepared to be one. They need to understand just how important a threat Yemen can be, just how deep the underlying forces that divide its current factions really are, that terrorism and extremism remains a far greater problem than ISIS, and that Iran’s ambitions to steadily broaden its strategic role throughout the region pose as much of a threat as its nuclear ambitions.
As Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria all demonstrate, it is easier to declare deadlines and withdrawals. Yemen is one more demonstration that strategy is based on reality and not doctrine.
Anthony H. Cordesman holds the Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C.
Commentary is produced by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a private, tax-exempt institution focusing on international public policy issues. Its research is nonpartisan and nonproprietary. CSIS does not take specific policy positions. Accordingly, all views, positions, and conclusions expressed in this publication should be understood to be solely those of the author(s).
~~~
5 facts you need to know about Yemen and its conflicts — RT News
Published time: 27 Mar, 2015 04:46
Edited time: 27 Mar, 2015 16:43
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Followers of the Houthi movement demonstrate to show support to the movement in Yemen's northwestern city of Saada March 26, 2015. (Reuters/Naiyf Rahma)
Followers of the Houthi movement demonstrate to show support to the movement in Yemen's northwestern city of Saada March 26, 2015. (Reuters/Naiyf Rahma) / Reuters
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One of the poorest and most violent countries in the Middle East, Yemen is also an area of strategic importance for regional players – and some of the world’s most dangerous terror groups. RT explains the underlying reasons behind the nation's conflicts.
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Oil, Military, Religion, Politics, Terrorism, Iran, Iraq, USA, Gas, War, Security, Saudi Arabia, Drones, Yemen
LIVE UPDATES: Gulf coalition launches airstrikes against Houthi rebels in Yemen
Strategic location
The territory that lies within Yemen’s borders is one of the most ancient cradles of civilization in the Middle East, once known as ‘Arabia Felix’ – Latin for “happy” or “fortunate” – in ancient times. The lands of Yemen were more fertile than most on the Arabian Peninsula, as they received more rain due to high mountains. But because of declining natural resources, including oil, Yemen and its population of about 26 million are now very poor.
Still, the country boasts a strategic location on the southwestern tip of Arabia. It is located along the major sea route from Europe to Asia, near some of the busiest Red Sea shipping and trading lanes. Millions of barrels of oil pass through these waters daily in both directions, to the Mediterranean through the Suez Canal and from the oil refineries in Saudi Arabia to the energy-hungry Asian markets. The Yemeni transport hub of Aden was one of the world's busiest ports in the 20th century.
North & South Yemen, plus the tribes
Although the history of the lands of Yemen date back thousands of years, modern Yemen itself is a young nation, with its current borders having taken shape in 1990, after North and South Yemen united. Before that, both parts were involved in conflicts of their own.
READ MORE: Saudi Arabia bombs Yemen, launches coalition op against Houthi rebels
Northern Yemen was established as a republic in 1970, after years of civil war between royalists and republicans, with the first supported by Saudi Arabia and the latter by Egypt. Yemen’s former president, Ali Abdullah Saleh, rose to power through the military and held power for decades. Although Southern Yemen agreed to merge with Saleh’s northern republic in 1990, they soon became unhappy about the move. The north and south became embroiled in a new civil war, resulting in thousands of casualties, while Saleh’s power prevailed.
Outside big Yemeni cities, there are a number of tribal areas that are effectively self-governing. With a large number of civilians being in possession of arms – it is believed there are more guns in the country than citizens – local tribal militias often repress the national army and apply their own laws, based on traditions rather than the state’s constitution. Houthis have risen to be one of the most powerful militias in Yemen.
Sunni-Shia rift
The majority of Yemen’s population is Muslim, but it is split between various branches of Islam – mainly Sunni or Zaidi Shia. The divisions between the Sunnis and the Shia are based on a long-running religious conflict that started as a dispute about the Prophet Mohammed’s successor. While Shia Muslims believe the prophet’s cousin should have filled the role, Sunnis support the picking of Muhammad’s close friend and advisor, Abu Bakr, as the first caliph of the Islamic nation.
That said, Zaidi Shias – making up about 40 percent of Yemen’s population – are the only Shia Muslim sect that do not share the belief in the infallibility and divine choice of imams, strongly revered as spiritual leaders among Shias. This causes them to align closer to Sunni practices.
At the same time, over the past decades, strict and puritanical Salafi and Wahhabi ideas of Sunni Islam – coming from neighboring Saudi Arabia – have become increasingly influential in Yemen.
Houthis
Houthis represent the Zaidi branch of Shiite Islam from the far north of Yemen, adjacent to the Saudi border. The name of the group comes from a leading family of the tribe. Its member – a Zaidi religious leader and former member of the Yemeni parliament, Hussein Badreddin al-Houthi – was accused by the government of masterminding a Houthi rebellion, including violent anti-Israeli and anti-American demonstrations, in 2004. The Yemeni regime ordered a manhunt for al-Houthi, which ended with hundreds of arrests and the death of the Zaidi leader, with dozens of his supporters also killed.
READ MORE: Yemen rebels gained access to secret US files – report
Since then, the Houthis have been actively fighting with the central power, demanding greater political influence and accusing the government of allying with mainly Wahhabi Saudi Arabia while neglecting national development and the needs of the traditional Zaidi tribes.
While Yemen’s now embattled President Abed Rabbo Mansour Hadi has claimed that Houthis are supported by Hezbollah – the Lebanese Shia militia – some Western officials have alleged that Iran, one of the few Muslim nations of the Shia branch, financially supports Houthis in an effort to control Yemen’s Red Sea coast. This allegation is denied by the Houthis themselves.
Al-Qaeda & ISIS
Since 2009, Yemen has been an operational base of Al-Qaeda militants. After the Yemeni and Saudi branches of Al-Qaeda merged to form Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), the group became one of the world’s biggest exporters of terrorism, with the US considering it the most dangerous branch of Al-Qaeda. Osama bin Laden’s family lived in southern Yemen before emigrating to Saudi Arabia.
READ MORE: Yemeni Al-Qaeda says France replaced US as ‘main enemy of Islam’
Yemen’s fight against AQAP has been largely supported by the United States. Since 2007, the US has supplied more than $500 million in military aid to Yemen through programs managed by the Defense Department and State Department, and conducted controversial drone strikes targeting terrorists in the country.
READ MORE: ‘Compromised & gone’: Pentagon lost $500mn of weapons, equipment in Yemen
Al-Qaeda’s ideology is based on radical Sunni Islam and thus is hostile to Houthis, who have also been at war with AQAP militants.
With several forces fighting in the country – including the official government, Houthis, and AQAP – the Yemeni chaos provided a fertile ground for extremism. Extremist groups affiliated with the Islamic State (IS, formerly ISIS/ISIL) now operate in Yemen, conducting terror acts against both the military and civilians. In the latest March 20 attack, over 100 people were killed and some 250 injured in suicide bomb attacks on mosques in the Yemeni capital Sanaa, with ISIS militants claiming responsibility for the assault.
READ MORE: ‘Yemen crisis: clearly a failure of US foreign policy’
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CNN || US in Yemen: If you threaten us, we'll respond
By Nicole Gaouette
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UPDATED: 03:18 AM EDT 10.14.16
Hours after the US struck three radar installations in Yemen in response to attempted attacks on a US Navy destroyer, Pentagon officials made clear they'll hit back again if needed and Iran moved its own warships into nearby waters.
"We want to make crystal clear if you threaten our forces, if you threaten our ships, we'll respond," Pentagon spokesman Peter Cook said Thursday. He described the missile launches against the USS Mason as "a response to direct threats to our people, to our ships and we responded to that threat and we'll respond again."
Also Thursday, the Iranian navy deployed two warships into the Gulf of Aden in order to protect commercial vessels against pirates, according to the Tasnim News Agency, an Iranian news service with close ties to Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps.
"With regard to the Iranian navy activities, I'll leave it to the Iranians to describe the disposition of those ships," Cook said. "We operate in those waters all the time."
The destroyer USS Nitze blasted radar sites along the Red Sea coast with Tomahawk cruise missiles after attempted attacks on the Mason attributed to Iran-backed Houthi rebels engaged in Yemen's civil war.
Pentagon officials said initial assessments indicated the Tomahawk strikes destroyed all three targets, but the exchange of fire underscored the risks of US support for Saudi Arabia's war in Yemen, which the White House is now reviewing.
In the meantime, the war is fueling anti-American sentiment in the region, deepening considerable strains in the US-Saudi relationship and raising the risk of unintended flare-ups with Tehran.
"The war in Yemen is escalating and becoming more dangerous," said Bruce Riedel, director of the Intelligence Project at the Brookings Institution.
With its strategic location at the entrance to the Red Sea, extensive border with Saudi Arabia and desperately poor population, Yemen is "a military and civil strategic nightmare," according to Anthony Cordesman, a former state and defense department official at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.
A deadly mix of forces are competing within its borders, including small cells of ISIS fighters, separatist groups, tribal factions, al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, Houthi rebels backed by Iran, forces linked to the former government and groups allied with Yemen's internationally recognized and Saudi-backed exiled leader.
The danger in Yemen is growing at a time when Congress has reduced US leverage with Saudi Arabia by passing legislation allowing US citizens to sue the kingdom for damages related to the attacks of September 11, 2001. Congress is also increasingly resistant to arms sales to Gulf nations, Riedel notes.
Referring to the Democratic and Republican candidates for president, Riedel added that "whether Clinton or Trump wins in November, they will inherit a damaged relationship in January."
Cook noted that two attempted missile strikes over four days against the USS Mason had posed a threat to that vessel and its crew. Those missiles had "originated from Houthi-controlled territory," Cook said, but he added that the Pentagon doesn't know who, exactly, "was pulling the trigger."
The attempted missile attacks on the USS Mason are believed to be Houthi payback for a Saudi-led coalition bombing of a funeral in Yemen's largest city on Saturday that killed 140 people.
The alliance of Houthi rebels and followers of the former president, Ali Abdullah Saleh, have been fighting for control of the country since 2014.
The war accelerated in March 2015 when Saudi Arabia, fearing the influence of its arch-rival Iran, led a coalition air campaign to support Yemen's exiled leader Abed Rabbo Mansour. The war has since killed almost 10,000 people according to the United Nations, which says that as many as 4,000 of those casualties were civilians.
The high level of civilian casualties at the hands of the Saudi-led coalition causes deep discomfort in Washington, administration officials say.
Vice President Joe Biden, speaking after a campaign event for Clinton, said the administration has "been pushing the Saudis as hard as we cannot, not to go in to Yemen and bomb in Yemen. But the Houthis are equally as bad. They're just firing on American ships as well. That's why we're working so hard to get a ceasefire and get a negotiated settlement."
The funeral strike prompted the non-profit group Human Rights Watch to call on the US to suspend arms sales to Saudi Arabia and for the international community to launch an investigation into possible war crimes there.
The US has sold Saudi Arabia over $111 billion in defense equipment and weaponry under President Barack Obama, and US and UK support have been crucial to the Saudi war in Yemen. "That makes them culpable in war crimes," Riedel said. He added that there's also a cost to the US image in the Middle East.
"The poorest Arabs are being blockaded by air and sea by the richest -- with our help," Riedel said.
The funeral attack prompted the White House to announce that it would review its backing for Saudi Arabia's operations in Yemen. Right now that support includes refueling, "advice and counsel on the conflict" and on how the Saudis conduct air strikes, Cook said, as well as intelligence sharing that Cook said has been reduced in recent weeks.
The White House review will examine "the degree to which the aid and assistance actually helps try to minimize collateral damage and civilian casualties," State Department spokesman John Kirby said Wednesday.
Deputy Press Secretary Eric Schultz said Thursday that the US calls on all parties in Yemen to deescalate violence. He stressed that the Tomahawk strikes were conducted in self defense, were limited in nature and were approved by Obama after a recommendation from Secretary of Defense Ash Carter.
The intent of the strikes was to deter further aggression against US assets in the region, Schultz said. It does not signal a greater US role in Yemen's civil war, nor will it distract from the mission against ISIS, he said.
Pentagon officials said that they have put more assets into the area for protection. "We have sufficient force to protect ourselves at all times," one defense officials said. The official wouldn't provide details.
He said that planning for the strike mission began right after the first attempt on the USS Mason, but it took a few days to verify the targets and move the USS Nitze and its Tomahawk missiles into place.
"We don't take it lightly," Cook said of the US decision to strike. "We don't seek a wider role in the conflict," Cook said. "This is about protecting our troops."
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